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ABSTRACT 
EXPERIENCING IN JAPANESE: 
THE EXPERIENCER RESTRICTION ACROSS CLAUSAL TYPES 
MAY 2015 
MASASHI HASHIMOTO 
B.S., UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO 
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Seth Cable 
 
 Adjectives of sensation and emotion (Experiencer adjectives) in Japanese can take only 
the speaker as their experiencer subject in declarative root sentences and the addressee in 
interrogative root sentences in conversation. This constraint, which I call the Experiencer 
restriction, is lifted in other various clauses, however. This dissertation examines the Experiencer 
restriction across clausal types under scrutiny, and presents two analyses of the phenomenon, 
following the claim by Krifka (2001, 2004), Speas and Tenny (2003) and others that speech acts 
are syntactically realized. 
 First, I introduce the phenomenon and give a brief review of its analyses which were 
made before the proposal of the speech act projection (Chapter 1). Then I explain the Japanese 
complementizer system and provide basic data on the Experiencer restriction across clausal types 
(Chapter 2). A conceptual-structural analysis of Experiencers by Jackendoff (1990) and syntactic 
analyses of Experiencers by Landau (2010) and others suggest that Experiencers are mental 
locations. Based on that, I propose a situation semantic analysis of Experiencers as mental 
vii 
locations in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I apply the situation-based analysis to the Experiencer 
restriction in non-restrictive relative clauses after arguing that Schlenker’s (2010, 2013a,b) uni-
dimensional analysis explains properties of Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses. In Chapter 5, 
I turn to another possible analysis, according to which Experiencer NPs agree with an epistemic 
modal head via a sentient feature [sen] and an index feature [n]. It can be seen as a revision of 
Tenny’s (2006) feature checking analysis, which claims that a [+sentient] feature and a 
[+discourse participant] feature are checked. I argue that the principle of parsimony favors the 
situation-based analysis over the feature-checking one. In Chapter 6, I compare recent formal 
analyses of the Experiencer restriction with my analyses. 
 This dissertation improves our understanding of situation semantics in connection to 
mind-body dualism. Also, it shows that study of Experiencers in Japanese gives us an insight into 
the syntax/semantics/pragmatics interface. It tells us not only properties of Experiencers but also 
properties of speech acts and the speech act projection. 
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 CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Experiencer restriction  
 In Japanese, attribution of a property represented by adjectives of general attribute 
description
1
 such as omo- ‘heavy’ and ao- ‘blue’ is usually expressed in form (1), as in (2).2,3 
 
(1) a. NP-{wa/ga}       Adj-i.  
  NP-{Top/Nom} Adj-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘NP is Adj’ 
 b. NP-{wa/ga}       Adj-k-at-ta. 
  NP-{Top/Nom} Adj-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘NP was Adj’ 
 
(2) a. sono taburetto-wa omo-i. 
  that   tablet-Top     heavy-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘The tablet is heavy.’ 
 b. tikyuu-wa  ao-k-at-ta. 
  earth-Top  blue-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘The earth was blue.’ 
                                                          
1
 This term is due to Sode’s (2002) classification of Japanese adjectives, according to which adjectives in 
Japanese are divided into adjectives of general attribute description and adjectives of feeling. I call the 
latter Experiencer adjectives in this dissertation. 
2
 I use Kunrei romanization as the system of romanization for Japanese in this dissertation, except in 
examples quoted from the previous literature. 
3
 In this dissertation, I follow Nishiyama’s (1999) analysis of the syntactic structure of Japanese adjectives, 
which adopts Bowers’ (1993) proposal of the Predication projection. 
2 
 
With almost all adjectives which represent emotions and sensations (which I call Experiencer 
adjectives), like uresi- ‘glad’ and samu- ‘cold’, however, form (1) can be used only if a property 
is attributed to the speaker.
4
 
 
(3) a. watasi-wa uresi-i. 
  I-Top        glad-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘I am happy.’ 
   b. *kare-wa  uresi-i.
5
 
    he-Top   glad-Pred.be.Pres 
   (Intended:) ‘He is happy.’ 
                           (from Kunihiro 1965: 82
6
) 
 
Let us call this restriction the Experiencer restriction.
7
 Many researchers have mentioned the 
restriction, and some (Kunihiro 1965, Teramura 1971, Kamio 1995, Azuma 1997b, Tenny 2006, 
                                                          
4
 There are two exceptions (Nishio 1972:30, 199ff): suki- (‘likeAdj’) and kirai- (‘dislikeAdj’) can take a third-
person subject, as in (i). In the following, these two adjectives are not considered. 
   (i)  kare-wa sore-ga {suki/kirai}-da. 
 he-Top  it-Nom {like/dislike}-be.Pres 
 ‘He {likes/dislikes} it.’ 
5
 This judgment is correct in most situations. However, as Kuroda (1965) and others note, the sentence 
becomes acceptable in some special cases. This point will be discussed in detail below. 
6
 The original is in Japanese. I added English glosses. 
7
 In this dissertation, I consider the restriction of the Experiencer argument of adjectives only. It should be 
noted that the restriction of the Experiencer argument is usually observed with other predicates also, as 
Teramura (1971:281) suggests. (i) is an example of a verb omo- ‘think’ (Nakau 1979 seems to be the first 
that analyzed the restriction in this case), and (ii.a,b) are examples of idiomatic phrases. 
    (i)   {watasi/*kare}-wa  [sono riron-ga         tadasi-i-to]                     omo-u. 
 {I/*he}-Top             [that  theory-Nom  correct-Pred.be.Pres-C] think-Pres 
 ‘{I think/*He thinks} that the theory is correct.’ 
    (ii) a.  {watasi/*kare}-wa hara-ga              tat-ta            yo. 
  {I/*he}-Top            stomach-Nom  put.up-Past  SFP 
 ‘{I/*He} got angry.’ 
          b. {watasi/*kare}-wa  ki-ga               meit-ta    yo. 
 {I/*he}-Top            energy-Nom  lose-Past  SFP ‘{I/*He} felt depressed.’ 
 
3 
Fujii 2006, 2007 and others) have analyzed it. In this dissertation, I analyze this phenomenon in 
more detail. Importantly, as discussed below, the restriction does not always hold, so a good 
analysis should account for appearance and disappearance of the restriction in various 
environments. Two guiding elements of my analysis are compositional possible-worlds semantics 
and recent researches on the fine-structure of the left periphery which are pursued by Rizzi (1997), 
Speas and Tenny (2003) and others and extended to Japanese by Tenny (2006) and Saito and 
Haraguchi (2012) among others. 
 In the following, I give a brief review of previous research to give the reader the feeling 
of the problem (section 1.2), and then explain the outline of this dissertation (section 1.3). 
 
1.2 Previous research on the Experiencer restriction 
 To grasp the problem a bit better, let us look at analyses which were made before the rise 
of the research of the fine-structure of the left (right) periphery of Japanese. (I discuss more 
recent analyses by Tenny 2006 and Fujii 2006, 2007 and a formal analysis by Kamio (1995, 
1997a,b) in Chapter 6.) 
 The Experiencer restriction was first noted by Kunihiro (1965) and Kuroda (1965) 
independently, and then discussed by Koyama (1966), Minami (1967), Teramura (1971, 1973), 
Nishio (1972), Kuroda (1973), Kuno (1973), Akatsuka McCawley (1978), Akmajian and 
Kitagawa (1981), Aoki (1986), Martin (1988), Kamio (1995, 1997, 2002), Nitta (1991), Azuma 
(1993, 1997a,b), Masuoka (1997), Tenny (2006), Fujii (2006, 2007) and others. Here, I take up 
Kunihiro (1965), Teramura (1971, 1973), Nitta (1991), and Azuma (1997b) because they discuss 
the Experiencer restriction in more detail than others (except those whose analyses are treated in 
Chapter 6). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
However, there seems to be more complexities with non-adjectives. Different from adjectives, non-
adjectives do not show the Experiencer restriction uniformly (for a relevant data, see Kinsui 1989). 
4 
 
1.2.1 A sememic feature compensation analysis by Kunihiro (1965) 
 The first analysis of the Experiencer restriction is due to Kunihiro (1965). He claims that 
Japanese Experiencer adjectives have a sememic feature of [first-person state], which makes a 
non-first-person Experiencer argument unacceptable unless there is another expression which 
compensates meaning mismatch of the sememic feature [first-person state] of an Experiencer 
adjective and a non-first-person Experiencer argument. 
 For example, an Experiencer adjective, uresi- ‘glad’, allows a first-person Experiencer 
but not a third-person Experiencer, as shown in (3). According to Kunihiro, uresi-’s sememic 
feature [first-person state] requires the Experiencer be a first-person, so (3b) is unacceptable. 
However, if an expression no-da (“it is that”) is added to such a sentence, a non-first-person 
Experiencer become acceptable, as in (4). 
 
(4) a. *kare-wa sabisi-i. 
    he-Top   lonely-is 
  (Intended:) ‘He is lonely.’ 
 b. kare-wa sabisi-i  no-da.     (Kunihiro 1965: 84 n.16
8
) 
  he-Top   loely-is it.is.that 
  ‘It is that he is lonely.’ 
 
In the case of (4), no-da, which represents “affirmation by the first-person”, compensates the 
violation of the first-person requirement. Definitely it is important to clarify which elements 
compensate the violation and which not, but Kunihiro does not say anything specific. 
                                                          
8
 I added English glosses. 
5 
 What is problematic about this analysis is that there are cases where the Experiencer 
restriction is lifted without an element which seems to compensate violation of the first-person 
requirement. One example is relative clauses. As discussed in detail later, the Experiencer 
restriction is active in non-restrictive restrictive relative clauses (Masuoka 1997), while it is lifted 
in restrictive relative clauses (Koyama 1966). 
 
(5) a. Restrictive relative clause (RRC) 
  [RRC atu-k-at-ta           ] hito-wa       umi-ni hait-ta       yo. 
  [RRC hot-Pred-be-Past ] people-Top sea-to  enter-Past SFP 
  ‘People who were hot entered the sea.’ 
 b. Non-restrictive relative clause (NRRC) 
  [NRRC atu-k-at-ta           ] {boku/Tarô}-wa umi-ni hait-ta       yo. 
  [NRRC hot-Pred-be-Past ] {I/Taro}-Top      sea-to  enter-Past SFP 
  ‘{I/*Taro}, who was hot, entered the sea.’ 
 
On the one hand, if the Experiencer is an argument of an Experiencer adjective in a restrictive 
relative clause, it can be third-person, as in (5a). On the other hand, if the Experiencer is an 
argument of an Experiencer adjective in a non-restrictive relative clause, then it cannot be third-
person, as in (5b). This fact is not accounted for by Kunihiro’s analysis. First, there is no ground 
to claim that relativization involves a sememic feature related to first-person, so it is not clear 
how compensation of the violation of first-person requirement is achieved with a restrictive 
relative clause. Second, if restrictive relative clauses can compensate the violation of first-person 
requirement, it is not clear why non-restrictive relative clauses cannot. 
 
6 
1.2.2 A performative analysis by Teramura (1971, 1973) 
 Teramura (1971, 1973) analyzes the Experiencer restriction, employing Austin’s (1962) 
speech act theory and Ross’s (1970) performative analysis. In his analysis, Teramura supposes 
that simple clauses such as (3), reproduced below, are under an unpronounced higher structure for 
the mood of expression of feeling, and claims that the mood of expression of feeling restricts the 
Experiencer to the speaker. 
 
 (3) a. watasi-wa uresi-i. 
I-Top        glad-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘I am happy.’ 
   b. *kare-wa  uresi-i. 
  he-Top   glad-Pred.be.Pres 
 (Intended:) ‘He is happy.’ 
 
Furthermore, he notes that sentences like (6) are good and claims that it is so because this type of 
sentence is in the past tense and not in the mood of expression of feeling.
9
 Specifically, he claims 
that when a sentence is in the past tense, it cannot be in the mood of expression of feeling, and 
proposes that such a sentence is in the mood of assertion and the mood of assertion does not 
restrict the Experiencer. 
 
                                                          
9
 As explained in detail later in Chapter 2, Teramura’s claim is not exactly correct. The acceptability of 
sentences with a non-first-person Experiencer is dependent on the situation where the sentence is presented. 
For example, if (6) is in third-person narrative, it is acceptable as Teramura notes. However, if it is in 
conversation, it is not acceptable. The reason of why the past tense is apparently relevant to the 
acceptability is that third-person narrative usually uses the past tense. The relevance of the distinction 
between conversation and third-person narrative to the Experiencer restriction was first noted in Kuroda 
(1965). 
7 
(6)  kare-wa uresi-k-at-ta. 
he-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past 
‘He was glad.’ 
 
 A big problem of this analysis is that there is no reason to expect that sentences like (3b) 
are always under the mood of expression of feeling. It would be more natural to suppose that 
when one tells another person’s feeling, one’s saying is accompanied with the mood of assertion. 
In other words, it is not clear why only the past tense is related to the mood of assertion.
10
 (See 
Azuma (1997b) for other problems of Teramura’s analysis.) 
 
1.2.3 An epistemological analysis (Kuno 1973, Nitta 1991) 
 Nitta’s (1991) account of the Experiencer restriction consists of the following two 
statements. A similar account is given by Kuno (1973) also. 
 
(7) (i) Experiencer adjectives are “predicates which directly express internal states” (Nitta 
1991:86
11
). 
 (ii) “Since it is only the speaker that can directly know [his own] internal states, it is only 
the speaker that can report them.” (Nitta 1991:86) 
 
A problem of this analysis is about statement (ii). (ii) presupposes that, at least in Japanese, one 
cannot report information which is not directly known to him. But it is incorrect: One can report 
                                                          
10
 Contrastively to Teramura, Kuroda (1973) and Tenny (2006) analyze sentences like (6), which do not 
impose the Experiencer restriction, as sentences without an assertive speech act. This point is treated in the 
following chapters. 
11
 Quotations from Nitta (1991) are translations from Japanese by myself. 
8 
(without help of evidential markers) information which he knows indirectly even in Japanese (this 
point is highlighted especially in Kamio’s (1990, 2002) work). Example (233) illustrates it. 
 
(8)  (Scenario: The speaker saw that there were puddles here and there in the ground.)  
  ame-ga      hut-ta     yo. 
rain-Nom  fall-Past SFP 
  ‘It rained.’ 
 
Therefore, this type of epistemological analysis does not work. 
 
1.2.4 A ‘loose Spec-head agreement’ analysis by Azuma (1997b) 
 To account for the observation that the Experiencer restriction is inactive or weak in 
some cases, Azuma (1997b) proposes that assertive sentences
12
 show the Experiencer restriction 
as a result of ‘loose Spec-head agreement’ at a projection called MP, which is a projection headed 
by modal elements like darô (‘probably, seem’).13,14 According Azuma (1997b:45), the Spec-head 
agreement is of a different type from the strict one for gender, number, and person agreement in 
French and other languages, in that requirement of agreement is loose. She suggests that it is easy 
                                                          
12
 Here, the phrase ‘assertive sentences’ is my translation of the Japanese term, nobetate bun (bun means 
sentence(s)), used in Azuma’s study (the term is used also in Nitta 1991). The notion of nobetate seems to 
overlap the notion of assertion in the speech act theory largely, as suggested by Azuma’s statements such 
that the nobetate bun describes states [eventualities] (Azuma 1997: 21) and that the nobetate bun transfers 
information from the speaker to the hearer (Azuma 1997: 23). It should be noted, however, that she also 
claims that sentences in third-person narrative is in the mood of nobetate (Azuma 1997: 97). It is in is in 
line with Teramura’s (1971, 1973) proposal, but it is in contrast to Kuroda’s (1973) and Tenny’s (2006) 
proposal that sentences in the nonreportive style are not accompanied with speech acts (this point is treated 
in detail in the following chapters). 
13
 The projection for darô is called ModP in my analysis in the following chapters, following Koizumi 
(1993) and others. 
14
 Azuma proposes that not assertive sentences but sentences with the mood of expression of feelings 
follow an ordinary strict Spec-head agreement. 
9 
for first-person topics to agree with the MP head for assertion of feeling, while it is difficult for 
third-person topics to agree with the same MP head (Azuma 1997b:45). 
 A big problem of this analysis is its lack of a detailed, formal explanation of the proposed 
agreement mechanism. Because of the lack, we cannot check its validity in detail. However, even 
without going into the details, it seems that the analysis is problematic: If the agreement which 
causes the Experiencer restriction is loose in the sense that the requirement of agreement is loose 
as Azuma states, then it cannot account for the basic fact that in some cases the Experiencer 
restriction is obligatory, as in the following example which contains a sentence-final particle yo.
15
 
 
(9)  {watasi/*kanozyo}-wa uresi-k-at-ta           yo. 
  {I         /*she}-Top        glad-Pred-be-Past SFP 
  ‘{I/*She} was very glad.’ 
 
1.3 Organization of this dissertation 
 This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I first explain background 
assumptions on the fine-structure of Japanese right periphery, and then present basic data on the 
Experiencer restriction in various environments. In Chapter 3, I give an analysis of the 
Experiencer restriction based on possibilistic situation semantics. Using the analysis, I account for 
                                                          
15
 My judgment is sometimes ‘stricter’ than Azuma’s: some sentences which Azuma judges as ‘??’ are 
unacceptable for me. The difference in judgment, however, does not affect the core of the argument given 
above. It is that there are unacceptable sentences even for speakers like Azuma, as shown in the following 
judgment by her (she uses # instead of * to indicate that they are pragmatically unnatural (Azuma 
1997b:50n.18). I added English glosses).  
(i) {watasi/#anata}-ga haha-ga           koisi-i.    (Azuma 1997b: 44(60b)) 
 {I/#you}-Nom         mother-Nom  missAdj-Pred.be.Pres 
 ‘I miss (my) mother/#You miss (your) mother.’ 
(ii) {boku/#kimi/#Ken}-{ga/wa} te-ga           ita-i.   (Azuma 1997b: 45(65)) 
 {I/#you/#Ken}-{Nom/Top}   hand-Nom  hurtAdj-Pred.be.Pres 
 ‘{My/#Your/#Ken’s} hand hurts.’ 
The point is that it is not clear how the loose Spec-head agreement leads to the strict unacceptability in 
these examples. 
10 
appearance and disappearance of the Experiencer restriction in non-restrictive relative clauses in 
Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I give another analysis of the Experiencer restriction, which employs the 
feature-checking mechanism. Then, in Chapter 6, I consider recent formal analyses of the 
Experiencer restriction by Kamio (1995, 1997a,b), Tenny (2006), and Fujii (2006, 2007). Chapter 
7 concludes this dissertation. 
11 
 CHAPTER 2
EXPERIENCER RESTRICTION: BASICS 
 
 In this chapter, I present some basic facts on the Experiencer restrictions in Japanese after 
presenting background information which is necessary to describe them. First, because the 
Experiencer restriction in embedded clauses is sensitive to the choice of complementizers, I give 
an overview of the Japanese complementizer system in the framework of the cartographic 
approach to the left (right)-periphery (Rizzi 1997, 1999 and others). Next, because the 
Experiencer restriction in non-embedded clauses is sensitive to the choice of narrative styles 
(Kuroda 1973), I give an overview of the so-called reportive and nonreportive narrative styles. 
Based on these backgrounds, I present some basic observations on the Experiencer restrictions in 
Japanese. 
 
2.1 Complementizers in Japanese 
 Japanese has three complementizers, to, no, and koto. To is sometimes called a 
quotative
16
  and no and koto are often called nominalizers. No and koto have rather similar 
properties (see Suzuki 2005 and Hiraiwa 2010 for example), and the syntactic status of no is 
clearer than that of koto
17
, so I mainly consider to and no here. 
                                                          
16
 I use the term quotative in a broad sense, to mean an element which introduces a direct discourse or an 
indirect discourse. 
17
 Inoue (1976), Uchibori (1996, 2000), Watanabe (1996) and others suppose that koto is a complementizer. 
Syntactically, koto (≈ ‘fact’, ‘thing’) is a formal noun which lacks a substantial meaning (Kuno 1973), and 
koto-clauses overtly have the form of complex NPs. For a semantic analysis of koto, see Hara, Kim, Sakai 
and Tamura (2013). 
12 
2.1.1 Quotative to 
 Quotative to originated from a demonstrative for ‘that’ (Yamanaka 1976, Nihon Daijiten 
Kankōkai 1976), as the English complementizer that did. Different from its English counterpart, 
however, quotative to can introduce direct discourse as well as indirect discourse. As shown in 
(10), to-clauses embedded under verbs of saying are ambiguous: in (10a) boku-no uti “my home” 
refers to the home of Taro, the local speaker, while in (10b) the same expression refers to the 
home of the speaker of the whole sentence. 
 
(10) a. Tarô-ga      “Hanako-wa  boku-no uti-ni       i-ru”-to        it-ta. 
  Taro-Nom   Hanako-Top I-Gen     home-at  be-Pres-TO  say-Past 
  ‘Taro said, “Hanako was in my home.”’   
 b. Tarô-ga       [Hanako-wa  boku-no uti-ni       i-ru-to]        it-ta. 
  Taro-Nom   Hanako-Top I-Gen     home-at  be-Pres-TO  say-Past 
  ‘Taro said that Hanako was in my home.’   
           (Based on Saito 2010:85(1a,b)) 
 
Also, it is notable that to can introduce interjections and sentence fragments (Oshima 2006):
18,19
 
 
(11)  Tarô-wa   “tye”-to  it-ta. 
Taro-Top  tut-TO   say-Past 
  ‘Taro said, “tut.”’ 
                                                          
18
 This is not special to Japanese to. As Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.) pointed out to me, Malayalam quotative 
complementizer ennǝ combines with interjections and with indirect discourse (Jayaseelan 2008, 2014).   
19
 Oshima states that sentence fragments are hallmarks of direct discourse as well as interjections, and use 
them to support the claim that to can introduce direct discourse. However, sentence fragments do not 
always indicate presence of direct discourse, as exemplified in the following example (Seth Cable, p.c.): 
      (i) We asked Dave who he loves, and he said his mother. 
13 
 
Because interjections are hallmarks of direct discourse, the grammaticality of (11) indicates that 
to can be a quoter of direct discourse. 
 In line with Saito and Haraguchi (2012), I assume that the ambiguity is due to the 
ambiguity of to. There are two to’s: one introduces direct discourse (toDD) and the other indirect 
discourse (toID).
20,21
 When we consider the Experiencer restrictions in embedded clauses, toDD is 
irrelevant, so it is important to use examples in which it is clear that toDD is not used. One device 
which distinguishes toID and toDD is (interpretations of) pronominal elements, as exemplified in 
(10). Another device is long-distance phenomena across the clausal boundary of to-clauses. For 
example, wh-expressions are often used for this purpose (e.g., Kuno 1988). The Japanese wh-
expressions (indeterminates) like dare ‘who’ need to be bound by an operator like the 
interrogative marker ka, as shown in (12). If such a wh-expression and ka are separated by the 
clausal boundary of a to-clause as in (13), the to must be toID. 
 
(12) a. Hanako-wa    [dare-ga      ki-ta-ka-to]             it-ta. 
  Hanako-Top  [who-Nom  come-Past-Q-TO]  say-Past 
  ‘Hanako said who came.’ 
  ‘Hanako said, “Who came?”’ 
 b. *Hanako-wa    [dare-ga      ki-ta-to]            it-ta.  (with lowering intonation
22
) 
    Hanako-Top  [who-Nom come-Past-TO] say-Past 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanako said who came.’ 
 
                                                          
20
 For different views, see Maier (2009) and Sudo (2012). 
21
 Saito and Haraguchi do not use the subscripts ‘DD’ and ‘ID’. In the most part of this dissertation, I drop 
the subscript because it is clear from the context. 
22
 With raising intonation, a null interrogative marker is available in the matrix clause and so the sentence 
becomes grammatical with the interpretation, ‘Who did Hanako say came?’ 
14 
(13)  Hanako wa [dare  ga  kita]  to     itta  ka.   (Kuno 1988:76(1.5c)) 
              who        came that said Q 
  ‘Who did Hanako say came?’ 
 
2.1.1.1 The syntactic category of to which introduces indirect discourse 
 In this dissertation, I adopt the cartographic approach proposed by Rizzi (1997, 1999), 
Cinque (1999) and others.
23
 In the cartographic approach, the CP-layer is split into several 
projections to account for the distribution of complementizers, topic, and focus elements. In Rizzi 
(1997), the following structure of the CP-layer is proposed. 
 
(14)  Rizzi (1997) 
  [ Force  [  (Top(ic)*) [  Foc(us)  [  (Top(ic)*)  [ Fin(ite) [ IP ] ]]]]] 
 
Here, Force specifies the clausal types such as “a question, a declarative, an exclamative, a 
relative, a comparative, an adverbial of a certain kind, etc.” (Rizzi 1997:283), and Fin(ite) 
specifies (at least) finite and non-finite clauses. Rizzi (1999) considers the positions of the Italian 
                                                          
23
 There are different analyses of to from the cartographic approach, though a detailed comparison between 
the cartographic approach and those different analyses is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For 
example, Fukui (1995) proposes that to is not a C but a postposition. One of his motivations for this claim 
is that to can co-occur with an interrogative marker, ka, as exemplified in (16). He argues that it means that 
to cannot be C, since ka occupies C and two elements cannot be in the same syntactic position. In the 
cartographic approach, CP is split into several projections, so Fukui’s reasoning loses its power.  
 Motomura (2003) proposes that to is not a C but an inherent Case marker which is accompanied 
with a Content role. Content role is a thematic role assigned to an expression which represents the thing 
said (Pietroski 2000). She gives the same argument as Fukui (1995) to claim that to is not a C, and she 
points out an observation that to-clauses cannot be subjects, different from English that-clauses. She claims 
that it is because to-clausal subjects would have two Cases, an inherent Case and a structural nominative 
Case (note that Japanese does not allow Case stacking). In the cartographic approach, it is explained by 
supposing that to-clauses cannot be assigned a Case (Saito and Haraguchi 2012). Because the subject 
position is a Case position, to-clauses cannot appear there. 
15 
complementizer che (‘that’) and the Italian interrogative complementizer se (‘if’) and revises the 
above structure slightly: 
 
(15)  Rizzi (1999) 
  [ Force  [ (Top*) [ Int(errogative)  [ (Top*)  [ Foc  [ (Top*)  [ Fin  [ IP ]]]]]]]] 
 
Here, Int(errogative) is the position which se occupies. It should be noted that it does not mean 
that interrogative and declarative forces are expressed by different heads, Int and Force, 
respectively. Rizzi supposes that when se occupies Int, there is a phonetically null Force head, 
which represents the force, based on selectional reasons and distribution of Spanish 
complementizers, que (‘that’) and si (‘if’). The Spanish complementizer que can embed a clause 
headed by the interrogative complementizer si (Plann 1982, Lahiri 1991), and Rizzi claims that 
que occupies Force, while si occupies Int. 
 What is important in the analysis of Japanese to is that it also can embed a clause headed 
by the interrogative marker ka, as in (16). 
 
(16)  Hanako-wa   [ [  boku-no        heya-ga       4-kai-ni     ar-u-ka]-to]             kii-ta. 
  Hanako-Top [ [  I(male)-Gen  room-Nom 4-floor-on  be-Pres-KA]-TO]  ask-Past 
  ‘Hanako asked if my room was on the fourth floor.’ 
 
It should be noted here that the first-person pronoun boku is used only by male speakers, but 
Hanako is a female name. Hence, the fact that this sentence is acceptable indicates that the first-
person pronoun refers not to Hanako (the local speaker) but to a male speaker, who must be the 
speaker of the whole sentence. It confirms that to in this example introduces indirect discourse, 
not direct discourse. 
16 
 Example (16) shows that to which introduces indirect discourse occupies a position 
higher than ka, the complementizer for questions. Saito (2010, 2011) and Saito and Haraguchi 
(2012) propose that to which introduces indirect discourse is a complementizer for paraphrases of 
direct discourse, following Plann’s (1982) analysis of the Spanish complementizer que. They base 
their analysis on Rizzi’s (1997), and assume that the Japanese interrogative complementizer ka 
occupies Force. As a consequence of the assumption, they propose that there is a head higher than 
Force in the CP-layer
24
, and call it Report. Schematically, they propose the following structure. 
 
(17)  Saito (2011), Saito and Haraguchi (2012) 
  [[[[[ TP ]  Fin ] …  ] Force ] Report ] 
                 (ka)       (to) 
 
On the other hand, if we base on Rizzi’s (1999) analysis, the Japanese complementizer system 
would be as follows. 
 
(18)  Structure in line with Rizzi (1999) 
  [[[[[ TP ]   Fin ] …  ]   Int  ]   Force ] 
                 (ka)       (to) 
 
 Which analysis is better suited for the Japanese right-periphery, (17) or (18)? It should be 
noted that the above-mentioned authors do not make their grounds very firm. In Rizzi (1999), the 
reason that Int is supposed under Force is that the Italian complementizer che (‘that’) is assumed 
to be Force. But the assumption that che occupies Force is introduced without supportive 
                                                          
24
 It is, however, not obvious that the projection for to is in the CP-layer. Maybe the projection for to is 
outside of CP (see Jayaseelan 2014 for such a claim for Malayalam complementizer ennǝ).  
17 
arguments. In Saito and Haraguchi (2012), the reason that Report is placed above Force is that to 
appears to the right of the Japanese interrogative complementizer ka, which is assumed to be 
Force. The assumption that ka occupies Force is based on the following consideration: “Ka is the 
complementizer for questions, and hence, is plausibly a Force head” (Saito and Haraguchi 
2012:109). In this dissertation, I follow Saito and Haraguchi and suppose that to and ka occupy 
Report and Force, respectively. A reason for choosing their analysis over Rizzi’s (1999) is that 
the semantic function of Int is not clear in Rizzi’s analysis, where Int does not represent the 
interrogative force. Another reason is that the matrix clause is expected to have Force but to 
cannot appear in the matrix clause. If to is not Force but Report, then the fact that to cannot 
appear in the matrix clause does not conflict with the supposition that the matrix clause contains a 
ForceP. 
 Now, let us add Speech Act Projection (SAP) to structure (17). SAP is the projection for 
specification of illocutionary forces. It is based on the claim by Krifka (2001, 2004), Speas and 
Tenny (2003) and others that illocutionary forces can be syntactically represented and so 
embeddable (Krifka does not assume a specific syntactic projection for speech acts, while Speas 
and Tenny argue for such a projection).
25
 Note that, although Speas and Tenny suppose that 
Rizzi’s Force specifies illocutionary forces, Rizzi himself does not mention illocutionary forces in 
his (1997, 1999) papers on ForceP. In Rizzi’s papers, ForceP is a projection for specification of 
clausal types such as declarative, interrogative, and relative clauses, as quoted in (19): 
 
                                                          
25
 The idea that the illocutionary force is syntactically realized can be traced back to Ross’s (1970) so-
called ‘performative analysis’. The main difference between the performative analysis and the recent 
proposals is that the former supposes that illocutionary forces are realized as an ordinary (though 
unpronounced) higher clause such as ‘I say to you that’, and so they should wrongly contribute to the truth-
conditional meaning, while the latter suppose that illocutionary forces are realized as a functional 
projection, so they do not need to contribute to the truth-conditional meaning (see Krifka 2001). 
18 
(19)  “Complementizers express the fact that a sentence is a question, a declarative, an 
exclamative, a relative, a comparative, an adverbial of a certain kind, etc., and can be 
selected as such by a higher selector. This information is sometimes called the clausal 
Type (Cheng 1991), or the specification of Force (Chomsky 1995). Here well will 
adopt the latter terminology.” (Rizzi 1997:283) 
 
Based on this characterization of ForceP, I suppose that ForceP represents a sentence radical, and 
it is not the projection for specification of illocutionary forces.
26
 The projection which is related 
to illocutionary forces is SAP.
27
 It is the place where speech act operators such as ASSERT 
appear. Since ForceP does not contain an illocutionary operator, SA must be located above Force.  
 The previous studies slightly differ on the precise position of SAP. Speas and Tenny 
(2003) propose that SAP selects Evaluative Phrase (Sentience Phrase). Tenny (2006) follows the 
proposal, and furthermore claims that SAP can be headed by a sentence-final particle yo. Saito 
and Haraguchi (2012) suppose that sentence-final particles head SAP and claim that SAP which 
                                                          
26
 This position is maintained by Jayaseelan (2008:46f): “However it is perhaps a mistake to identify 
Rizzi’s notion of Force with the illocutionary force of speech act theory. In Jayaseelan (2001b) I argued 
that the “question meaning” of a direct question—namely a request for information—is actually a matter of 
pragmatics. The syntax itself only presents a disjunction, a partition of a domain of discourse […] 
Disjunction (then) is the force of a question clause; which was indeed our rationale for deciding to generate 
the disjunction operator as the head of ForceP. This ForceP must be present in an embedded clause no less 
than in a matrix clause.” 
27
 The speech act projection appears also in Cinque (1999), Speas (2004), Speas and Tenny (2003), Tenny 
(2006) and others. On the one hand, Cinque claims that his speech act mood projection is not the Force 
projection, and that his speech act projection is lower than Force. If so, his speech act projection is not 
Force nor SAP in this dissertation. On the other hand, Speas and Tenny (2003:317) (Tenny 2006 follows 
this analysis) write as follows: “We follow Rizzi (1997), Ambar (1999, 2002) and Cinque (1999) in 
claiming that syntactic structures include a projection whose head encodes illocutionary force. This head is 
overt in languages that have sentence particles, clitics or morphemes indicating whether the sentence is a 
statement, question, etc. We’ll adopt Cinque’s terminology, calling this projection Speech Act Phrase, 
projected from a Speech Act Mood head.” It seems to indicate that their SAP is a fusion of ForceP and SAP 
in this dissertation. 
19 
is headed by a sentence-final particle wa
28
 selects TP while SAP which is headed by yo/ne/na has 
no selectional requirement. 
 Abstracting away subtle differences among the proposals, I assume the following 
structure in this dissertation. 
 
(20)  [[[[[ TP ]  Fin ] …  ] Force ]       (SA)                ] (Report) ] 
              (ka)    (wa, yo, ne, sa, …)      (to) 
    (ASSERT)             
                (INTERROG) 
 
Following Tenny (2006), I assume that sentence-final particle yo occupies the SA head. For 
concreteness, I suppose that other sentence-final particles such as wa and ne are also SA heads, as 
Saito and Haraguchi (2012) do. Because these particles can appear simultaneously and they all 
modify speech acts, SAP would be split into several projections in a finer analysis. Elements in 
parentheses in (20) can be missing. As for Report, matrix clauses do not have it, and embedded 
clauses do not need to have it, as exemplified by the following examples: 
 
(21)  Matrix clause 
  Tarô-no    imôto-ga     ki-ta-(*to) 
  Taro-Gen sister-Nom  come-Past-(*Rep) 
  ‘Taro’s sister came.’ 
 
(22)  Embedded clauses 
                                                          
28
 It is different from the topic-marker wa. 
20 
 a. Tarôi-wa    [ReportP [ karei-no imôto-ga      ki-ta]-to]              it-ta. 
Taroi-Top  [ReportP  [ hei-Gen  sister-Nom  come-Past]-Rep] say-Past 
  ‘Taroi said that hisi sister came.’ 
 b. Tarôi-wa    [karei-no imôto-ga      ki-ta-ka]          it-ta. 
  Taroi-Top  [hei-Gen  sister-Nom  come-Past-Q]  say-Past 
  ‘Taroi said if hisi sister came.’ 
 
(23)  Tarôi-wa    [ReportP [ karei-no imôto-ga      ki-ta-ka]-(to)]            kii-ta. 
  Taroi-Top  [ReportP [ hei-Gen  sister-Nom  come-Past-Q]-(Rep)] ask-Past 
  ‘Taroi asked whether hisi sister came.’ 
 
(21) shows that to cannot be added to a matrix clause, and (22a,b) and (23) show that a verb iw- 
‘say’ and a verb kik- ‘ask’ can combine not only with a to-complement clause but also with a ka-
complement clause, which is smaller than ReportP. 
 With regard to SA, it is present in some clauses but missing in other clauses, as discussed 
in section 2.2.
29
 
 
2.1.1.2 Verbs which take to-complement clauses 
 To-complement clauses typically appear with verbs of communication, but some other 
propositional attitude verbs also can combine with them. Saito (2010) gives a partial list of verbs 
that select for to-complement clauses. The following is a slightly augmented version of the list. 
 
(24)  Verbs which take to-complement clauses 
                                                          
29
 It is in accordance with Krifka’s claim that some embedded clauses have illocutionary forces. 
21 
  Omo-u ‘think’, kangae-ru ‘consider’, sinzi-ru ‘believe’, sir-u ‘know’, i-u30 ‘say’, 
sakeb-u ‘scream’, syutyoo-su-ru ‘claim, insist’, tazune-ru ‘inquire, ask’, kik-u ‘ask’, 
kitaisu-ru ‘expect’, kanzi-ru ‘feel’ 
      (based on Saito 2010: 92 (21a), augmented by myself) 
 
2.1.2 Nominalizers no and koto 
 Different from complementizer to, complementizer no and koto form phrases which are 
case-marked, similarly to nominals. For example, as a pronoun sore ‘it’ in object position is 
accompanied with the accusative case marker -o in (25a), a no/koto-clause in (25b) is marked 
with -o. Therefore, these two elements are often called nominalizers. 
 
(25) a. Tarô-wa    sore-o      sit-tei-ta. 
  Taro-Top  that-Acc  know-Perf-Past 
  ‘Taro knew it.’ 
 b. Tarô-wa     [[TP Hanako-ga   boku-no uti-ni       i-ru]-{no/koto}]-o                     
  Taro-Top   [[TP Hanako-Top I-Gen     home-at  be-Pres]-{NO/KOTO}]-Acc 
  sit-tei-ta. 
  know-Perf-Past 
  ‘Taro knew that Hanako was in my home.’ 
 
 Concerning koto, there are two popular analyses: (i) it is C (Inoue 1976, Uchibori 1996, 
2000, and Watanabe 1996, among others) and (ii) it is a noun which has bleached meaning (called 
                                                          
30
 This verb is the most basic and commonest among verbs of speech. Its stem is iw-, but exceptionally it is 
pronounced as yu- before u. For that reason, the verb is also written as yu-u. 
22 
a ‘formal noun’) (Hara, Kim, Sakai and Tamura 2013, and others). In the former analysis, koto-
phrases are CP, while in the latter analysis, koto-phrases are complex NP. 
 
2.1.2.1 The syntactic category of no 
 Nominalizers can embed a TP, as exemplified in (25b). Now, let us see that clauses 
headed by a nominalizer no are Finite Projections (FinPs) (Hiraiwa and Ishihara (2002), Endo 
(2010), Sato (2012), Saito and Haraguchi (2012) and others). 
 First, the nominalizer no can precede the interrogative complementizer ka, but it cannot 
follow ka, as shown in (26a,b): 
 
(26) a. Hanako-wa   [ForceP boku-no  heya-ga      4-kai-ni     ar-u-no-ka]        kii-ta. 
  Hanako-Top [ForceP I-Gen      room-Nom 4-floor-on  be-Pres-NO-Q] ask-Past 
  ‘Hanako asked if my room was on the fourth floor.’ 
 b. *Hanako-wa   [ForceP boku-no  heya-ga      4-kai-ni     ar-u-ka]-no-o             kii-ta. 
    Hanako-Top [ForceP I-Gen      room-Nom 4-floor-on  be-Pres-Q]-NO-Acc ask-Past 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanako asked if my room was on the fourth floor.’ 
 
 Second, the nominalizer no can precede darô ‘seem, probably’ (e.g., Kishimoto 201131), 
which is supposed to project an epistemic modal projection (ModP)
32
, as in (27), but it cannot 
follow darô, as in (28). 
 
                                                          
31
 The acceptability of darô under nominalizer koto is not as clear as under nominalizer no. 
32
 The label for the projection for darô varies among researchers: ModalP (Koizumi 1991, 1993), ModP2 
(Inoue 2007), E-ModalP (Ueda 2007), E-ModP (Kizu 2009), and ModP (Kishimoto 2011, Sato 2011). 
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(27)  Hanako-wa    boku-no uti-ni       i-ru-(no)-darô. 
Hanako-Top  I-Gen     home-at  be-Pres-(NO)-Mod 
  ‘It is probable that Hanako is in my house.’ 
 
(28) a. Tarô-wa   [Hanako-ga     boku-no uti-ni       i-ru-(*darô)-no]-o             sit-tei-ru. 
  Taro-Top [Hanako-Nom I-Gen     home-at  be-Pres-(*Mod)-NO]-Acc know-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Taro knows that (*it is probable that) Hanako is in my house.’ 
 b. Tarô-wa   [ForceP [Hanako-ga     boku-no uti-ni     i-ru-(*darô)-no]-ka]        kii-ta. 
  Taro-Top [ForceP [Hanako-Nom I-Gen     home-at be-Pres-(*Mod)-NO]-Q] ask-Past 
  ‘Taro asked if (*it was probable that) Hanako was in my house.’ 
 
 Based on the fact that no appears to the right of T and to the left of the interrogative 
complementizer ka, and the epistemic modal darô, I suppose that no is a Finite head (Fin), 
following Hiraiwa and Ishihara (2002) and others. The syntactic structure of the Japanese right 
periphery is as follows. 
 
(29)  [[[[[ TP ]  Fin ]   Mod  ]  Force ]   SA  ]   Report ] 
          (no)   (darô)      (ka)    (SFP)       (to) 
 
2.1.2.2 No-clauses and predicates which take them 
 The following is a partial list of predicates which take no-clauses (some of them can take 
to-clauses also). 
 
(30) i. Verbs which take no-clause complements 
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  wasure-ru ‘forget’, kookai-su-ru ‘regret’, mi-ru ‘see’, mat-u ‘wait’, tamera-u ‘hesitate’, 
kyohi-su-ru ‘refuse’, ukeire-ru ‘accept’, kitai-su-ru ‘expect’, kanzi-ru ‘feel’ 
 ii. Adjectives which take no-clause subjects
33
 
  akiraka-da ‘is clear’, kanô-da ‘is possible’, kantan-da ‘is easy’, muzukasi-i ‘is difficult’, 
taihen-da ‘is a big deal’  
         (from Saito 2010: 92 (21b)) 
 
2.2 Reportive/nonreportive styles and the Experiencer restriction 
2.2.1 Reportive and nonreportive styles 
 Japanese uses different grammatical styles for conversation and third-person narrative 
(Kuroda 1973, Tenny 2006). One style, which is called the reportive style, is used in conversation, 
first-person stories, and narrative in non-first-person stories with a narrator who is not omniscient. 
The latter style, which is called the nonreportive style, is used in narrative in non-first-person 
stories with an ‘omniscient narrator’ who does not participate in the stories nor is referred to, i.e., 
stories without a narrator.
34,35
 
 A difference between the reportive and nonreportive styles is that the reportive style 
allows sentence-final discourse particles (such as wa, yo, sa, ne), while the nonreportive style 
does not. In other words, sentence-final discourse particles cannot be used in non-first-person 
stories without a narrator. 
 Another difference concerns the interpretation of the Japanese long-distance reflexive 
zibun in the reportive and nonreportive styles. Kuroda (1973) claims that when placed in the 
                                                          
33
 In contrast to no-clauses, to-clauses cannot be a subject. See footnote 23 for related discussion. 
34
 I argue in section 2.2.3 that conversation sometimes allows nonreportive style. 
35
 The claim that non-first-person stories with an ‘omniscient narrator’ actually do not have a narrator is 
argued for by Benveniste (1959), Kuroda (1973), and Banfield (1982), among others. Cf. Ryan (1981). 
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object position in some adverbial clauses, zibun cannot be coreferential with the matrix subject in 
the reportive style.
36
 
 
(31) a. Johni-wa   [Billj-ga      zibun{*i/j}-o   home-ta       toki]   Mary-no   soba-ni    i-ta        yo. 
  Johni-Top [Billj-Nom  self{*i/j}-Acc  praise-Past  when] Mary-Gen side-Loc be-Past SFP 
  ‘Johni was by Mary when Billj praised {*himi/himselfj}.’ 
 b. Johni-wa   [Billj-ga      zibun{i/j}-o   home-ta       toki]    Mary-no   soba-ni    i-ta. 
  Johni-Top [Billj-Nom  self{i/j}-Acc  praise-Past  when] Mary-Gen side-Loc be-Past 
  ‘Johni was by Mary when Billj praised {himi/himselfj}.’ 
               (adapted from Kuroda 1973:385(33),(34)) 
 
(31a) has a sentence-final discourse particle, so it is clearly in the reportive style. In this case, 
zibun cannot be coreferential with John, the matrix subject. (31b) has no sentence-final discourse 
particle, so it can be either in the reportive style or in the nonreportive style. In this case, zibun 
can be coreferential with the matrix subject. 
 The observation that different grammatical styles are used for conversation and non-first-
person narrative is not limited to Japanese. According to Benveniste (1959), French distinguishes 
conversation and non-first-person narrative by person and tense.
37
 As for person, it is obvious: je 
and tu are used for conversation, but not for non-first-person narrative. As for tense, conversation 
allows all the tenses except the aorist tense (i.e., the simple past). The aorist tense is usable only 
in the non-first-person narrative. 
                                                          
36
 Zibun has three uses: reflexive (anaphoric), empathic (perspectival), and logophoric (Oshima 2004). It is 
important to note that Kuroda’s claim is about the reflexive use of zibun. Logophoric zibun can be 
coreferential with the matrix subject in the reportive style, as in (i). 
     (i)  bokui-wa  [Billj-ga     zibun{i/j}-o    home-ta      toki]   Mary-no   soba-ni    i-ta        yo. 
           Ii-Top       [Billj-Nom self{i/j}-Acc  praise-Past  when] Mary-Gen side-Loc be-Past SFP 
           ‘Ii was by Mary when Billj praised {mei/himselfj}.’ 
37
 Benveniste (1959) calls the two different styles in French two plans d’énonciation (‘planes of utterance’), 
discours and histoire. 
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2.2.2 The two grammatical styles and the Experiencer restriction 
 Kuroda (1973) notices that in a simple clause the Experiencer restriction is active in the 
reportive style, but not in the nonreportive style, as exemplified in (32). 
 
(32) a. (Scenario: In conversation) 
  {boku/*kimi/*kare}-wa   sono  koto-ga        uresi-k-at-ta            (yo). 
  {I/*you/*he}-Top             that    thing-Nom  glad-Pred-be-Past  (SFP) 
  ‘{I am/*You are /*He is} glad about that.’ 
 b. (Scenario: In third-person narrative) 
  kare-wa   sono  koto-ga        uresi-k-at-ta          (*yo). 
  he-Top    that    thing-Nom  glad-Pred-be-Past (*SFP) 
  ‘He was glad about that.’ 
 
 (32a) is uttered in conversation, so it is in the reportive style,
38
 and it shows the Experiencer 
restriction. Note that it can contain a sentence-final discourse particle. (32b) is uttered in third-
person narrative, so it is in the nonreportive style, and it does not show the Experiencer restriction. 
Note that it cannot contain a sentence-final discourse particle. 
 
2.2.3 The nonreportive style in conversation 
 Experiencer verbs such as omo-u ‘think’ also show the Experiencer restriction (Teramura 
1971, Nakau 1979), and the restriction is lifted in narrative of third-person stories (Kudo 1995), 
as the Experiencer restriction of Experiencer adjectives is lifted in third-person narrative. 
                                                          
38
 It is, however, not always so, as I show in the next subsection.  
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Interestingly, Kudo observes that the restriction is lifted also in some special type of conversation, 
where the speaker gives an explanation of something, and that sentence-final discourse particles 
cannot be used there.
39
 In the following example of conversation, omo-u appears with a second-
person Experiencer subject and no ‘hedging’ element which lifts the Experiencer restriction such 
as a modal element, an evidential marker, or the perfective aspect marker -tei. A sentence-final 
discourse particle cannot be attached to the sentence. 
 
(33)  “Anata-no kekkon-ni      tuite-mo,         boku-nari-no      kaisetu-ga            ar-u.” 
  you-Gen  marriage-Dat regarding-also I-own.way-Gen explanation-Nom be-Pres 
  ‘About your marriage also, I have my own explanation.’ 
  “Osie-te        kudasai.” 
    teach-Conn please 
  ‘Please tell me.’ 
  “Anata-wa  nido-tomo   onazi  koto-o        si-te         sippaisi-ta  dake   
    you-Top    twice-both  same   thing-Acc  do-Conn  fail-Past     only   
  na-n-da.                          Anata-wa  zibun-o    mamot-te         kure-ru     hito-ga 
  Pres-Evid-Pred.be.Pres  you-Top    self-Acc   protect-Conn  Ben-Pres   person-Nom  
  hosi-k-at-ta-n-da.                                    Sore-wa   anata-ga,   kozi’in-no          kurasi-o 
  wantA-Pred-be-Past-Evid-Pred.be.Pres  that-Top  you-Nom   orphanage-Gen  life-Acc 
  si-ta        koto-ni-mo          kankeiaru-ka-mo  sirena-i.                  17-no   anata-wa, 
  do-Past  KOTO-Dat-also  related-Q-also        may-Pred.be.Pres 17-Gen  you-Top 
  aite-ga               omawarisan-nara  zibun-o    hogosi-te         kure-ru     
  partner-Nom   policeman-if             self-Acc  protect-Conn  Ben-Pres 
                                                          
39
 She calls this type of text ‘kaisetsu’-no  tekusuto (‘text of explanation’). 
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  tekiyaku-da-to                             omot-ta.      Keredo   omawarisan-toiedomo 
right.person-Pred.be.Pres-Rep  think-Past   but          policeman-even 
  syakaitekini-mo  nikutaitekini-mo  hotondo  muryoku-ni           tika-i-to  
  socially-also        physically-also    almost     powerlessness-to  close-Pred.be.Pres-Rep 
  yû            koto-o           sit-ta           toki,    kimi-wa  wakare-ta.      …” 
  say.Pres  KOTO-Acc   know-Past  when  you-Top   separate-Past 
  ‘You only failed by doing the same thing in both cases. You wanted a person who 
protected you. It may be related to the fact that you was brought up in an orphanage. 
Seventeen-year-old you thought that if your partner was a policeman, he was just 
the right person to protect you. However, when you knew that even a policeman was 
socially and physically almost powerless, you separated. …’ 
          (Kudo 1995: 96.
40
 I added boldface and underline.) 
 
 In the same environment, Experiencer adjectives behave similarly. For example, in 
conversation (33), we can replace the third utterance with (34). 
 
(34)   “Anata-wa  nido-tomo   onazi   koto-o        si-te         sippaisi-ta  dake   
    you-Top    twice-both  same    thing-Acc  do-Conn  fail-Past     only   
  na-n-da.                          Anata-wa  zibun-o    mamot-te        kure-ru      hito-ga 
  Pres-Evid-Pred.be.Pres  you-Top    self-Acc   protect-Conn  Ben-Pres   person-Nom  
  hosi-k-at-ta.               17-no   anata-wa, 
  wantA-Pred-be-Past  17-Gen you-Top 
                                                          
40
 This conversation is a quotation from a novel, Ayako Sono (1966) Satogashi-ga Kowareru Toki [When a 
Sweetmeat Breaks]. Tokyo: Kodansha. 
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  aite-ga            omawarisan-nara  zibun-o    hogosi-te         kure-ru 
partner-Nom  policeman-if          self-Acc  protect-Conn  Ben-Pres 
  tekiyaku-da-to                            omot-ta.      Keredo  omawarisan-toiedomo 
  right.person-Pred.be.Pres-Rep   think-Past   but          policeman-even 
  syakaitekini-mo  nikutaitekini-mo  hotondo  muryoku-ni            tika-i-to  
  socially-also        physically-also    almost     powerlessness-to   close-Pred.be.Pres-Rep 
  yû            koto-o           sit-ta           toki,    kimi-wa wakare-ta.      …” 
say.Pres  KOTO-Acc   know-Past  when   you-Top separate-Past. 
  ‘You only failed by doing the same thing in both cases. You wanted a person who 
protected you. Seventeen-year-old you thought that if your partner was a policeman, 
he was just the right person to protect you. However, when you knew that even a 
policeman was socially and physically almost powerless, you separated. …’ 
 
In (34), an Experiencer adjective hosi- ‘want’ appears with a second-person Experiencer subject 
and no hedging element which lifts the Experiencer restriction. (Note that in (33) the Experiencer 
adjective appears with an evidential marker -n, which lifts the Experiencer restriction.) A 
sentence-final discourse particle cannot be attached in this case also. 
 Because absence of the Experiencer restriction and unavailability of sentence-final 
discourse particles are hallmarks of the nonreportive style, I take it that Kudo’s observation 
shows that the special type of conversation is the nonreportive style in conversation. With this 
qualification, I continue saying sloppily that sentences in conversation are in the reportive style in 
the rest of this dissertation. 
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2.2.4 The syntactic analysis of the reportive and nonreportive styles 
 Following Tenny (2006), I suppose that the difference between the reportive and 
nonreportive styles is due to the presence and absence of a SAP. Sentences in the reportive style 
have a SAP, as in (35). 
 
(35)  In the reportive style 
 
              SAP 
        
   ForceP            SA 
       
        TP        wa, yo, ne, … 
 
Sentences in the nonreportive style lack a SAP, as in (36). 
 
(36)  In the nonreportive style 
 
  ForceP 
   
      TP 
 
Sentence-final discourse particle are SA heads, so they can appear only in the reportive style. In 
the following chapters, I propose some mechanisms of how the presence and absence of a SAP 
affect the Experiencer. 
 
2.3 Basic data of the Experiencer restriction 
 In this section, I give some basic data of the Experiencer restriction. 
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2.3.1 Simple root clauses, epistemic modals, and evidentials 
 In simple declarative root clauses, the Experiencer of Experiencer adjectives cannot be 
the addressee(s) or those who are not discourse participants (Kunihiro 1965, Kuroda 1965 and 
others), as exemplified in (37). As mentioned earlier, this restriction is active only in the reportive 
style. The sentences in (37) end with a sentence-final discourse particle yo, so it is clear that they 
are in the reportive style. 
 
(37) a. {boku/*kimi/*kare}-wa  samu-i                      yo. 
  {I/you/he}-Top                cold-Pred.be.Pres   SFP 
  ‘{I am/*You are/*He is} cold.’ 
 b. {boku/*kimi/*kare}-wa   sono  koto-ga        uresi-i                      yo. 
  {I/you/he}-Top                 that    thing-Nom  glad-Pred.be.Pres   SFP 
  ‘{I am/*You are /*He is} glad about that.’ 
 c. sono sûpu-wa   {boku/*kimi/*kare}-ni-wa   oisi-i                               yo 
  that   soup-Top {I      /*you /*him}-for-Top delicious-Pred.be.Pres   SFP 
  ‘The soup tastes good to {me/you/him}.’ 
 
 A speaker cannot make an assertion about others’ feeling in a simple root sentence such 
as (38), no matter how convinced about the truth of the proposition the speaker is. Even if the 
speaker has strong evidence of his belief about someone’s feeling (for example, suppose that the 
experiencer told her feeling to the speaker), the speaker cannot make an assertion about the 
experiencer’s feeling as in (38). 
 
(38)  (The speaker is not Hanako) 
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  *Hanako-wa    uresi-k-at-ta           yo. 
  Hanako-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past  SFP 
   (Intended:) ‘Hanako was glad.’ 
 
To express a direct experience of others in a root clause, the speaker has several choices: (i) to 
use a verbal suffix -gar which means “behave like” as in (39a), (ii) to use an indirect evidential as 
in (39b), and (iii) to use an epistemic modal as in (39c). 
 
(39) a. Hanako-wa    uresi-gat-ta                  yo. 
  Hanako-Top  glad-behave.like-Past  SFP 
  ‘Hanako behaved like being glad (= Hanako’s behavior suggested that she was glad).’ 
 b. Hanako-wa   sono  hito-ga            kowa-k-at-ta              soo-da                 yo. 
Hanako-Top  that   person-Nom   afraid-Pred-be-Past   Hearsay-be.Pres  SFP 
  ‘Hanako was afraid of the person -HEARSAY.’ 
 c. Hanako-wa   sono  hito-ga            kowa-k-at-ta             nitigaina-i      yo. 
  Hanako-Top  that   person-Nom   afraid-Pred-be-Past  must-be.Pres   SFP 
  ‘Hanako must have been afraid of the person.’ 
 
From here on, I say that clauses without these devices are ‘unmarked’ or ‘in the unmarked form’. 
 
2.3.2 Embedded clauses under attitude verbs 
 In the case of embedded clauses under attitude verbs, some of them show the Experiencer 
restriction, but others not. In most cases, what is relevant is presence of an assertive speech act. 
The only exception is vivid memory report, which does not involve a speech act. 
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2.3.2.1 Embedded clauses under verbs of saying 
 This section considers verbs of saying such as yu-u
41
 ‘say’, syutyôsu-ru ‘assert, claim’ 
and hôkokusu-ru ‘report’, and shows that to-clauses under these verbs restrict the Experiencer 
argument of Experiencer adjectives to the local speaker, namely the referent of the subject of 
these verbs, while no-clauses under these verbs not. 
 First, let us consider to-complement clauses. As shown in (40), the Experiencer in to-
complement clauses under verbs of saying is restricted to the local speaker (e.g., Fujii 2006:160-
161). 
 
(40) a. Hanakoi-wa   [{kanozyoi/*Tarô/*watasi}-wa kanozyoi-no  otôto-no         koto-ga   
Hanakoi-Top [{shei/*Taro/*I}-Top                 shei-Gen        brother-Gen  event-Nom 
uresi-k-at-ta-to]                 {it/syutyôsi}-ta. 
glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep] {say/assert}-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi {said/asserted} that {shei/*Taro/*I} was glad about heri brother.’ 
 b. Taroi-wa  Atsukoj-ni  [Δi/*j  watasi-no tomodati-ga   nikurasi-i-to]   itta. 
Taro-Top Atuko-Dat [         my            friend-Nom  hate-Prs-C       said 
‘Taroi said to Atsukoj that {hei, *shej} hated my friend.’ (Fujii 2006: 160(5a)) 
 
 Second, let us consider no-complement clauses. Most verbs of saying do not allow a no-
complement clause,
42
 but some do. For example, yu-u ‘say’ can take a no-complement clause in a 
                                                          
41
It is the same verb that is transcribed as i-u in (24). See footnote 30. 
42
 For example, sakeb-u ‘shout’, syutyôsu-ru ‘claim’, dangensu-ru ‘claim’ do not allow a no-complement 
clause: 
        (i) *Hanako-wa    [Tarô-ga      bôru-o     nage-ta       no]-o     {saken-da/syutyôsi-ta/dangensi-ta}. 
   Hanako-Top  [Taro-Nom  ball-Acc  throw-Past Fin]-Acc {shout-Past/claim-Past/claim-Past} 
   (Intended:) ‘Hanako {shouted/claimed/claimed} that Taro threw a ball.’ 
These verbs of saying cannot take a no-complement in a negative sentence also. 
        (ii) *Hanako-wa    [Tarô-ga      bôru-o     nage-ta       no]-o     {sakeba/syutyôsi/dangensi}-na-k-at-ta. 
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negative sentence.
43
 Let us consider (41). (41a) contains an Experiencer adjective and an 
Experiencer NP which does not refer to the local speaker. (41b) uses a gar-verb which 
corresponds to the Experiencer adjective used in (41b). (41c) contains an Experiencer NP which 
refers to the local speaker. I feel that (41a) is degraded, compared with (41b) and (41c). However, 
the judgment is subtle and fragile. 
 
(41) a. ?Hanakoi-wa   [(sore-o     kii-te)      kanozyoi-no  itoko-ga               
          Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hear-ing) shei-Gen        cousin-Nom 
  uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o                  iw-ana-k-at-ta. 
  glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc  say-Neg-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi did not say that heri cousin was glad (to hear that).’ 
 b. Hanakoi-wa   [(sore-o     kii-te)      kanozyoi-no   itoko-ga                     
        Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hear-ing) shei-Gen       cousin-Nom 
  uresi-gat-ta-no]-o               iw-ana-k-at-ta. 
  glad-GAR-Past-Fin]-Acc  say-Neg-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi did not say that heri cousin behaved as being glad (to hear that).’ 
 c. Hanakoi-wa   [(sore-o     kii-te)       kanozyoi-ga     
        Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hear-ing) shei-Gen     
  uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o                 iw-ana-k-at-ta. 
  glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc  say-Neg-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi did not say that shei was glad (to hear that).’ 
                                                                                                                                                                             
   Hanako-Top  [Taro-Nom  ball-Acc  throw-Past Fin]-Acc{shout/claim/claim}-Neg-Pred-be-Past 
   (Intended:) ‘Hanako didn’t {shout/claim/claim} that Taro threw a ball.’ 
43
 In a positive sentence, it is impossible to use a no-complement clause with yu-u: 
        (i) *Hanako-wa    [Tarô-ga      bôru-o     nage-ta       no]-o      it-ta. 
   Hanako-Top  [Taro-Nom  ball-Acc  throw-Past Fin]-Acc say-Past 
   (Intended:) ‘Hanako said that Taro threw a ball.’ 
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One way to make the judgment of (41a) better and solid is to add adverbial hontôwa ‘actually’, as 
in (42). 
 
(42)  Hanakoi-wa   [(sore-o     kii-te)     kanozyo-no  itoko-ga         hontôwa 
        Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hear-ing) shei-Gen      cousin-Nom   actually   
  uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o                 iw-ana-k-at-ta. 
  glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc  say-Neg-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi did not say that heri cousin was actually glad (to hear that).’ 
 
If one adds hontôwa to a root clause or a to-complement clause of a verb of saying, the 
Experiencer restriction remains, as in (43), (44), and (45), so I suppose that hontôwa does not lift 
the Experiencer restriction and that the degradedness of (41a) is not an effect of the Experiencer 
restriction under investigation.  
 
(43)  {watasi/#Tarô}-wa  hontôwa   uresi-k-at-ta             yo 
{I/Taro}-Top           actually    glad-Pred-be-Past    SFP 
  ‘{I/#Taro} was actually glad.’ 
 
(44)  {kimi/#Tarô}-wa  hontôwa  uresi-k-at-ta            (ka)   
  {you/Taro}-Top    actually   glad-Pred-be-Past    Q 
  ‘{Are you/#Is Taro} actually glad?’ 
 
(45)  #Hanakoi-wa   [(sore-o     kiite)       kanozyoi-no  itoko-wa       hontôwa        
    Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hearing)  shei-Gen         cousin-Top  actually 
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  uresi-k-at-ta-to]               {it-ta/saken-da/…}. 
glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep]  {say-Past/shout-Past/…} 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanakoi {said/shouted/…} that heri cousin had been actually glad.’ 
 
 Another verb of saying which can take a no-complement clause is hôkokusu-ru ‘report’. 
Hôkokusu-ru allows a no-complement clause irrespective of the polarity, as shown in (46). 
 
(46)  Hanakoi-wa   [kanozyoi-no   itoko-ga       uresi-gat-ta-no]-o            
        Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen       cousin-Nom   glad-GAR-Past-Fin]-Acc 
  hôkokusi-{/na-k-at}-ta. 
  report-{/Neg-Pred-be}-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi {reported/did not report} that heri cousin behaved as being glad.’ 
 
Hôkokusu-ru shows a pattern similar to yu-u ‘say’ with respect to the Experiencer restriction. To 
see that, let us consider (47a), which contains an Experiencer adjective and an Experiencer NP 
which does not refer to the local speaker. Although the judgment is subtle, (47a) sounds awkward 
in an out-of-the-blue context, compared to (46), which contains a gar-verb, and (47b), which 
contains an Experiencer NP which refers to the local speaker. 
 
(47) a. ?-??Hanakoi-wa   [kanozyoi-no  itoko-ga          uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o     
               Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen       cousin-Nom   glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc 
  hôkokusi-{/na-k-at}-ta. 
  report-{/Neg-Pred-be}-Past 
  ?-??‘Hanakoi {reported/did not report} that heri cousin was glad.’ 
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 b. Hanakoi-wa   [kanozyo-ga    uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o 
Hanakoi-Top [shei-Nom        glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc 
  hôkokusi-{/na-k-at}-ta. 
  report-{/Neg-Pred-be}-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi {reported/did not report} that shei was glad.’ 
  
However, (47a) becomes better if the adverbial hontôwa is added: 
 
(48)  Hanakoi-wa   [kanozyoi-no  itoko-ga          hontôwa  uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o     
        Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen        cousin-Nom   actually    glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc 
  hôkokusi-{/na-k-at}-ta. 
  report-{/Neg-Pred-be}-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi {reported/did not report} that heri cousin was actually glad.’ 
 
 These data indicate two things. First, in a to-complement clause under a verb of saying, 
the Experiencer is restricted. Second, in a no-complement clause under a verb of saying, an 
Experiencer is not restricted, though an interpretation in which the Experiencer is different from 
the local speaker is not preferred. 
 
2.3.2.2 Embedded clauses under attitude verbs such as think, believe, and know 
 To-complement clauses under an attitude verb such as thinking, believing, and knowing 
allow an Experiencer who is not the referent of the subject of the verb, as shown in (49).
44
 
                                                          
44
 Different from me, Fujii (2006, 2007) claims that to-complement clauses of omo-u ‘think’ restrict the 
Experiencer. He first states as follows (Fujii 2006: 161): “when SubjExp predicates occur in the 
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(49) a. Hanakoi-wa     [{zibuni/kanozyoi-no  itoko}-wa    uresi-k-at-ta-to]           
  Hanakoi-Top   [{selfi/shei-Gen        cousin}-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep] 
  {omot/sinzi}-tei-ta. 
  {think/believe}-Perf-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi {thought/believed} that {shei/heri cousin} had been glad.’ 
 b. Hanakoi-wa     [kanozyoi-no  itoko-wa      uresi-k-at-ta-to]           
  Hanakoi-Top   [shei-Gen        cousin-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep] 
  sit-tei-ta. 
  know-Perf-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi knew that heri cousin had been glad.’
45
 
 
In this respect, they differ from to-complement clauses under verbs of saying, which do not allow 
such an Experiencer. 
 Similarly, no-complement clauses under a verb of knowing do not restrict the 
Experiencer of Experiencer adjectives, as shown in (50).
46
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
complement clause of verbs like say, think or ask, the restriction on the interpretation of their subject arises 
in such a way that the understood subject must be bound by the matrix subject or object.”  (Note that 
Experiencer adjectives are SubjExp (subject Experiencer) predicates.) Then he gives the following 
example:  
         (i) Marii-wa  [Hiroshij-ni  [zibuni/j-ga      Nagoya-ga      natukasi   -i  -to]  omotte]  hosikatta 
 Mari-Top  Hiroshi-Dat  self     -Nom  Nagoya-Nom  nostalgic -Prs-C  to.think  wanted 
 ‘Marii wanted Hiroshij to think that {shei, hej} missed Nagoya.’ (Fujii 2007: 15(36)) 
Example (i) suggests that his claim is that the Experiencer in to-complement clauses of omo-u must be 
bound by one of the subjects or objects of superordinate clauses. 
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 In to-complement clauses of the verb of knowing, sir-u ‘know’, the Experiencer cannot be the referent of 
the subject of the verb. This phenomenon was first observed by Akatsuka McCawley (1978: 274). Its 
mechanism has to be worked out in future research. 
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 Verbs of thinking and believing do not select for a no-complement clauses. 
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(50)  Hanakoi-wa   [{zibuni/kanozyoi-no  itoko}-ga       uresi-k-at-ta           no]-o 
Hanakoi-Top [{selfi    /shei-Gen        cousin}-Nom glad-Pred-be-Pres  Fin]-Acc 
  sit-tei-ru. 
  know-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Hanakoi knows that {shei/heri cousin} was glad.’ 
 
2.3.2.3 Complement clauses of verbs of vivid remembrance 
 In the environments discussed above, clauses which restrict the Experiencer are those 
which are immediately below an assertive speech act. But there is a case in which there is no 
assertive speech act involved. Let us look at (51a,b). They contain verbs of memory report, oboe-
ru
47
 (‘memorize’) and omoidas-u (‘recall’). (51a) shows that a non-de se individual cannot be an 
Experiencer, and (51b) shows that a non-de se individual can be used as a non-Experiencer 
subject in the same environment. 
 
(51) a. Hanakoi-wa   [{zibuni/*Tarô}-ga  uresi-k-at-ta          {no/ koto}]-o           (ariarito) 
Hanakoi-Top  [{selfi/Taro}-Nom  glad-Pred-be-Past {Fin/NMLZ}]-Acc  (vividly) 
  {oboe-tei/omoidasi}-ta. 
  {memorize-Perf/recall}-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi (vividly) {remembered/recalled
48
} that {shei/*Taro} felt glad.’ 
 b. Hanako-wa   [Tarô-ga      uresi-{gat/*k-at}-ta            {no/koto}]-o            (ariarito)                   
  Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom  glad-{GAR/Pred-be}-Past {Fin/NMLZ}]-Acc  (vividly) 
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 The verb oboe-ru itself means ‘memorize’. With a perfective aspect morpheme -tei-, the verb (oboe-tei-
ru) means ‘have remembrance’.  
48
 Here, ‘remember’ is used to mean a state of having remembrance, while ‘recall’ is used to mean an act of 
recalling. Though the English verb remember have both the meanings of the action of remembering and the 
state of having  remembrance, there is no Japanese verb which has the two meanings. 
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  {oboe-tei/omoidasi}-ta. 
  {memorize-Perf/recall}-Past 
  ‘Hanako (vividly) {remembered/recalled} that Taro {behaved as feeling/*felt} glad.’ 
 
2.3.3 Relative clauses 
 In this section, I illustrate that restrictive relative clauses do not show the Experiencer 
restriction, while non-restrictive relative clauses do, following previous studies.
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 Different from 
others, Tenny (2006) claims that relative clauses show the Experiencer restriction, but I argue that 
her claim is dubious. 
 Koyama (1966), Minami (1967), and Nishio (1972) observe that the Experiencer 
restriction disappears in ‘modifiers of nominals’, as exemplified in (52), (53), and (54).50,51  
 
(52)  [ik-ita-i]          hito-wa       te-o           age-te        kudasai 
[go-wantAdj-Pred.be.Pres]  person-Top hand-Acc  raise-Con  please 
  (lit. ‘As for people who want to go, please raise your hand.’) 
  ‘Please raise your hand if you want to go.’  (Koyama 1966: 73(16)) 
 
(53)  [kare-ga   kanasi-i]                riyû 
  [he-Nom  sad-Pred.be.Pres]  reason 
  ‘The reason why he is sad’    (Minami 1967: 41) 
 
                                                          
49
 In Chapter 4, non-restrictive relative clauses will be examined in detail, and the claim that non-restrictive 
relative clauses do not show the Experiencer restriction will be revised.  
50
 Koyama’s original claim (p.73) is as follows (I translated the original Japanese text).  
         (i) Fact 12. . . . adjectives of feelings can be used to represent others’ feelings if they are used as 
modifiers of nominals (eg16[=(52)]). Otherwise, they can be used only to represent the speaker’s feelings. 
51
 I added English glosses to these examples. 
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(54)  [inu-no     kowa-i]                    ko-mo      oo-i. 
  [dog-Gen afraid-Pred.be.Pres] child-also many-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘There are also many children who are afraid of dogs.’ (Nishio 1972: 30) 
 
Kuroda (1973) and Akmajian and Kitagawa (1981) also note that relativization lifts the 
Experiencer restriction, as in (55) and (56). 
 
(55)  atui hito 
  ‘hot man’      (Kuroda 1973: 379(7)) 
 
(56)  atama-ga   ita-i              kodomo wa     kono ko     desu. 
  head-nom  hurt-present child      topic  this   child  is 
  ‘The child who has a headache is this child.’ 
       (Akmajian & Kitagawa 1981:110(150b)) 
 
In these examples the present tense morpheme -i appears with the Experiencer adjectives, but the 
past tense morpheme -ta also can appear as in (57), so the present tense is not relevant to the 
absence of the Experiencer restriction in these examples. 
 
(57) a. [kare-ga   kanasi-k-at-ta]        riyû 
  [he-Nom  sad-Pred-be-Past]  reason 
  ‘The reason why he was sad’ 
 b. atu-k-at-ta            hito 
  hot-Pred-be-Past man 
  ‘a man who was hot’ 
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 c. atama-ga   ita-k-at-ta              kodomo wa     kono ko     desu. 
head-nom  hurt-Pred-be-Past child      topic  this   child  is 
  ‘The child who had a headache is this child.’ 
 
 Note that relative clauses in these examples are restrictive ones, which restrict a set of 
individuals represented by the host noun such as hito ‘man, person’ and ko(domo) ‘child’. 
Masuoka (1997) observes that there is a difference between restrictive and non-restrictive relative 
clauses with respect to the Experiencer restriction: restrictive relative clauses lift the Experiencer 
restriction, whereas non-restrictive relative clauses don’t. For example, let us compare a minimal 
pair, (58a,b). The relative clause in (58a) restricts the set of people (hito), so it is a restrictive 
relative clause. Here, the Experiencer restriction is not active. On the other hand, the relative 
clause in (58b) combines with an NP which denotes a single individual,
52
 so it is a non-restrictive 
one. In this case, the Experiencer restriction is active: only the speaker can be the Experiencer. 
 
(58) a. [sono nyûsu-o     kii-te     uresi-k-at-ta]            hito-wa 
[that  news-Acc  hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past]  man-Top 
  kinô          sono gi’in-no                   zimusyo-ni it-ta        (yo) 
  yesterday  that   assemblyman-Gen  office-to     go-Past  (SFP) 
  ‘The man who was glad to hear the news went to the assemblyman’s office yesterday.’ 
 b. (Context: There is only a single person who has the name, Tarô, in the discourse.) 
  [sono nyûsu-o     kii-te     uresi-k-at-ta]           {#Tarô/watasi}-wa 
  [that  news-Acc  hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past] {#Taro/I}-Top 
                                                          
52
 Precisely speaking, it is possible to analyze that what combines with the relative clause is not a single 
individual but a set of stages of the individual, as Del Gobbo (2003) claims for Chinese ‘non-restrictive’ 
relative clauses.  Non-restrictive relative clauses are treated in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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  kinô          sono gi’in-no                   zimusyo-ni it-ta        (yo) 
yesterday  that   assemblyman-Gen  office-to     go-Past  (SFP) 
  ‘{#Taro/I}, who was glad to hear the news, went to the assemblyman’s office 
yesterday.’ 
 
 Different from these authors, Tenny (2006) claims that the Experiencer restriction is 
active in relative clauses. Her claim is based on an observation on (59a,b).
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(59)  a. Samui hito     wa    dare  desu  ka? 
cold    person Top  who  Cop  Question 
‘Who is/are the cold person(s)?’   (Tenny 2006:272(62a)) 
 b. Samugatteiru hito      wa   dare  desu  ka? 
  cold-GARU  person  Top  who  Cop  Question 
  ‘Who is/are the cold person(s)?’   (Tenny 2006:272(62b)) 
 
Tenny states as follows: “In (62a) [=(59a)] the teacher is asking the whole class who among them 
is cold. In (62b) [=(59b)] the teacher is asking one student who is or are the cold person or people 
in the class? In (a) the implicit second person evaluator of affirmative truth (the individual(s) who 
identify themselves as cold) must be direct experiencers or self-ascribers.” I agree with the first 
statement, namely that (59a) is appropriate when the teacher is asking the whole class who among 
them is cold, but do not with the third statement. The third statement is too strong: in fact, the 
question by the teacher can be answered not only as in (60a) but also as in (60b) in a special 
condition. (Note that if the third statement is correct, answers like (60b) should be always 
unavailable.)  
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 Tenny attributes the observation to Ayumi Matsuo. 
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(60) a. Taro: watasi desu. 
          I          Cop 
 ‘I am.’ 
 b. Taro: Hanako desu. 
            Hanako Cop 
   ‘Hanako is.’ 
 
Answer (60b) is not assertable by Taro if his judgment that Hanako is cold is based on his direct 
observation of her behavior, but it is assertable if his judgment is based on Hanako’s saying that 
she is cold. It should be noted that under the same condition, Taro cannot make an assertion as in 
(61), as expected by the Experiencer restriction. 
 
(61)   Taro: #Hanako-ga     samui desu. 
      Hanako-Nom cold    Cop 
            (Intended:) ‘Hanako is cold.’ 
 
The difference in assertability under the same condition confirms that in (restrictive) relative 
clauses the Experiencer restriction is lifted, while in root clauses it is active. 
 To recapitulate, the Experiencer restriction is not active in restrictive relative clauses 
(Koyama 1966, Minami 1967, Nishio 1972, Kuroda 1973, Akmajian and Kitagawa 1981 and 
others), while it is active in non-restrictive relative clauses (Masuoka 1997). Different from these 
scholars, Tenny (2006) claims that relative clauses do not lift the Experiencer restriction, but a 
closer inspection shows that Tenny’s data suggests existence of a restriction of a different kind 
and does not indicate that the Experiencer restriction is active in relative clauses. 
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2.3.4 Summary 
 We have seen the following facts about the restriction on the Experiencer argument of 
Experiencer adjectives in Japanese. 
 
(62) a. In a root clause in reportive style, the Experiencer of an Experiencer adjective must be 
the speaker. 
 b. In a to-clause under a verb of saying, the Experiencer must be the local speaker. In a 
no-clause under a verb of saying, the Experiencer restriction is lifted. 
 c. In a clause under an epistemic modal, an evidential, or a non-communicational attitude 
predicate (except vivid memory report), the Experiencer restriction is lifted. 
 d. In a clause under a vivid memory report verb, an Experiencer must be the subject of the 
memory verb, namely the de se individual in the clause. 
 e. In a restrictive relative clause, the Experiencer restriction is lifted. 
 f. In a non-restrictive relative clause, the Experiencer is restricted to the speaker. 
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 CHAPTER 3
SITUATION-BASED ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIENCER RESTRICTION 
 
 In this chapter, I propose (63) to account for the Experiencer restriction. 
 
(63) a. An Experiencer has a semantics similar to that of locatives. 
 b. In Japanese, assertion requires the location of the topic situation, if mental, to be the 
mental location of the speaker, namely the speaker’s mind. 
 
It is based on a claim that Experiencers are mental locations, which originated from studies of 
lexical conceptual structures and syntax (Jackendoff 1990, Bouchard 1995, Arad 1998, Landau 
2010, Varchetta 2010, 2012). In the following, I first claim that sentences which violate the 
Experiencer restriction do not have a truth-value (section 3.1). Then I propose that Experiencers 
are mental locations, and develop a situation semantic analysis of mental locations (sections 3.2, 
3.3, and 3.4). After proposing (63b) in section 3.5, I show that the semantics yields the 
Experiencer restriction in various environments correctly (sections 3.6 and 3.7). In section 3.8, I 
treat the Experiencer restriction in an embedded clause under a verb of vivid memory report, 
which is special in that the Experiencer restriction does not involve speech acts. Section 3.9 
shows that the proposed semantics naturally explains the absence of the Experiencer restriction in 
restrictive relative clauses. In section 3.10, I treat the Experiencer restriction in interrogatives, and 
in section 3.11 I discuss the denotation of the verbal suffix -gar, which lifts the Experiencer 
restriction. 
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3.1 The Experiencer restriction and the truth-value gap 
 Let us consider sentence (64) as an example of an Experiencer sentence, i.e., a sentence 
with an Experiencer adjective. 
 
(64)  Hanako-wa   uresi-i                     yo. 
  Hanako-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres  SFP 
  ‘Hanako is glad.’ 
 
If the Experiencer, Hanako, is not the speaker, this sentence is not felicitously assertable, as 
reviewed in the previous chapter. But by what mechanism does such a sentence become 
unacceptable? In the following, I claim that if the Experiencer is not the speaker, unmarked
54
 
Experiencer sentences in the reportive style have no truth-value, and give a compositional 
semantics to treat Experiencer sentences. 
 My proposal is that the unacceptability of the Experiencer sentence is of a kind similar to 
that of sentences with first person pronouns which are used to refer to non-speakers. First person 
pronouns cannot be used to refer to non-speakers, as shown by the following assertions by John. 
 
(65)  (Scenario: John is speaking.) 
 a. *I (pointing to Taro) painted the picture. 
 b. I (pointing to John himself) painted the picture. 
 
Assertion (65a) is absurd. According to the traditional presuppositional analysis of features on 
referential pronouns (Cooper 1983, Dowty and Jacobson 1989, Heim and Kratzer 1998, Büring 
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 The term ‘unmarked’ is defined in section 2.3.1. 
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2005, Heim 2008, Kratzer 2009 and others), in which features denote a partial identity function as 
in (66), the absurdness of John’s assertion (65) is a result of the truth-value gap. 
 
(66) a. [[ [female] ]]
g,c
 = λx: x is female . x 
 b. [[ [1st] ]]
g,c
 =  λx: x includes the speaker in c. x (Kratzer 2009: 219(68)) 
 
Because Taro is not the speaker, the meaning of “I” in (65) is undefined. Consequently, the 
meaning of the whole sentence is undefined. This is the source of the absurdness of (65a). 
 In the following, I present an analysis which treats absurdness of unmarked Experiencer 
sentences with non-speaker Experiencers (namely the Experiencer restriction) in a similar way. 
That is, the analysis treats the absurdness of such sentences as a result of a truth-value gap.
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 Then, naïvely it is supposed that the Experiencer (or the Experiencer role introducer) has 
a presupposition similar to the first person pronoun as in (67). Here, I give an interpretation of the 
Experiencer role introducer in the neo-Davidsonian framework, assuming that the Experiencer 
role introducer is a two-place predicate. In the following sections, the meaning of the Experiencer 
role is included in the meaning of Experiencer predicates for ease of presentation. Let us call it 
the ‘first-person presuppositional analysis’. 
 
(67)   [[ Exp ]]
g,c
 = λe.λx: x is the speaker in c. Exp(x,e) 
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 Admittedly, it is not true that every absurd sentence is truth-value-less. Let us consider (i), for example. 
Gajewski (2002, 2009), Fox and Hackl (2006), Singh (2008), Magri (2009), Abrusán (2011) and others 
propose that such tautological or contradictory sentences are ungrammatical in virtue of their logical 
structure.  
   (i)   a. *There is every curious student.     (Gajewski 2009:1(1c)) 
          b. *Some student but Sue passed the exam.    (Gajewski 2009:2(4a)) 
Most Experiencer sentences, however, cannot be taken to be tautological or contradictory. For example, (ii) 
is true if Hanako is the speaker and she was glad at the time under discussion, and is false if Hanako is the 
speaker and she was not glad at the time under discussion. So, it is not tautological or contradictory. 
    (ii) Hanako-wa   uresi-k-at-ta            yo. 
 Hanako-Top glad-Pred-be-Past  SFP 
  ‘Hanako was glad.’ 
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Then unmarked Experiencer sentences have no truth value and so are absurd if the Experiencer is 
not the speaker. 
 There are, however, two problems which we need to overcome in order to construct such 
an analysis of the Experiencer restriction. 
 The first problem is that the first-person presuppositional analysis given in (67) cannot 
cover all Experiencers. (67) takes it for granted that there is a speaker in the context when an 
Experiencer is introduced. However, in third-person narrative, for example, there is no speaker in 
the narrated context (Benveniste 1959, Kuroda 1973, Banfield 1982 among others). It is true that 
the narrator is the speaker of the narrative in the actual context, but he is not the speaker in the 
narrated context. He is not present in the third-person narrative. To deal with such a ‘speaker-less’ 
context, it is necessary to modify the first-person presupposition in (65) in some way. 
 The second problem is that the first-person presuppositional analysis does not explain the 
absence of the Experiencer restriction in some embedded clauses. Note that in the case of first-
person pronouns, the first-person restriction is active in any clause. In other words, the referent of 
a first-person pronoun “I” in any clause is restricted to the speaker in the actual context. For 
example, (68) shows that the referent of first-person pronouns in a clause under a verb of speech 
and a verb of thought is restricted to the speaker in the actual context. 
 
(68)  (Scenario: John is speaking.) 
 a. *Mary {said/thought} that I (pointing to Taro) painted the picture. 
 b. Mary {said/thought} that I (pointing to John himself) painted the picture. 
  
On the other hand, the Experiencer restriction is active in a clause under a verb of speech, while it 
is not active in a clause under a verb of thought, as exemplified in (69). 
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(69)  Mary-wa   [John-ga      uresi-k-at-ta-to]               {*it   /omot}-tei-ru. 
Mary-Top [John-Nom  glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep]  {*say/think}-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Mary {*says/thinks} that John was glad.’ 
 
 In this chapter, I propose an analysis in which a presupposition on the Experiencer and a 
presupposition on the assertive Force lead to the desired truth-value gap as a net effect, using the 
possibilistic situation semantics. In this analysis, the presupposition on the Experiencer is not 
dependent on a speaker, so the first problem mentioned above is overcome. The dependency on 
the speaker is introduced by the presupposition on the assertive Force, which appears only in a 
clause which has a speaker. I will show that disappearance of the Experiencer restriction in many 
clauses is a result of the absence of the assertive Force. 
 In the following three sections (3.2, 3.3, and 3.4), I propose that Experiencers are mental 
locations, and consider their situation semantic treatment as well as their presupposition. Then, in 
section 3.5, I propose a presupposition of the assertive Force. 
 
3.2 Experiencers as mental locations 
 It is often the case that psychological predicates have periphrastic counterparts which 
contain locative prepositions. 
 
(70) a. Nina is in love (with Paul). 
 b. There is in me a great admiration for painters. 
          (Arad 1998, 228(83)) 
 
This observation is not limited to English, as shown in (71) - (74). 
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(71)  Irish 
 a. Tá  fuath    do  Y  ag X. 
  is    hatred  to       at 
  ‘X hates Y.’     (McCloskey & Sells 1988:181(76a)) 
 b. Tá  eagla roimh  Y ar  X. 
  is   fear   before     on 
  ‘X is afraid of Y.’    (McCloskey & Sells 1988:181(77a)) 
 
(72)  French 
 a. Paul a     mis Marie en colére. 
  ‘Paul has put Mary in rage.’    (Varchetta 2010:131 n.20) 
 b. Cela a    éveillé  en Pierre une rage terrible. 
  ‘That awoke in Pierre a terrible rage.’   (Bouchard 1995:275(35a)) 
 
(73)  Italian 
 a. Il   professore di matematica mette sempre paura ai suoi alunni, a prescindere. 
  the professor  of Maths          put     always fear    to his    pupils irrespectively 
         (Varchetta 2010:131(34b)) 
 b. La  preoccupazione (per l’esame   di domani)     è  in       Marco. 
  the preoccupation    (for the exam of tomorrow) is inside Marco 
         (Varchetta 2010:138(54b)) 
 
(74)  Hebrew 
 a. yeš        be-Gil eyva  gdola  klapey  soxney    bituax. 
  there-is in-Gil rancor great  toward agents-of insurance 
  ‘Gil has a great rancor toward insurance agents.’ (Landau 2010: 11(16a)) 
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 b. yeš        be-tox Rina tšuka    amitit le-omanut. 
  there-is inside  Rina passion real    to-art 
  ‘Inside Rina there is a real passion for art.’ 
 
Japanese also conforms to the observation, as in (75). 
 
(75) a. sono sûgaku-no kyôzyu-wa      gakusei-ni    {osore/zôo/zisin}-o        
  that   math-Gen professor-Top student-into  {fear/hatred/confidence}-Acc 
  hukikom-u. 
  breathe-Pres 
  ‘The professor of Math puts {fear/hatred/confidence} into his students.’ 
 b. Taro-wa   Hanako-o      {kyôhu/huan}-ni         otosiire-ta. 
  Taro-Top Hanako-Acc {fear/uneasiness}-into  put-Past 
  ‘Taro {terrified/worried} Hanako.’ 
 
 The observation backs a claim that psychological predicates express locative relations 
between the Experiencer and mental states (Jackendoff 1990, Bouchard 1995, Arad 1998, Landau 
2010, and Varchetta 2010, 2012). Jackendoff (1990) suggests that Experiencers are represented as 
locations in conceptual structure (“location of the fear, pleasure, and so forth”). For example, he 
supposes that the meaning of x frighten y is represented as in (76a), which is translated as in (76b). 
 
(76) a. [CS
+
 ([X]
α
, [INCH [BE ({FEAR ([α])], [AT [Y]])]])] 
 b.  X causes fear of X to come to be in Y 
         (Jackendoff 1990: 300 n.4) 
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Arad (1998) claims that “the experiencer is either conceived as the stuff contained in the mental 
state […] or the container in which the mental states resides”, and Varchetta (2010, 2012) also 
makes a similar proposal. Landau (2010) proposes that Experiencers are mental locations, by 
arguing that all object Experiencers are oblique (or dative) and that Experiencers undergo 
“locative inversion”. In the case of Experiencer subjects, Irish (McCloskey and Sells 1988), 
Scottish Gaelic (Landau 2010, referring to G. Ramchand), Marathi (Pandharipande 1990), and 
Malayalam (Mohanan and Mohanan 1990) typically mark Experiencer subjects with dative case 
or a locative adposition.
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 Similarly, Japanese Experiencer arguments of Experiencer predicates 
show nominative-dative alternation (Kuno 1973 and many others), as in (77).
57
 Note that the 
‘dative marker’ -ni is a locative postposition, as shown in (78). 
 
(77) a. watasi-ga samu-k-at-ta. 
  I-Nom      cold-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘I was cold.’ 
 b. watasi-ni-wa samu-k-at-ta. 
  I-Dat-Top      cold-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘It was cold for me.’ 
 
(78) a. gakkô-ni-wa       ôkina tosyokan-ga  at-ta. 
  school-Loc-Top large  library-Nom  be-Past 
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 English Experiencer subjects are always marked with nominative case, but they introduce a path, as a 
source or a goal, different from non-Experiencer subjects (Speas 1990). It suggests that English also treats 
Experiencer subjects as locations. 
    (i)  a. I got angry but it went away. 
          b. ??I laughed but it went away.    (Landau 2010:13(22a,b)) 
    (ii) a. I tried to remember his name, but it wouldn’t come to me. 
          b. ??I tried to write his name, but it wouldn’t come to me. (Speas 1990:(7)) 
57
 The nominative Exp construction is used when there is no theme argument, while the Exp-ni-wa 
construction is used when there is an implied or explicit theme argument. See Azuma (1997b) for details. 
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  ‘In the school, there was a large library.’ 
 b. watasi-wa gakkô-ni   it-ta. 
  I-Top         school-to go-Past 
  ‘I went to school.’ 
  
 Based on these observations and claims, I suppose that Experiencers, including Japanese 
ones, are mental locations. 
 
3.3 Situation semantics of ordinary locations 
 In this section, I give a situation semantic analysis of ordinary (i.e., non-mental) locations, 
as a preliminary to a semantic analysis of mental locations. 
  
3.3.1 Semantics of locations 
 Semantic similarities between time and space are repeatedly noted in the literature 
(Castañeda (1967, 1987, 1989), Kaplan (1989), Perry (1979), von Stechow (1982), Newen (1997) 
and others). On the other hand, there is an apparent asymmetry between time and space in syntax: 
tense is syntactically realized as inflection but space is not. Actually, however, there are 
languages which have space inflection. For example, Nez Perce has space inflection markers, 
cislocative (proximal) -m and translocative (distal) -ki, which appear between aspect and tense 
inflection markers, and Deal (2008) argues that space inflection and tense inflection work 
independently to locate the topic time (Klein 1994) and the topic location in the language. More 
concretely, in her analysis, tense is treated as a modifier of situations which restricts the topic 
situation with respect to the temporal axis, and space is treated as a modifier of situations which 
restricts the topic situation with respect to the spatial axis. Thus, tense and space are treated on a 
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par in her analysis. Following her approach in the spirit, let us consider semantics of some non-
Experiencer sentences in this section. 
 
3.3.2 Root clauses 
 Following Kratzer (2004, 2007) and Schwarz (2009, 2012), I suppose that a topic 
situation is introduced by a syntactic head. In the framework of possibilistic situation semantics 
(Kratzer 2014), Schwarz (2009) proposes the following lexical entry for such a head (he attributes 
it to Kratzer 2008).
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(79)  [[ Topic ]]
g,c
 = λp.λs′.λs. [s ≈ s′ & p(s)]        (Schwarz 2009: 93(104)) 
 
Here, ≈ represents the counterpart relation (Lewis 1986).59 This head takes a proposition and a 
topic situation, and yields a set of all the counterparts of the topic situation where the proposition 
holds. 
 Following Deal (2008), I treat tense as a temporal modifier of situations. Using the 
temporal precedence relation < and the inclusion relation , past tense and present tense can be 
represented as follows. 
 
(80) a. [[ past ]]
g
 =  λs. s < s* 
 b. [[ present ]]
g
 = λs. s*  s 
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 In Kratzer 2004, the topic situation is introduced by a head called ‘Assert’. In Kratzer 2007 and Schwarz 
2009, 2012, it is introduced by a head called ‘Topic’. 
59
 A speaker who is talking about a situation (namely a topic situation) cannot know whether the topic 
situation is actual or not because humans are not omniscient. Therefore, it is plausible to suppose that what 
the speaker is saying about is not a property of a topic situation (which may be non-actual) but a property 
of the set of counterparts of a topic situation (which includes the topic situation in the actual world). 
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Here, s* means the utterance situation. 
 For example, let us consider the following sentence. 
 
(81)  Brahms died in 1897. 
 
We can represent the lexical entry for a verb die as in (82). 
 
(82)  [[ die ]]
g
 = λx.λs. x dies in s 
 
The LF of (81) is calculated as in (83).
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 Here, t means a temporal inclusion relation. 
 
(83)        TopicP: λs. s ≈ sTop and Brahms died in s and s t 1897 and s < s* 
  
  sTop Topic′: λs′.λs. s ≈ s′ and Brahms died in s and s t 1897 and s < s*
   
  Topic TP: λs. Brahms died in s and s t 1897 and s < s* 
   λp λs′ λs [s ≈ s′ & p(s)]        
           T        VP 
            |  λs. Brahms died in s and s t 1897 
                       past                      
              λs.s < s*      PP                             VP 
                λs.s t 1897         λs. Brahms died in s 
                                    
                      in 1897    NP                 V 
                                      | 
                         Brahms   died: λx.λs. x died in s 
 
It represents the truth condition that the sentence is true if Brahms died in 1897 and it happened 
earlier than the utterance time, as desired. 
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 In this section, contribution of viewpoint aspects is set aside. This point will be treated in section 3.6.1. 
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 Locative modification is calculated similarly as temporal modification. Let us consider 
the following example. 
 
(84)  Brahms died in Vienna. 
 
 Its LF is calculated as follows. Here, sp means a spatial inclusion relation. 
 
(85)        TopicP: λs. s ≈ sTop and Brahms died in s and s sp Vienna and s < s* 
  
  sTop Topic′: λs′.λs. s ≈ s′ and Brahms died in s and s sp Vienna and s < s*
   
  Topic TP: λs. Brahms died in s and s sp Vienna and s < s* 
   λp λs′ λs [s ≈ s′ & p(s)]        
            T                         VP 
             |  λs. Brahms died in s and s sp Vienna 
                        past             
                   λs. s < s* PP                        VP 
             λs. s sp Vienna         λs. Brahms died in s 
                                                
                      in Vienna          NP             V 
                                            | 
                            Brahms           died: λx.λs. x died in s 
 
It represents that Brahms died in Vienna and it happened earlier than the utterance time, as 
desired. 
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3.3.3 Non-root clauses: clauses under attitude verbs, clauses under epistemic modals, and 
relative clauses 
3.3.3.1 Attitude ascriptions 
 De re attitude ascriptions are about a topic situation
61
 (Kratzer 1998, 2004, 2007, 2014). 
For example, to believe a proposition p (in de re reading) is to believe that p about a topic 
situation s. The topic situation is also called a res argument. In other words, the lexical entry of 
believe can be written as in (86), where s′ is a res argument. 
 
(86)  [[ believe ]] = λpλs′λxλs [x believes p of s′ in s]   (Kratzer 2004) 
 
 Let us consider (87) and calculate its meaning for illustration.  
 
(87)  John thinks that Brahms is alive. 
 
Its LF is calculated as follows. Here, pBia is a shorthand for the proposition, λs.[Brahms is alive in 
s & s*  s]. 
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 The following story about the butler and the judge (Kratzer 1998:185) illustrates that attitude ascriptions 
are about some topic situation: 
Suppose the judge fell into a ditch, drunk, head first. A passer-by pulled him out, took him to the 
hospital, and disappeared. The judge was unconscious, and had no recollection of the incident. The 
hospital staff gave only a vague description of the man who saved the judge’s life. Miles away, not 
knowing about the mishap, the judge's butler reads a false report on the financial situation of his 
master. Close to bankruptcy, he had allegedly approached a wealthy man (whose name was not 
disclosed) to help him out, threatening that he would commit suicide if the financial collapse 
couldn’t be avoided. The report closed by mentioning that some public figure saved the judge 
from financial ruin, and thereby saved his life. The butler suspected that it was Milford. Returning 
to his village, the butler meets a group of men discussing the judge’s accident. Not paying much 
attention, the butler thinks the men are talking about the judge’s financial traumas. He eventually 
mentions his suspicion that Milford saved the judge’s life. The next day, when everybody was 
speculating about who had taken the judge to the hospital, and thereby saved the judge’s life, it 
was reported that the butler suspected that it was MILFORD who saved the judge’s life. 
The fact that the last sentence has an interpretation in which it is false indicates that the attitude ascription 
is about some particular situation, which specifies the situation in which the judge’s life is saved.  
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(88)    TopicP: λs. s ≈ sTop and John believes pBia of sres in s and s*  s 
  
      sTop Topic′: λs′.λs. s ≈ s′ and John believes pBia of sres in s′ and s*  s′ 
   
  Topic TP: λs. John believes pBia of sres in s and s*  s 
   λp λs′ λs [s ≈ s′ & p(s)]        
            T               VP: λs. John believes pBia of sres in s    
             |                 
                         pres        NP                 V′ : λx.λs. x believes pBia of sres in s] 
                   λs. s*  s     |          
               John     sres             V′: λs′λxλs. x believes pBia of s′ in s          
                                             
                           V               CP: pBia 
           |   
                 believe Brahms is alive 
             λpλs′λxλs [x believes p of s′ in s]   
 
3.3.3.2 Epistemic modals 
 Epistemic modals are quantifiers over situations. For example, the lexical entries for 
might and must are given as follows. 
 
(89) a. [[ might ]]
c
 = λpλs s′ [Accc(s)(s′) & p(s′) ]   (Kratzer 2014: (18a)) 
 b. [[ must ]]
c
 = λpλs s′ [Accc(s)(s′) & p(s′) ] 
 
Here, Acc means an accessibility relation: Accc(s)(s′) means that s′ is an alternative of s in view 
of the information available in a context c. The information available in c yields different flavors 
of modals. 
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3.3.3.3 Relative clauses 
 It is plausible that relative clauses also introduce a topic situation (Schwarz 2012). To 
show that, let us consider (90), for example. 
 
(90)  John met the man who saved the judge’s life. 
 
An available reading of (90) is that there is an individual who saved the judge’s life at a particular 
situation and John met the person at a different situation (which is the topic situation of the root 
clause). So, I suppose that relative clauses have a TopicP, which introduces a topic situation. 
 For example, an LF for the relative clause in (90) is calculated as follows. 
 
(91)               λx.λs. s ≈ sTop and x saved the judge’s life in s and s < s* 
   
          λx   TopicP: λs. s ≈ sTop and x saved the judge’s life in s and s < s* 
   
                sTopTopic′: λs′.λs. s ≈ s′ and x saved the judge’s life in s and s < s* 
    
    Topic TP: λs. x saved the judge’s life in s and s < s* 
     λp λs′ λs [s ≈ s′ & p(s)]     
                     T             VP: λs. x saved the judge’s life in s 
                      |               
                                  past        NP                V′ : λy.λs. y saved the judge’s life in s 
                           λs. s < s*         |          
                                     x      saved the judge’s life 

It means that x’s saving the judge happened in a counterpart of sTop. sTop can be different from the 
matrix topic situation, which is provided by a TopicP in the matrix clause, so the reading 
mentioned above is obtained: the situation where the man saved the judge’s life and the situation 
where John met the man are different. 
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3.4 Situation semantics of mental locations: proposal 
 In this section, I propose a situation semantics of mental locations. 
 As I stated in section 3.2, I suppose that Experiencers are mental locations, based on the 
works of Jackendoff (1990), Landau (2010) and others. Concretely, I propose the following. 
 
(92)  Similarly to external events and states which happen in situations which have an 
extension in the spatial axis, experiences such as fear and pleasure happen in situations 
which have an extension in the mental axis. Mental locations are minds of sentient 
individuals.  
 
The set of mental locations can be regarded as the so-called “phenomenal space” in the 
philosophy of consciousness
62
. Especially, the idea that there is a different axis for consciousness 
from the axes for space-time is advanced by Smythies (2003). 
 The notion of ‘mental location’ is formalized as follows. I define the set of mental 
locations Dm as the difference of the set of locations, Dl, and the set of physical locations Dph: 
 
(93)  Definition of the set of mental locations Dm 
  Dm := Dl − Dph 
 
The elements of Dm are called mental locations. I assume that Dm forms a join-semilattice
63
 Dm, 
 which is isomorphic to the join-semilattice of sentient individuals in discourse, Dsen,. 
Letting μ be the lattice isomorphism from Dsen,  to Dm,  and a be an element in Dsen, I call 
the element μ(a) a’s mind. For example, suppose that John and Mary are sentient individuals in 
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 For example, see Huemer (2011) for a review of the sense data theory. 
63
 For lattices, see, e.g., Partee, ter Meulen, and Wall (1993). 
62 
discourse. Then, Dsen consists of three elements, John, Mary, and JohnMary, and the lattice 
isomorphism μ maps these elements to John’s mind, Mary’s mind, and John’s mindMary’s 
mind in Dm, respectively: 
 
(94)             μ 
 
    JohnMary    John’s mindMary’s mind  
                   
         John    Mary    John’s mind    Mary’s mind 
 
 
                Dsen,         Dm, 
 
 
In this case, the set of locations, Dl, consists of John’s mind, Mary’s mind, John’s mindMary’s 
mind, and the physical locations. 
 Note that (95) holds because μ is the lattice isomorphism between Dsen,  and Dm, ). 
 
(95) i. For a, b  Dsen, a  b  μ(a)  μ(b), 
 ii. For μ(a), μ(b)  Dm, μ(a)  μ(b)  a  b. 
 
 As the function t which maps an eventuality (event or state) s to its temporal interval, t(s), 
it is possible to suppose a function l which maps a situation to its location. Letting Ds be the set of 
situations, l is given as in (96). 
 
(96)  l: Ds → Dl 
 
 I assume that the location function l is total. Furthermore, I assume that it preserves the inclusion 
relation between situations: 
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(97)  s1  s2  l(s1)  l(s2) 
 
 I suppose that Experiencer expressions specify the location of the described situation, 
based on the assumption that the Experiencer argument is a locative. But there is one twist. The 
specification of mental situations by Experiencers is a presupposition, not part of the at-issue 
content. Otherwise, it does not yield a truth-value gap which explains the absurdness of sentences 
which does not satisfy the condition on the Experiencer. In this respect, Experiencers are similar 
to tenses in some theories, in which tenses are supposed to be presuppositional. Kratzer (1998a) 
advances analogies between tenses and pronouns, which were first observed by Partee (1973), 
and proposes the following lexical entries for English present and past tenses (she considers a 
zero tense also, which is omitted here). 
 
(98) a. [[ present ]]
g,c
 is only defined if c provides an interval t that includes t0 (the utterance 
time). If defined, then [[ present ]]
g,c
 = t. 
 b. [[ past ]]
g,c
 is only defined if c provides an interval t that precedes t0. If defined, then 
[[ past ]]
g,c
 = t.     (from Kratzer (1998a: 101)) 
 
For example, let us consider a sentence, Tarô-wa uresi-i (‘Taro is glad’). What I propose is that 
the Experiencer argument is tied to a definedness condition on the expressed proposition, as in 
(99). 
 
(99)  [[ uresi- ]] = λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s 
 
In this formulation, ‘Taro is glad’ means ‘gladness is at s’ if the location of s is Taro’s mind, and 
has no truth-value otherwise. 
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 Note that a sentient individual a cannot have direct evidence of a situation s, namely that 
a cannot claim to have perceived s (Willett 1988), if the location of s is not in Dph  {μ(a)}. It is 
because one cannot perceive feelings and thoughts of others. (The same point is discussed in Sun 
1993 and Garrett 2001 in terms of ‘observability’.) Thus, the following relations hold. 
 
(100)   For a  Dsen and a situation s,  
  a can directly witness s  s is observable to a  l(s)  Dph  {μ(a)} 
 
3.5 Assertion and mental locations 
 I suppose that assertion imposes a condition on topic situations in Japanese. In prose, my 
concrete proposal is (101). 
 
(101)  In Japanese, assertion requires the location of the topic situation, if it is mental, to be 
the speaker’s mind. 
 
English assertion does not impose such a condition on topic situations, so the Experiencer 
restriction does not emerge in English. 
 Formally, my proposal is represented as follows. As stated in section 3.3.2, a topic 
situation is introduced by a Topic as in (79), which is reproduced as (102) below: 
 
(102)  [[ Topic ]]
g,c
 = λp.λs′.λs. [s ≈ s′ & p(s)]        (Schwarz 2009: 93(104)) 
 
The lexical entry for Assert, which is a SA head of assertive sentences, is given as in (103). 
 
(103)  [[ Assert ]]
g,c
 = λp.λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. p(s) 
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Schematically, combination of a TopicP and a SAP yields the following meaning, using (102) and 
(103). 
 
(104)             SAP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. [s ≈ sTop & p(s)] 
        
  Assert        TopicP: λs. [s ≈ sTop & p(s)] 
         
       sTop          Topic′: λs′.λs. [s ≈ s′ & p(s)] 
                   
             Topic            TP: λs.p(s) 
      
The definedness condition restricts the situations which are counterparts of the topic situation to 
situations whose location is physical or is the speaker’s mind. 
 From the next section, let us see how the restriction imposed by Assert and the 
presupposition of Experiencer adjectives yield the observed Experiencer restriction. 
 
3.6 The Experiencer restrictions in root clauses 
3.6.1 The Experiencer restrictions in root clauses in the reportive style 
 First, let us consider a simple root clause, (105). It is not felicitously assertable because it 
has a non-speaker Experiencer.  
 
(105)  (When the speaker is not Taro) 
  *Tarô-wa    uresi-i                     yo. 
    Taro-Top  glad-Pred.be.Pres  SFP 
  (Intended:) ‘Taro is glad.’ 
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To analyze this example, let us look at a detailed analysis of the Japanese tense-aspect system by 
Kiyota (2008). 
 According to a comparative study of Japanese and Salish aspects (viewpoint aspects and 
Aktionsarten) by Kiyota (2008), Japanese does not have standard viewpoint aspects such as 
perfective and imperfective, different from Salish, English, and other languages. It does not mean 
that Japanese just lacks pronounced standard viewpoint aspect markers. Instead, he claims that 
compositional semantics of the temporal interpretation of Japanese sentences does not involve the 
standard viewpoint aspects, and speculates that Japanese does not have the functional projection 
for them. 
 Kiyota’s analysis is based on Pancheva’s (2003) proposal of the ramified aspect system. 
It is often the case that Perfect is treated on a par with standard viewpoint aspects (Giorgi and 
Pianesi 1998, von Stechow 2002, among others), but Pancheva argues that Perfect’s various 
interpretations (universal, experiential, and resultative) are consequences of compositional 
semantics of Perfect and viewpoint aspects, supposing that Perfect is not a viewpoint aspect but 
selects for a viewpoint aspect phrase. In her analysis, the aspect phrase consists of two AspPs, the 
lower one for viewpoint aspects, and the higher one for Perfect, as in (106). 
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(106)                     TP 
        
           T               AspP1 
                          
     [PAST] /         Asp1           AspP2 
  [PRESENT] /                
   [FUTURE]     [PERFECT]  Asp2                      vP 
          |        | 
      [(UN)BOUNDED] /     Aktionsart 
           [NEUTRAL] / 
        [RESULTATIVE]      
              (based on Pancheva 2003: 284(9a)
64
) 
 
The [BOUNDED] and [UNBOUNDED] features correspond to the perfective and imperfective 
viewpoint aspects, respectively. [NEUTRAL] corresponds to the neutral viewpoint aspect, which 
is adopted from Smith (1997), and [RESULTATIVE] corresponds to the resultative viewpoint 
aspect, which is a new viewpoint aspect introduced by Pancheva to account for the resultative 
interpretation of Perfect. 
 A Japanese aspect marker -tei- has a progressive, a resultative, and an experiential perfect 
interpretation. Kiyota (2008) argues that -tei- is a Perfect marker and the various interpretations 
of -tei- are consequences of the combination of various Aktionsarten and the semantics and 
pragmatics of the Perfect marker -tei-.  Importantly, the calculation of the interpretations does not 
involve viewpoint aspects. In this respect, the Japanese aspect is different from that of Salish, 
English and other languages (Kiyota notes that Icelandic may have a similar aspect system as 
Japanese). In his analysis, Japanese TP has the following structure (here, I use the head-initial 
order for ease of comparison). 
 
                                                          
64
 The tree in Pancheva (2003:284(9a)) does not include the RESUTATIVE viewpoint aspect, which is 
introduced later in the same paper . 
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(107)                     TP 
        
           T                AspP1 
                          
     [PAST] /         Asp1           vP 
  [PRESENT]              |              |   
         [PERFECT]    Aktionsart 
 
Semantically, the Japanese Perfect relates events to a topic time. (The function of relating events 
to a topic time is assigned to viewpoint aspects in English, Salish and other languages.) Kiyota 
proposes the following meaning for predicates and Perfect -tei-. 
 
(108) a. Homogeneous states: λe.P(e) 
 b. Inchoative states: λe. e1 e2[e=
S
(e1  e2)  (BECOME(P))(e1)  P(e2)] 
 c. Activities: λe. e1 e2[e=
S
(e1  e2)  (BECOME(P))(e1)  DO(P))(e2)] 
 d. Achievements: λe. (BECOME(P))(e) 
 e. (Non-culminating)
65
 accomplishments: λe. e1 e2[e=
S
(e1  e2)  (BECOME(P))(e1)  
DO(P))(e2) & [w′ [w′ is an inertia world w.r.t. w at the beginning of e → [e′ [e′ is a 
culmination of e in w′ & e causes e′ in w′ ]]]] 
         (Kiyota 2008: 217(6)) 
 
(109)  [[ -tei- ]] = λP.λe.λt.e′. [ e′  e & τ(e′) < t & P(e)] (Kiyota 2008: 225(16)) 
 
Here, e=
S
(e1  e2) means that e is a complex event which is the sum of two sub-events, e1 and e2. 
Note that the Japanese Perfect relates an event to the topic time. 
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 The culmination of accomplishments is not entailed but implicated in Japanese. See Kiyota (2008) for 
details. 
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 Now, let us calculate the meaning of a simple Experience sentence, based on this analysis 
of the Japanese tense-aspect system. Unfortunately, Kiyota presents calculations of only 
sentences with the Perfect marker -tei-. What happens when the Perfect marker is absent? In the 
case of English and Salish, we can suppose that Asp1 does not have semantic/pragmatic 
contribution when a Perfect marker is absent. However, in the case of Japanese, we need an 
element which relates events (situations) to a topic time, when a Perfect marker is absent. It is 
because standard viewpoint aspects relates an event to a reference time and Perfect relates a 
reference time to a topic time in English and Salish while Japanese has no viewpoint aspect and 
Perfect relates an event to a topic time. From the parsimony, I suppose that sentences without the 
Japanese Perfect marker -tei- contain a covert Asp1 element Asp which relates an event 
(situation) to a topic time as follows. 
 
(110)  [[ Asp ]] = λP.λe.λt.[τ(e) = t & P(e)] 
 
 This aspectual element yields correct interpretations. For example, let us consider the 
following sentence, which contains an achievement verb tuk-u ‘arrive/reach’. It represents a 
completed event, as the badness of the continuation in (111) shows. 
 
(111)  Tarô-wa    tui-ta.          (#Sikasi, mada tui-tei-na-i.) 
  Taro-Top  arrive-Past  (#But       yet     arrive-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres) 
  ‘Taro arrived. (#But he has not yet arrived.)’ 
 
The past tense morpheme represents a precedence relation between the topic time and the 
utterance time. I assume the following lexical entry. Here, < represents the temporal precedence 
relation. 
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(112)  [[ -ta ]] = λe.λt. t < t* 
  where t* means the utterance time. 
 
Then the logical form of TP, Tarô-wa tui-ta ‘Taro arrived’, is calculated as follows. 
 
(113)        TP: λe.λt.[τ(e)=t & t < t* & BECOME-ARRIVE(e) & Th(Taro,e)] 
      
           T                AspP1:  
    λe.λt.[τ(e)=t & BECOME-ARRIVE(e) & Th(Taro,e)] 
         -ta                    
  [[ -ta ]] = λe.λt. t < t*    Asp1:      vP: λe.BECOME-ARRIVE(e) & Th(Taro,e) 
                      |                  
                       Asp            Taro-ga tui- 
               λP.λe.λt.[τ(e) = t & P(e)] 
 
Finally, by applying declarative operator (114) to (113), we obtain the interpretation of the 
sentence, (115). 
 
(114)  The declarative operator: λP e[P(e)]    (Krifka 1989: 90) 
 
(115)  λt.e.[τ(e)=t & t < t* & BECOME-ARRIVE(e) & Th(Taro,e)] 
 
It means that there is an event of Taro’s arriving and it occurred before the utterance time. 
 As another example, let us consider the following sentence, which contains a stative 
predicate. It does not have implication about completion of the event. 
 
(116)  Tarô-wa   Amherst-ni i-ta.            ({Ima-mo  i-ru           / Ima-wa    
  Taro-Top Amherst-in exist-Past  ({now-also exist-Pres/ now-Top  
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  i-na-i}.) 
exist-Neg-Pred.be.Pres}) 
  ‘Taro was in Amherst. ({He is still there / He is not there now}.)’ 
 
The logical form of TP, Tarô-wa Amherst-ni i-ta ‘Taro was in Amherst’, is calculated in the same 
way as above. 
 
(117)        TP: λe.λt.[τ(e)=t & t < t* & BE.IN.AMHERST(e) & Th(Taro,e)] 
      
           T                AspP1:  
    λe.λt.[τ(e)=t & BE.IN.AMHERST(e) & Th(Taro,e)] 
         -ta                    
  [[ -ta ]] = λe.λt. t < t*    Asp1:      vP: λe.BE.IN.AMHERST(e) & Th(Taro,e) 
                      |                  
                       Asp            Tarô-wa Amherst-ni i-ta 
               λP.λe.λt.[τ(e) = t & P(e)] 
 
Adding the declarative operator, we obtain the interpretation of the sentence. 
 
(118)  λt.e.[τ(e)=t & t < t* & BE.IN.AMHERST(e) & Th(Taro,e)] 
 
It means that there is an event (state) of Taro’s being in Amherst and it occurred before the 
utterance time. Note that the endpoints of the state of being in Amherst are not included in the 
state represented by the stative, Amherst-ni i- ‘be in Amherst’, and also that the meaning of the 
null aspect Asp does not require the endpoints of the state of being in Amherst to be included in 
the topic time.
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 Therefore, it does not have any implication on completion of the state, in 
accordance with the data. 
                                                          
66
 The reader may recall Smith’s (1997) analysis of English (perfective) statives and French perfective 
statives. Smith claims that in English, statives are accompanied with the perfective viewpoint aspect and 
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 Now, based on the viewpoint-aspect-less system, let us consider a sentence with an 
Experiencer adjective and derive the Experiencer restriction. As Strawson (1950) claims, one 
cannot assert a sentence with no truth value felicitously. The goal here is to show that the logical 
form of a sentence with a non-speaker Experiencer does not have a truth value. 
 Before considering a specific example, let us translate the above semantics using 
situation semantic terms. Note that the sole function of Asp was to convert events to their times 
and dissolve the type mismatch. Because in situation semantics the notion of the topic time is 
extended to the topic situation, aspects relate an event/situation to a situation. So the meaning of 
Asp becomes trivial (at least) for statives (now the meaning of the declarative operator, 
existential quantification over events, is included in that of Asp): 
 
(119) a. [[ Asp ]] = λp.λs.p(s)   if the predicate is stative
67
 
 
The meaning of tense morphemes can be given as in (120). 
 
(120) a. Past tense: [[ -ta ]] = λs. τ(s) < t* 
 b. Present tense: [[ -ru,  ]] = λs. t*  τ(s) 
  
 Using these lexical entries, let us consider (105), which is reproduced below. 
 
(105)  (When the speaker is not Taro) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that the perfective viewpoint aspect of English statives does not require the endpoints of the state to be 
included in the topic time. Contrastively, she claims, the perfective viewpoint aspect of French statives 
require the endpoints of the state to be included in the topic time. My analysis, therefore, is somewhat 
similar to Smith’s analysis of English statives. 
67
 Events can be seen as situations which exemplify the expressed proposition (Kratzer 2014). When the 
predicate is a stative, any situation on which the proposition holds exemplifies the proposition, so we can 
simply replace events with situations. 
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  *Tarô-wa    uresi-i                     yo. 
    Taro-Top  glad-Pred.be.Pres  SFP 
  (Intended:) ‘Taro is glad.’ 
 
Its logical form is calculated as follows. 
 
(121)         SAP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop & t*   τ(s) 
         & gladness is at s] 
  
  Assert    TopicP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop & t*   τ(s) & gladness is at s] 
          
   sTop     Topic′: λs′ λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ s′ & t*  τ(s) & gladness is at s] 
            
                Topic          TP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). t*  τ(s) & gladness is at s′ 68 
                     
               Pres           AspP1: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s 
                λs. t*  τ(s)     
                                   Asp1              VP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s 
                       |   
               Asp          V       PredP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s  
                        
                   -i
69
     NP              Pred′: λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s  
                                 ‘is’        |              
                Tarô          uresi-k
70
                     
                    ‘glad’ 
 
Let us confirm that the logical form does not have a truth value for any situation as long as the 
speaker is not Taro. From the definedness conditions of Assert and Experiencer predicates, the 
logical form can have a truth value only for a situation s whose location is physical or the 
                                                          
68
 Here, the logical form for AspP1 and that for Pres are both of type s,t, and are combined by Predicate 
Modification rule. Though the logical form for Pres is defined for any s, the logical form for AspP1 is 
defined only for s such that l(s) = μ(Taro). So the logical form for the combination of AspP1 and Pres is 
also defined only for s such that l(s) = μ(Taro). 
69
 The be-verb -i ‘is’ is a raising verb (Kawai 2006b, 2008), as its English counterpart. I suppose that it 
raises to T. 
70
 The combination of the Predication head -k and the be-verb in the present tense is realized as -i, so -k 
does not appear in the surface form. For details on this point, see Nishiyama (1999), who analyzes the 
inflectional endings of Japanese adjectives using Distributed Morphology. 
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speaker’s mind (l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}), and is also Taro’s mind (l(s) = μ(Taro)). These two 
conditions can be satisfied only if the speaker is Taro. It is the desired result: the infelicity of 
assertion of the sentence when the speaker is not Taro is a reflection of the truth-value gap of the 
sentence.
71,72
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 If the relation between s and sTop is not a counterpart relation as given in (102) but an inclusion relation 
as in (i), the logical form has a truth value for some situations even if the speaker is not Taro, against the 
expectation, but it can be fixed by supposing that the inclusion relation is part of the presupposition, not 
part of the at-issue content.  
   (i)  [[ Topic ]]
c
 = λp.λs′.λs. s′  s & p(s′) 
       First, let us see that this meaning of Topic does not yield a truth gap which corresponds to the 
Experiencer restriction. For example, the logical form of the example sentence, (105), is as follows. 
   (ii) [[ SAP ]]
c
 = λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. [sTop  s & t*   τ(sTop) & gladness is at sTop],  
         if l(sTop) = μ(Taro). # otherwise. 
For any mental situation whose location is the speaker’s mind, if the location of the topic situation is Taro’s 
mind, the logical form has a truth value. Importantly, the two definedness conditions, l(s) Dph  
{μ(speaker(c))} and l(sTop) = μ(Taro), are imposed on different situations. So, even if the speaker and Taro 
are not the same individual, the logical form can have a truth value. Thus, it does not explain the 
Experiencer restriction. 
       Next, let us see that if the inclusion relation is part of the presupposition as in (iii), the logical form of 
sentences have a truth gap which corresponds to the Experiencer restriction.  
   (iii) [[ Topic ]]
c
 = λp.λs′.λs: s′  s. p(s′) 
With (iii), the logical form of the example sentence, (105), becomes as follows. 
   (iv) [[ SAP ]]
c
 = λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & sTop  s. [ t*   τ(sTop) & gladness is at sTop],  
         if l(sTop) = μ(Taro). # otherwise. 
This logical form has a truth value only for a situation which satisfies (iii) and (iv). 
   (v) l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & sTop  s 
   (vi) l(sTop) = μ(Taro) 
These two conditions can be satisfied only by a situation s whose location is the speaker’s mind and which 
includes sTop whose location is Taro’s mind. Such a situation can exist only when the speaker is Taro, 
because the location function l preserves the inclusion relation between situations. This means that (105) 
has a truth value only when the speaker is Taro, and it explains the Experiencer restriction. 
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 If the contribution of the Experincer, l(s) = μ(x), is not a presupposition but a part of the at-issue content 
as in (i), the right truth-value gap is not produced.  
    (i)  [[ uresi- ]] = λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x) & gladness is at s 
To see that, let us consider the logical form for the example sentence, (105), which is as follows. 
    (ii) [[ SAP ]]
c
 = λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. [l(s) = μ(Taro) & s ≈ sTop & t*   τ(s) & gladness is at s] 
The definedness condition of this logical form is satisfied if s is a situation whose location is physical or is 
the speaker’s mind. Thus, if the location of s is μ(speaker(c)) and the speaker is not Taro, then the logical 
form has a truth-value (the truth-value is false because the situation falsifies the relation l(s) = μ(Taro)). It 
does not fit with the judgment of the sentence. 
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3.6.2 The Experiencer restriction in negated root clauses in reportive style 
 Next, let us consider a negated root clause, (122). The negated sentence is not felicitously 
assertable if Taro is not the speaker, similarly to the affirmative counterpart. 
 
(122)  (When the speaker is not Taro) 
  *Tarô-wa    uresi-ku    na-i                        yo. 
  Taro-Top  glad-Pred  Neg-Pred.be.Pres  SFP 
  (Intended:) ‘Taro is not glad.’ 
 
The calculation goes as follows. 
 
(123)         SAP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop & t*   τ(s) & 
          ¬ (gladness is at s)] 
        
  Assert   TopicP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop & t*   τ(s) & ¬ (gladness is at s)] 
               
            sTop     Topic′: λs′ λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ s′ & t*  τ(s) & ¬ (gladness is at s)] 
            
                 Topic         TP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). t*  τ(s) & ¬(gladness is at s′)  
                     
                Pres          NegP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). ¬ (gladness is at s) 
                  λs. t*  τ(s)   
        Neg            AspP1: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s 
          |       
                                     na-     Asp1              VP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s 
                             ‘not’        |              
                   λp.λs.¬p(s)   Asp           V                PredP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s  
                            
                     -i       NP              Pred′:   
                                    ‘is’       |         λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s 
                             Tarô           
              uresi-k                    
                      ‘glad’ 
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This calculation yields the correct interpretation of (122). The logical form has a truth value only 
if Taro is the speaker, and has the value 1 if Taro is not glad at the utterance time. 
 
3.6.3 Absence of the Experiencer restriction in root clauses in the nonreportive style 
 Next, let us consider a root clause in the nonreportive style. As stated above, a root clause 
in the nonreportive style does not restrict an Experiencer inside of it. Let us take (124) for 
illustration. 
 
(124)  (In third-person narrative) 
  Tarô-wa    uresi-k-at-ta. 
  Taro-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘Taro was glad.’ 
 
Its logical form is calculated as follows. (From here, I omit tense and aspect because they do not 
have any impact on the derivation of the Experiencer restriction, as shown in the calculations in 
the previous sections.) Recall that crucially, when a sentence is in nonreportive style, it lacks a 
SAP. Consequently, nothing will require that the topic situation, if not physical, be the speaker’s 
mind. 
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(125)              TopicP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). s ≈ sTop & gladness is at s 
                       
                     sTop      Topic′: λs′ λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). s ≈ s′ & gladness is at s 
          
                        Topic        VP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s 
             
                      V         PredP:  λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s  
                                           
                -i       NP           Pred′:  λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s   
                             |             
               Tarô         uresi-k                     
                 ‘glad’ 
 
Now, the definedness condition of the logical form is just that the location of the situation s is 
Taro’s mind. It can be satisfied whoever utters sentence (124), so the Experiencer (Taro) is surely 
not restricted. 
 The point is that root clauses in the nonreportive style do not have a SAP, so the 
definedness condition which a SA has is not imposed on their logical form. 
 
3.7 The Experiencer restriction in embedded clauses 
3.7.1 Embedded clauses under verbs of saying 
 As explained in section 2.3.2.1, an Experiencer in a to-complement clause under a verb of 
saying is restricted to the local speaker, as in (126), while an Experiencer in a no-complement 
clause under a verb of saying is not. 
 
(126)  Hanakoi-wa    [{kanozyoi/*Tarô}-wa  uresi-i-to]                        it-ta. 
  Hanakoi-Top  [{shei/Taro}-Top           glad-Pred.be.Pres-Rep]  say-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi said that {shei was/*Taro was} glad.’ 
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 The point is that there is an Assert head in a SAP in the embedded to-complement clause 
under a verb of saying, and it yields the Experiencer restriction. In the case of a no-complement 
clause embedded under a verb of saying, it does not contain a SAP (note that a no-complement 
clause is smaller than SAP (see (29)), so the Experiencer restriction does not emerge, as in the 
case of a root clause in nonreportive style.  
 As an example, let us consider the following sentence. 
 
(127)  *Hanako-wa   [Tarô-wa   uresi-i-to]                       yu-u. 
    Hanako-Top [Taro-Top  glad-Pred.be.Pres-Rep] say-Pres 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanako says that Taro is glad.’ 
 
The LF of the to-clause of (127), Tarô-wa uresi-i-to, is calculated as follows. It is assumed that 
the Rep head does not have a relevant semantic contribution. 
 
(128)             RepP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop & 
          gladness is at s] 
        
  Rep       SAP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop &  
     |             gladness is at s] 
    to        
              Assert    TopicP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). s ≈ sTop & gladness is at s 
                       
                     sTop      Topic′: λs′ λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). s ≈ s′ & gladness is at s 
          
                        Topic        VP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s 
             
                      V         PredP:  λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s  
                                           
                -i       NP           Pred′:  λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s   
                             |             
               Tarô         uresi-k                     
                 ‘glad’ 
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The LF of the matrix VP is given in (130). Here, I omit a condition on the counterparts of the 
topic situation of the matrix clause imposed by matrix assertion, because it is relevant to the event 
described by the matrix clause (namely the event of saying) but is irrelevant to the Experiencer 
restriction in the to-clause. For concreteness, I suppose lexical entry (129) for the verb of saying 
yu-u ‘say’ (the temporal coordinate which is represented in it is omitted below). Here, Φ means a 
to-complement clause, which is of type s,t.  
 
(129)  [[ say Φ ]]c = λΦ.λs′.λx.λs. for any context c′ compatible with what x says at t(c) in s, 
[[ Φ]]c′(s′).73 
 
The LF of (127) is given as in (130). 
 
                                                          
73
 In a toID-clause under a verb of saying, first- (and second-)person pronouns always refer to the matrix 
speaker and addressee, respectively, as explained in section 2.1.1. Therefore, for this analysis to be viable, 
it is necessary to suppose that the Japanese first- and second-person pronouns are evaluated with respect to 
the matrix context (while the Japanese Assert is evaluated with respect to the local context), in line with 
Schlenker’s (2003) treatment of shiftable and non-shiftable indexicals. A conceptual problem of this 
approach is that it does not explain the observation that indexicals shift together in a clause in languages 
like Slave and Zazaki (Anand and Nevins 2004, Anand 2006). Currently, however, it does not seem that 
there is Japanese-internal evidence against the Schlenkerian approach. Sudo (2012) proposes an analysis in 
the line of Anand (2006) which covers Japanese, claiming that ‘direct’ discourse introduced by toDD is 
actually a shifted context and that it shows shift together. But his Japanese data is questionable. For 
example, he states that wh-phrases in a toDD-clause can take a wide scope (i.e., a scope wider than the to-
clause) and that Kuno (1988) agrees with the judgment. However, Kuno himself states that wh-phrases in 
such an environment cannot take a wide scope (and I agree with Kuno). Also, Kuno claims that extraction 
from toDD-clauses is banned. Kuno’s (and my) judgment suggests that toDD really introduces direct 
discourse, which is unintegrated to the matrix clause, contrary to Sudo’s claim. 
 Another possible analysis, which does not assume (129), is that Assert does not involve speaker(c) 
as in (i) but involves a semantic parameter for the Experiencer, h, as in (ii), and h is set to the matrix 
speaker at a SAP in a matrix clause and to the subject of a verb of saying at a SAP in a toID-clause under the 
verb of saying. 
    (i) λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. [s ≈ sTop & p(s)] 
    (ii) λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(h)}. [s ≈ sTop & p(s)] 
(The semantic parameter for the Experiencer is explained in more detail in chapter 5. Although the chapter 
explains a feature-checking analysis of the Experiencer restriction in addition to the semantic parameter, 
involvement of the parameter in an analysis of the Experiencer restriction is a separate matter from 
involvement of feature checking.) This analysis avoids the above-mentioned potential problem related to 
context shift. 
 I leave the problem to decide which analysis is superior for future work. 
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(130)               VP 
          
     NP                  V′ 
                        
  Hanako    sres                V′ 
                     
                 V                RepP 
             |                  
                yu-      Tarô-wa uresi-i-to 
                                   ‘say’      ‘that Taro is glad’ 
 
It is calculated as follows. 
 
(131)  [[ Hanako sres says that Taro is glad ]]
c 
  = [[ sres says that Taro is glad ]]
c
([[Hanako]]
c
) 
  = ([[ says that Taro is glad ]]
c
 (sres))(Hanako) 
  = λs. c′ compatible with what Hanako says in s, [[that Taro is glad]]c′(sres) 
  = λs. c′ compatible with what Hanako says in s, (λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c′))} & 
l(s) = μ(Taro).[s ≈ sTop & gladness is at s])(sres) 
  = λs. c′ compatible with what Hanako says in s, sres ≈ sTop & gladness is at sres, 
   if l(sres) Dph  {μ(speaker(c′)) & l(sres) = μ(Taro). # otherwise. 
 
The definedness condition is satisfied only if Taro is the speaker in the reported context, c′. This 
explains the Experiencer restriction. Taro is not the speaker in the reported context c′ for sentence 
(127), so the sentence does not have a truth-value. 
 
3.7.2 Embedded clauses under attitude verbs of thinking, believing and knowing 
 Attitude verbs such as believe and know do not impose the Experiencer restriction in 
complement clauses. It is because these verbs do not involve speech acts. In other words, what is 
thought, believed or known is not asserted. Thus, complement clauses of these non-
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communicational verbs do not contain an SAP, different from to-clauses under verbs of saying. 
Therefore, the Experiencer restriction does not emerge in an embedded clause under non-
communicational attitude verbs. 
 
3.7.3 Embedded clauses under epistemic modals and evidentials 
3.7.3.1 Embedded clauses under epistemic modals 
 Let us consider a sentence with an epistemic modal, as in (132). It shows no Experiencer 
restriction. 
 
(132)  Tarô-wa   uresi-i                    nitigaina-i. 
  Taro-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres  must-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘Taro must be glad.’ 
 
The lack of the Experiencer restriction is expected because epistemic modals are quantifiers over 
situations, as reproduced below. 
 
(89) a. [[ might ]]
c
 = λpλs s′ [Accc(s)(s′) & p(s′) ]   (Kratzer 2014: (18a)) 
 b. [[ must ]]
c
 = λpλs s′ [Accc(s)(s′) & p(s′) ] 
 
Note that the evaluation situation s′ for the embedded proposition, Taro was glad, is not a topic 
situation introduced by Topic[assert]. Instead, s′ is a situation accessible to the topic situation. 
There is no special reason to suppose that the accessibility relation keeps the constraint that the 
mental location of the situation is the plurality of the minds of people with whom the speaker 
identifies. Therefore, it is plausible that Topic[assert] at the top of the sentence does not force the 
Experiencer restriction on an Experiencer in an embedded clause under an epistemic modal.  
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3.7.3.2 Embedded clauses under evidentials 
 Let us consider a sentence with an evidential, as in (133). It also shows no Experiencer 
restriction. 
 
(133)  Tarô-wa   uresi-i                    yôda. 
  Taro-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres  Evid 
  ‘It seems that Taro is glad.’ 
 
 Two types of evidentials are found in literature: epistemic modals and modifiers of 
speech act. In the case of Japanese, McCready and Ogata (2006) analyze all evidential markers as 
epistemic modals. If their analysis is on the right track, the same argument as above can be 
applied. The evaluation situation for the embedded proposition is not a topic situation introduced 
by Topic[assert], so the Experiencer restriction does not emerge. If (some) Japanese evidential 
markers are modifiers of speech act, the fact of absence of the Experiencer restrictions in 
embedded clauses under evidentials suggests that assertion modified by these modifiers do not 
impose the speaker-empathy restriction on a topic situation. 
 
3.8 The Experiencer restriction in vivid memory report 
 Vivid memory reports restrict an Experiencer. However, it cannot be the case that the 
reported content (what is remembered) contains an assertive speech act. In this section, I give an 
explanation of this fact, using situation semantic treatment by Barwise (1981), Stephenson (2010) 
and others. 
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3.8.1 Direct perception report and situations 
 Barwise (1981) compares direct and indirect perception reports such as (134a,b).  
 
(134) a Austin saw a man get shaved in Oxford.    
 b. Austin saw that a man got shaved in Oxford.  (Barwise 1981: 371 (1),(2)) 
 
The complement of direct perception report is transparent, while that of indirect perception report 
is opaque: for example, suppose that the man who got shaved in Oxford who Austin saw was 
Barwise. Then (135a) is a valid inference, but (135b) isn’t. 
 
(135) a. Austin saw Barwise get shaved in Oxford.  
 b. Austin saw that Barwise got shaved in Oxford. 
 
To account for the characteristics of direct perception reports, Barwise proposes that in direct 
perception reports, what is reported to be perceived is a situation. For example, direct perception 
report, Beryl saw Meryl feed the animals, can be analyzed as in (136). 
 
(136)   There is an actual past situation s that Beryl saw, and s supports the truth of Meryl feed 
the animals.      (Kratzer 2014: (5)) 
 
3.8.2 Vivid memory report 
 Stephenson (2010) finds that attitude reports such as remember and imagine have a vivid 
reading which is similar to that of a direct perception report. For example, let us consider the 
following sentence pair. 
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(137) a. Mary remembered John feeding the cat. 
 b. Mary remembered that John fed the cat.  (Stephenson 2010: 147(1),(2)) 
 
 
(137a) can be true only if Mary witnessed the situation where John fed the cat, while (137b) can 
be true even if Mary was only told about John’s feeding the cat. Stephenson (2010) calls the use 
exemplified by (137a) the vivid use, which requires direct witnessing of the situation, and the 
other use the non-vivid use, which does not require direct witnessing. 
 As (137a) shows, gerundive small clause complements have only a vivid use. The vivid 
use is also forced by modifiers such as vividly or in perfect detail, as shown in (138). Without 
vividly, (138) has a non-vivid interpretation also. 
 
(138)  Mary vividly remembered that John was busy feeding the cat. 
         (Stephenson 2010: 149 (12)) 
 
 Similarly to the analysis of direct perception reports by Barwise and others, Stephenson 
proposes a situation semantic analysis of the vivid use of memory/imagination reports. She, 
however, makes an addition: she claims that an analysis of de se vivid reports requires centered 
situations, not just situations, extending Lewis’s (1979) and Chierchia’s (1989) analyses of de se 
attitude reports using centered worlds. I follow Stephenson’s analysis of vivid memory reports 
here, but my analysis does not depend on how one treats de se vivid reports. What is relevant to 
my analysis is the requirement of direct witnessing of a situation, as we will see. 
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3.8.3 Analysis of vivid memory report 
 In the formulation by Stephenson (2010), the verb remember in its vivid reading takes 
three arguments, a propositional content, a centered situation, and an agent. Concretely, 
remember in the vivid use has the following lexical entry (Stephenson uses an intensional system). 
 
(139)  [[ remember ]]
w,t
 = [λp. [λs,y: p(s,y) = 1. [λx. x has the cognitive relation of 
remembering vividly towards s,y in w at t] ] ] 
         (Stephenson 2010: 153 (29)) 
 
She explains this as follows: “This says that a sentence of the form x remembers p, making 
reference to a particular centered situation s,y, is true at world w and time t iff x holds the 
appropriate vivid cognitive relation towards s,y, provided that p is true in s,y.” The cognitive 
relation of remembering vividly towards s,y is characterized as in (140). 
 
(140)  For x to vividly remember s,y (in w at t), it must be the case that: 
  i. x formed a memory of s by directly witnessing it 
  ii. x’s experience of s is from the perspective of y 
  iii. the time of s is prior to t 
  iv. s ≤ w (for true memories) 
        (Stephenson 2010: 513 (30)) 
 
 Let us see how a vivid interpretation of memory reports is derived from this lexical entry 
for remember. For example, a gerundive small clause complement, John feeding the cat, is 
translated as in (141) (a finite clause complement, that John feeds the cat, is also translated into 
the same LF). 
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(141)  [[ John feeding the cat ]]
w,t
 = [λs,y. John feeds the cat in s] 
         (Stephenson 2010: 514 (33)) 
 
In this case, the LF is independent of the center, y. However, in the case of controlled 
complement clauses, their LF is dependent on the center: 
 
(142)  [[ feeding the cat ]]
w,t
 = [λs,y. y feeds the cat in s] 
         (Stephenson 2010: 514 (34)) 
 
For example, a sentence, John remembered feeding the cat, is calculated as follows (here, tense is 
ignored). 
 
(143)  [[ John remembered feeding the cat ]]
w,t
 = [[ remember]]
w,t
 ([[ feeding the 
cat ]]
w,t
)(s1,z)([[ John ]]
w,t
) 
  = [λp. [λs,y: p(s,y) = 1. [λxe. x has the cognitive relation of remembering vividly 
towards s,y in w at t] ] ]([λs,y. y feeds the cat in s])(s1,z)(John) 
  = 1 iff John has the cognitive relation of remembering vividly towards s1,z in w at t, 
provided that z feeds the cat in s1. 
         (Stephenson 2010: 515 (36)) 
 
In this case, for John to remember vividly s1,z, it must be the case that his experience of s1 is 
from the perspective of z (from condition (ii) of (140)). It leads to the conclusion that John’s 
experience is from the perspective of the feeder of the cat, namely that John fed the cat and his 
memory is from inside. 
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3.8.4 The Experiencer restriction in vivid memory report 
 As explained in the previous chapter, vivid memory report restricts Experiencers, as in 
(144). In this section, I present an analysis of this fact, based on Stephenson’s observation that 
vivid memory reports require direct witnessing. 
 
(144) a. *Hanako-wa   [Tarô-ga      uresi-k-at-ta          no]-o        oboe-tei-ru 
     Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past  Fin]-Acc  remember-Perf-Pres 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanako remembers that Taro was glad.’ 
 b. Hanakoi-wa   [kanozyoi-ga    uresi-k-at-ta           no]-o        oboe-tei-ru 
   Hanakoi-Top [shei-Nom        glad-Pred-be-Past  Fin]-Acc  remember-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Hanakoi remembers that shei was glad.’ 
 
 Let us recall (140.i). A vivid memory report shows that the agent formed a memory of a 
particular situation s which supports a reported propositional content by directly witnessing the 
situation. Note that a sentient individual a cannot directly witness a situation if its location is not 
in Dph  {μ(a)}, as stated in (100): 
 
(100)  For a  Dsen and situation s,  
  a can directly witness s  s is observable to a  l(s)  Dsp  {μ(a)} 
 
Therefore, (140.i) requires (145) as a necessary condition. 
 
(145)  For x to vividly remember s,y (in w at t), it must be the case that 
  l(s)  Dph  {μ(x)} 
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Now, using the lexical entry for uresi-i ‘be glad’ (99),  
 
(99)  [[ uresi-i ]] = λx.λs. l(s) = μ(x) & gladness is in s] 
 
let us calculate (144a) (in the following, I use English translations for easy of presentation). 
 
(146)  [[ Hanako remembers that Taro was glad ]]
w,t
 = [[ remember]]
w,t
 ([[ that Taro was 
glad ]]
w,t
)(s1,z)([[ Hanako ]]
w,t
) 
  = [λp. [λs,y: p(s,y) = 1. [λxe. x has the cognitive relation of remembering vividly 
towards s,y in w at t] ] ]([λs,y. [s′.s  s′ & l(s′) = μ(Taro) & gladness is in 
s′])(s1,z)(Hanako) 
  = 1 iff Hanako has the cognitive relation of remembering vividly towards s1,z in w at 
t, provided that [s′.s1  s′ & l(s′) = μ(Taro) & gladness is in s′]. 
 
Because of the conditions s′.s1  s′ & l(s′) = μ(Taro) in (146), we see that condition (147) needs 
to be met for the sentence Hanako-wa Tarô-ga uresi-k-at-ta no-o oboe-tei-ru (‘Hanako 
remembers that Taro was glad’) to have a truth value. 
 
(147)  l(s1) = μ(Taro) 
 
Suppose that (147) is satisfied. Then the sentence cannot be true. Hanako has the cognitive 
relation of remembering vividly towards s1,z, so (148) must hold (see (145)). However, (147) 
and (148) are incompatible (because Taro is not Hanako and μ is the lattice isomorphism between 
Dsen, and Dm,). 
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(148)  l(s1)  Dph  {μ(Hanako)} 
 
Therefore, the sentence is not felicitously assertable for cooperative discourse participants.   
 
3.9 Absence of the Experiencer restriction in restrictive relative clauses 
 In restrictive relative clauses, an Experiencer is not restricted (Koyama 1966, Masuoka 
1997), as exemplified in (149). The Experiencer of the feeling of being glad in (149) is not the 
speaker, but (149) is acceptable. 
 
(149)  [sono nyûsu-o     kii-te     uresi-k-at-ta]            hito-wa 
[that  news-Acc  hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past]  person-Top 
  kinô          sono gi’in-no                   zimusyo-ni it-ta        (yo) 
yesterday  that   assemblyman-Gen  office-to     go-Past  (SFP) 
  ‘The person who was glad to hear the news went to the assemblyman’s office 
yesterday.’ 
 
This is a natural consequence of the semantics of situations. To see that, let us consider the 
following sentence, for example. 
 
(150)  [(sono toki) uresi-k-at-ta]             hito-wa        (tugi-no     hi-mo)    ki-ta            (yo). 
[(that   time) glad-Pred-be-Past]  person-Top  (next-Gen day-also) come-Past  (SFP) 
‘The person who was glad (at that time) came (next day also).’  
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The syntactic structure of (150) is given as follows. In this dissertation, I assume a movement 
analysis of relativization in Japanese, following Ishizuka (2009), for concreteness.
74
 “wh” 
represents a phonetically null relative pronoun. Recall that relative clauses have their own topic 
situation which can be different from the topic situation of the matrix clause, as argued in section 
3.3.3. SAP is present in reportive style, but not in nonreportive style. 
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 See Ishizuka (2008, 2009) for a comparison of the movement analysis and the base-generation analysis 
proposed by Kuno (1973) and others. My arguments do not depend on the choice. 
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(151)         (SAP) 
  
  (Assert)  TopicP 
          
   sTop     Topic′ 
              
                Topic       TP 
                      
               Past          VP 
                        
     -ta       DP             V′ 
                      
          D      NP3             ki-
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          |    ‘come’ 
        the  NP2           CP3            
                   
            s5          NP1  s4       CP2 
                                    
                     hito       whi       CP1 
                ‘person’              
      λx.λs. x is a person in s         C     TopicP 
                            
                   s′Top     Topic′ 
                      
                                 Topic           TP 
                                       
                              Past             VP 
                                       
                   -ta     V            PredP 
       λs′. τ(s′) < t*                 
                                         ar-  NP             Pred′ 
                                        ‘be’     |              
                    whi          uresi-k 
                            ‘glad’ 
 
 
The denotation of CP2 is given as follows. 
 
(152)  [[ whi TopicP ]]
c
  
  = λx.[[ TopicP ]]c,g[i→x] 
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 The citation form of this verb is ku-ru (‘come-Pres’). 
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  = λx. λs′: l(s′) = μ(x). [s′ ≈ s′Top & τ(s′) < t* & gladness is at s′] 
 
Note that it is not plausible that CP2 and NP1 combine directly, as in (153).  
 
(153)         NP  
            
        NP1              CP2 
                     
       hito  whi       CP1 
    ‘person’                       
      λx.λs. x is a person in s      C     TopicP 
                          
                  s′Top     Topic′ 
                    
                                Topic          TP 
                                     
                            Past             VP 
                                      
                   -ta     V           PredP 
       λs′. τ(s′) < t*                 
                                        ar-  NP             Pred′ 
                                        ‘be’     |              
                    whi          uresi-k 
                            ‘glad’ 
 
 
If (153) were the correct structure, the main predicate of the relative clause and the host NP were 
always evaluated with respect to the same situation, especially to the same time. However, there 
are examples in which the main predicate of a relative clause and its host NP are evaluated with 
respect to different times. For example, a person who heard a story about the childhood of George 
Washington (say, the cherry tree story) can assert (154). 
 
(154)  watasi-wa  [daitôryô-ni         nat-ta]RC         kodomo-no hanasi-o    kii-ta. 
  I-Top          [President-Pred  become-Past] child-Gen    story-Acc  hear-Past 
  ‘I heard a story about a child who became President.’ 
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Here, the time of becoming President is later than that of being a child. They are different and do 
not overlap. Because this kind of sentence is fine, I suppose that relative clauses and their host 
nouns combine with different situation pronouns, as in (151).
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 The denotation of the relative 
clause CP3 and that of NP2 in (151) are as follows. 
 
(155) a. [[ CP3 ]]
c
 = λx: l(s4) = μ(x). s4 ≈ s′Top & τ(s4) < t* & gladness is at s4 
 b. [[ NP2 ]]
c
 = λx. x is a person in s5 
 
They are combined by Predicate Modification. 
 
(156)  [[ NP3 ]]
c
  
  = [[ [ NP2 CP3 ] ]]
c 
  = λx: l(s4)=μ(x). x is a person in s5 & s4 ≈ s′Top & τ(s4) < t* & gladness is at s4 
 
Assuming that Japanese has a phonetically null counterpart of the English definite article the,
77
 it 
has the following lexical entry. 
 
(157)  [[ the ]]
c
 = λfe,t: !x. f(x)=1. the y such that f(y) = 1 
       (based on von Fintel & Heim 2007:81(152c)) 
 
                                                          
76
 Another possibility is that relative clauses existentially quantify over situations (cf. the referential 
analysis of tense (Partee 1973 and others) and the quantificational analysis of tense (Ogihara 1989, 
Kusumoto 1999 and others)). The choice of the analyses does not change the argumentation. In both the 
analyses, the definedness condition of Assert, which restricts the topic situation of the root clause, does not 
have an effect on the situation with respect to which the content of the relative clause is evaluated. 
77
 This is a simplification just for the sake of argument. 
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NP3 combines with the. 
 
(158)  [[ DP ]]
c
  
  = [[ [ the NP3 ] ]]
c
  
  = the y such that y is a person in s5 & l(s4)=μ(y) & s4 ≈ s′Top & τ(s4) < t* & gladness is 
at s4, if !x. [x is a person in s5 & l(s4)=μ(x) & s4 ≈ s′Top & τ(s4) < t* & gladness is at s4]. 
  # otherwise. 
 
It means that the denotation of DP is defined if there is exactly one individual who is a person in 
s5 and was glad in s4, which is in the past and is a counterpart of the topic situation of the relative 
clause, s′Top. When defined, it denotes the unique person in s5 who was glad in s4, which is in the 
past and is a counterpart of the topic situation of the relative clause, s′Top. SAP of (151) has the 
following denotation. 
 
(159)  [[ SAP ]]
c
 
  = λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. [s ≈ sTop & τ(s) < t* & ιy[y is a person in s5 & 
l(s4)=μ(y) & s4 ≈ s′Top & τ(s4) < t* & gladness is at s4] comes in s], 
  if !x. [x is a person in s5 & l(s4)=μ(x) & s4 ≈ s′Top & τ(s4) < t* & gladness is at s4]. 
  # otherwise. 
 
It means that the unique person denoted by DP came in a situation s which is in the past and is a 
counterpart of the topic situation of the root clause, sTop, if the location of the situation s is 
physical or the speaker’s mind. Note that the definedness condition of Assert at the root, namely 
the condition that the location of the situation s is physical or the speaker’s mind, restricts the 
situation variable with respect to which the main predicate of the root clause, but there is no 
95 
principle which connects the situation variable s with the situation pronoun s4 at the top of the 
relative clause. Therefore, the Experiencer restriction does not emerge.  
 
3.10 The Experiencer restriction in interrogatives 
 In interrogative sentences, the Experiencer is restricted to the addressee, as in (160). 
 
(160)  (When Taro is not the addressee:) 
  {*boku/kimi/*Tarô}-wa    uresi-i                    (ka)? 
  {*I       /you/*Tarô}-Top   glad-Pred.be.Pres   Q 
  ‘{*Am I/Are you/*Is Taro} glad?’ 
 
In this section, let us consider how this restriction emerges.   
 In section 3.4, I proposed that an assertive SA head (Assert) in Japanese requires that the 
location of the topic situation be physical or be the speaker’s mind, (103). 
 
(103)  [[ Assert ]]
g,c
 = λp.λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. p(s) 
 
Here, I propose that an interrogative Force head in Japanese requires that the location of the topic 
situation be physical or be the addressee’s mind.  
 
(161)  [[ Quest ]]
g,c
 = λp.λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(addr(c))}. p(s) 
 
To make the calculation concrete, let us use a proposition set approach for interrogatives 
(Hamblin 1973, Karttunen 1977). According to Hamblin’s treatment of interrogatives, the 
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meaning of interrogatives is a set of possible answers. Thus, the interrogative Force head Q which 
produces a polar question has meaning (162). 
 
(162)  [[ Q ]]
g,c
 = λp.λs.{p(s), ¬p(s)}  
 
 To see that (162) leads to the Experiencer restriction in interrogatives, let us consider the 
meaning of (163), which is an unacceptable sentence unless Taro is the addressee. 
 
(163)  Tarô-wa   uresi-i                     Q? 
  Taro-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres   Q 
  ‘Is Taro glad?’ (* unless Taro is the addressee) 
 
Using it, the meaning of (163) is given as in (164). 
 
(164)         SAP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(addr(c))} & l(s) = μ(Taro). {s ≈ sTop & gladness is at s,  
   s ≈ sTop & ¬(gladness is at s)} 
        
  Quest    ForceP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). {s ≈ sTop & gladness is at s, s ≈ sTop & ¬(gladness is  
          at s)} 
                             
              Q       TopicP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). s ≈ sTop & gladness is at s 
                                      
                       sTop     Topic′: λs′ λs: (s) = μ(Taro). s ≈ s′ & gladness is at s 
            
                  Topic        VP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s 
                         
     V         PredP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s 
                         
     -i        NP           Pred′: λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s  
                 ‘is’  |             
                 Tarô         uresi-k    
                       ‘glad’ 
 
The logical form is defined only if Taro is the addressee. This is the Experiencer restriction. 
97 
 
3.11 The denotation of the verbal suffix -gar 
 Finally, let us consider the denotation of the verbal suffix -gar ‘behave as being …’, 
which lifts the Experiencer restriction, in more detail.  
 How does -gar lift the restriction? Gar-suffixation is systematically applicable, so I 
assume that it is an operation in the syntactic component (vid. Marantz 1997), and that 
compositional semantic calculation is viable. I propose the following meaning for -gar. 
 
(165)  [[ -gar ]]
c
 = λfe,s,t.λx.λs. x behaves in s in a way which suggests that s′[τ(s′)=τ(s) & 
f(x)(s′) = 1]. 
 
For example, if uresi- ‘glad’ and -gar are combined as follows. 
 
(166)  [[ uresi-gar ]]
c
  
  = [[ -gar ]]
c
([[ uresi- ]]
c
)  
  = (λfe,s,t.λx.λs. x behaves in s in a way which suggests that s′[τ(s′)=τ(s) & f(x)(s′) = 
1]) (λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s) 
  =  λx.λs. x behaves in s in a way which suggests that s′[τ(s′)=τ(s) & l(s′) = μ(x) & 
gladness is at s′]  
 
It means that an individual x (which corresponds to the referent of the subject) behaves in a 
situation s in a way which suggests that x is glad at the same time. (Concretely, the location of s′ 
is x’s mind, while the location of s is physical.) Note that it is not a partial but a total function. 
Hence, the Experience restriction does not emerge (recall that the Experiencer restriction emerges 
from the definedness condition on the meaning of the Experiencer predicate and that on Assert). 
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 For illustration, let us consider the following sentence. 
 
(167)  Tarô-wa   uresi-gat-ta        yo. 
  Taro-Top glad-GAR-Past  SFP 
  ‘Taro behaved as being glad.’ 
 
Its logical form is calculated as follows (tense and aspect are omitted). 
 
(168)         SAP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. [s ≈ sTop & Taro behaves in s in a way which 
   suggests that s′[τ(s′)=τ(s) & l(s′) = μ(Taro) & gladness is at s′] 
  
  Assert    TopicP: λs.[s ≈ sTop & Taro behaves in s in a way which suggests that s′[τ(s′) 
      |         =τ(s) & l(s′) = μ(Taro) & gladness is at s′] 
     yo     
   sTop     Topic′: λs′′ λs.[s ≈ s′′ & Taro behaves in s in a way which suggests that s′ 
    [τ(s′)=τ(s) & l(s′) = μ(Taro) & gladness is at s′] 
            
                Topic          VP: λs: Taro behaves in s in a way which suggests that s′[τ(s′)= 
     τ(s) & l(s′) = μ(Taro) & gladness is at s′] 
                     
               NP                    V: λx.λs. x behaves in s in a way which suggests that  
                      s′[τ(s′)=τ(s) & l(s′) = μ(x) & gladness is at s′] 
                      Tarô       uresi-            -gar  
 
The logical form for SAP gives the truth condition that the sentence is true for a situation s if s is 
a counterpart of the topic situation sTop and Taro behaves in s in a way which suggests that Taro is 
glad at the same time, τ(s). It is a right paraphrase of ‘Taro behaved as being glad’. Importantly, 
this logical form has a truth value, whoever the subject of the sentence is. In other words, gar-
verbs do not show the Experiencer restriction.
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 A fact which should be mentioned is that gar-verbs do not prefer the speaker as an Experiencer (Nitta 
1991, Sawada 1993, Kamada 2000 and others): 
   (i)  watasi-wa uresi-{k-at-/??gat}-ta              yo. 
         I-Top        glad-{Pred-be/??GAR}-Past  SFP 
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 CHAPTER 4
NON-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSES AND THE EXPERIENCER 
RESTRICTION 
4.1 Introduction 
 In this section, I consider Experiencer restrictions in non-restrictive relative clauses. 
 In the previous literature, it is observed that restrictive clauses do not impose the 
Experiencer restriction, while non-restrictive relative clauses do (Masuoka 1997). However, the 
observation is applicable to non-restrictive relative clauses only in extensional contexts. In the 
following, I add new data: (i) an Experiencer in a non-restrictive relative clause is restricted to the 
local speaker if the relative clause is in the scope of a verb of saying, whereas (ii) it is not 
restricted if the relative clause is in the scope of a non-communicational attitude verb. 
 This is a familiar pattern now—under assertion or a verb of saying, an Experiencer is 
restricted to the local speaker, but under a non-communicative attitude verb, it is not restricted. 
The only difference is that now the Experiencer is further embedded in a non-restrictive relative 
clause. To analyze it, it is necessary to have an analysis of Japanese non-restrictive relative 
clauses in general. In the following, I first show that Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses 
resist being in the scope of operators in higher clauses, but they can be embedded under to-
                                                                                                                                                                             
        ‘I {was glad/behaved as being glad}.’ 
According to the proposed lexical entry for -gar, it is suggested by use of gar-verbs that the referent of the 
subject NP is in a certain mental state. It is plausible that -gar signals the speaker’s lack of direct evidence 
that the referent of the subject NP is in the mental state (cf. von Fintel and Gillies’ 2010 analysis of must). 
Then, it is reasonable that the speaker cannot be the Experiencer argument of gar-verbs, because the 
speaker usually has direct evidence of his/her own feelings. An apparent problem of this analysis is that 
addition of -mi-se-ru ‘let (someone/them) see’ makes the speaker Experiencer fine: 
   (ii) watasi-wa uresi-gat-te         mi-se-ta 
         I-Top        glad-GAR-Conn see-let-Past 
        ‘I let him see me behave as being glad.’ 
To solve this problem, it is necessary to analyze the meaning of the construction V-te mi-se-ru in detail. I 
leave it for future work. 
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complements of attitude verbs. To account for this observation, I employ an analysis proposed by 
Schlenker (2010, 2013a,b) for English and French appositive relative clauses, and propose that 
Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are attached to ForceP, whether matrix or embedded. 
Then I argue that the Experiencer restriction in non-restrictive relative clauses is accounted for in 
a way similar to the Experiencer restriction in the other environments analyzed in the previous 
chapter. That is, the source of the Experiencer restriction in non-restrictive relative clauses is 
assertion’s speaker-empathy requirement. 
 
4.2 Restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses in Japanese 
 Different from English, it is not easy to distinguish non-restrictive relative clauses and 
restrictive relative clauses in Japanese. In particular, Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses do 
not use comma intonation. To single out non-restrictive relative clauses in Japanese, I use relative 
clauses with host nouns which refer to a singleton in the discourse, as in (169). 
 
(169)  [NRRC watasi-ga kinô           at-ta         ] {Tarô/Hanako-no   hahaoya} 
  [NRRC I-Nom      yesterday  meet-Past ] {Taro/Hanako-Gen mother} 
  (lit.) ‘{Taro/Hanako’s mother}, who I met yesterday’ 
 
It should be noted that, depending on the discourse, the host nouns in example (169) can be 
interpreted as non-singletons. That is, in a discourse in which there is more than one person 
whose name is Taro or Hanako, the host nouns in (169) do not refer to a singleton, and so the 
relative clause can be restrictive. In the following, when a proper noun appears in an example, it 
is always assumed that there is only a single individual to whom the name refers in the discourse. 
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 Restrictive relative clauses do not restrict an Experiencer in them (Masuoka 1997), as 
exemplified in (149), reproduced below. The absence of an Experiencer restriction in restrictive 
relative clauses was accounted for in the previous chapter.  
 
(170)  [sono nyûsu-o     kii-te     uresi-k-at-ta]            hito-wa 
  [that  news-Acc  hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past]  man-Top 
  kinô          sono gi’in-no                   zimusyo-ni it-ta        yo 
  yesterday  that   assemblyman-Gen  office-to     go-Past  SFP 
  ‘The man who was glad to hear the news went to the assemblyman’s office yesterday.’ 
 
On the other hand, non-restrictive relative clauses restrict an Experiencer to the speaker (Masuoka 
1997). In (171), Taro, a third-person individual, cannot be the Experiencer if (171) is uttered in a 
truth-directed context. (If it is uttered in a non-truth-directed context, the restriction disappears. 
For example, if this sentence is part of a story which the speaker is narrating, then there is no 
problem in using Taro as an Experiencer.) 
 
(171)  [sono nyûsu-o     kii-te     uresi-k-at-ta]           {watasi/*Taro}-wa 
  [that  news-Acc  hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past] {I/Taro}-Top 
  kinô          sono gi’in-no                   zimusyo-ni it-ta        yo 
  yesterday  that   assemblyman-Gen  office-to     go-Past  SFP 
  ‘{I/*Taro}, who was glad to hear the news, went to the assemblyman’s office 
yesterday.’  
 
 To find an analysis of restrictions on an Experiencer in non-restrictive relative clauses is 
the goal of this chapter. As a first step, let us look at analyses of non-restrictive relative clauses in 
the next section. 
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4.3 Analyses of non-restrictive relative clauses 
 Currently, it is a cross-linguistically disputed topic whether non-restrictive relative 
clauses are non-embeddable (‘scopeless’). Prima facie, non-restrictive relative clauses are non-
embeddable. For example, let us consider the following pair, taken from Schlenker (2010:75). 
 
(172) a. I doubt that John, who is smart, is competent. 
  ⇒ John is smart. 
 b. I doubt that John is smart and competent. 
  ⇒ John is smart. 
 
(172b) shows that ‘John is smart’ is in the scope of the attitude predicate. The contrast between 
(172b) and (172a) suggests that the content of the non-restrictive relative clause is not in the 
scope of the attitude predicate. 
 Potts (2005) claims that non-restrictive relative clauses
79
 cannot be semantically 
embedded. To account for the observation, he proposes an analysis using a multidimensional 
semantics. In his analysis, the content of non-restrictive relative clauses is not in the at-issue 
meaning. Instead, it is in a different dimension of meaning, which Potts calls CI (conventional 
implicature) meaning. CI meanings are never embedded in his system, so the meaning of non-
restrictive relative clauses is supposed to be a good example of conventional implicature in his 
analysis. 
                                                          
79
 Potts himself avoids the term, non-restrictive relative clause, and prefers the term, supplementary 
relative. See section 4.2.3 of Potts (2005). 
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 However, since Potts’ analysis, it has been pointed out that there are data which suggest 
that non-restrictive relative clauses are embeddable (Amaral, Roberts, and Smith 2007, Potts 
2007, Harris and Potts 2009a,b, Schlenker 2010, 2013a,b, Sæbø 2011, and others). On the one 
hand, some researchers claim that those data can be explained by assuming a pragmatic 
perspective shift and they do not show that non-restrictive relative clauses are embeddable (Harris 
and Potts 2009a,b). On the other hand, some researchers propose that those data indicate that non-
restrictive relative clauses are really embeddable, and claim that multidimensional semantics is 
unnecessary to account for the behavior of non-restrictive relative clauses (Sæbø  2011, Schlenker 
2010, 2013a,b). 
 The dispute is not limited in English. For example, Del Gobbo (2003, 2005) claims that 
Chinese non-restrictive relative clauses are embeddable, while Constant (2011) claims that they 
are not embeddable. In the next section, let us consider the case of Japanese. 
 
4.4 Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses 
 To my knowledge, the problem of embeddability of Japanese non-restrictive relative 
clauses has not been discussed in detail in the literature except Miyake (1995).
80
 In this section, I 
present the following observations. 
 
(173) a. Negative polarity items (NPIs) in non-restrictive relative clauses are not licensed by a 
matrix negation operator (Miyake 1995) 
 b. Tense of non-restrictive relative clauses is not in the scope of the matrix tense (Miyake 
1995) 
                                                          
80
 Sato (2012) also contains some related examples. 
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 c. Indeterminate phrases in non-restrictive relative clauses are not licensed by the matrix 
Q (Miyake 1995) 
 d. Even inside of a topic DP, a non-restrictive relative clause can represent information 
which is not taken for granted 
 e. Narrow reading under to-complements of attitude verbs is available 
 
These data are consistent with the claim that Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are attached 
to matrix or embedded ForceP (at least at LF).
81
 
 
4.4.1 NPIs in non-restrictive relative clauses are not licensed by a matrix negation operator 
 In Japanese, although NPIs in restrictive relative clauses can be licensed by matrix 
negation (Kinsui 1986), NPIs in non-restrictive relative clauses are not licensed by matrix 
negation (Miyake 1995). It is consistent with the hypothesis that non-restrictive relative clauses 
are not in the scope of matrix negation, different from restrictive relative clauses. 
 Let us consider expressions, rokuna (‘satisfactory, worth mentioning’) and kore-to it-ta 
(‘any remarkable’) as examples of NPIs (Kinsui 1986). As the following examples show, they 
need to be licensed by negation.
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81
 Here, I am not claiming that all these data are consequences of the attachment of Japanese non-restrictive 
relative clauses to ForceP. What I am saying (consistency) is weaker than that. Maybe some of them are 
accounted for by other mechanisms than the position of the non-restrictive relative clause. 
82
 It is often the case that NPIs are licensed in downward-entailing environment in general. Downward-
entailing environments include not only negated clauses but also conditionals. In the case of the above 
Japanese NPIs, rokuna is not licensed in conditionals, but kore-to it-ta is: 
 (i) *rokuna         sensyu-ga     tor-e-reba,      tîmu-wa   rainen       yusyô  
        satisfactory player-Nom  take-Ability-if  team-Top next.year win.the.championship 
      deki-ru   kamosirenai. 
      can-Pres might 
      (Intended:) ‘If we can take satisfactory players, our team might be able to win the  
      championship next year.’ 
 (ii) kore-to it-ta       kiroku-ga    de-reba, kanozyo-wa suisens-are-ru               darô. 
       any remarkable  record-Nom set-if      she-Top        nominate-Pass-Pres  Epis 
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(174) a. rokuna          sensyu-ga     tor-e-na-k-at-ta.    
  satisfactory   player-Nom  take-Ability-Neg-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘We couldn’t take any satisfactory players.’   (Kinsui 1986:620(56))83 
 b. *rokuna          sensyu-ga     tor-e-ta.     
    satisfactory   player-Nom  take-Ability-Past 
  (Intended:) ‘We could take satisfactory players.’  (Miyake 1995:56(21a)) 
 
(175) a. kore-to it-ta      kiroku-ga      de-na-k-at-ta. 
any remarkable  record-Nom  set-Neg-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘Any remarkable records weren’t created.’ 
 b. *kore-to it-ta       kiroku-ga     de-ta. 
    any remarkable   record-Nom  set-Past 
  (Intended:) ‘Some remarkable records were created.’ 
 
Let us embed these NPIs in relative clauses. In the case of an NPI in a restrictive relative clause, 
it is licensed not only by negation in the same relative clause but also by negation in a 
superordinate clause (Kinsui 1986): 
 
(176) a. saikin-wa       [rokuna        siai-o        si-na-i]                         bokusâ-ga   i-ru. 
  recently-Top [satisfactory  fight-Acc  do-Neg-Pred.be.Pres]  boxer-Nom  exist-Pres 
  ‘Recently there are boxers who do not fight any satisfactory fight.’ 
  b. *saikin-wa       [rokuna        siai-o        su-ru]      bokusâ-ga    i-ru. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
       ‘If she sets any remarkable records, she will be nominated.’  
83
 For this and following examples, I added emphasis and glosses. 
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    recently-Top [satisfactory  fight-Acc  do-Pres]  boxer-Nom  exist-Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
  (Intended:) ‘Recently there are boxers who fight any satisfactory fight.’ 
 c. saikin-wa       [rokuna        siai-o        su-ru]      bokusâ-ga    i-na-i. 
  recently-Top [satisfactory  fight-Acc  do-Pres]  boxer-Nom  exist-Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘Recently there are not boxers who fight any satisfactory fight.’ 
          (Miyake 1995:57(22a)) 
 d. nihon-ni-wa      [[rokuna       ronbun-o   kak-u]         gakusya-ga      i-ru]  
  Japan-Loc-Top [[satisfactory paper-Acc write-Pres]  scholar-Nom   exist-Pres] 
  daigaku-ga          na-i. 
  university-Nom  Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘There are not universities which have scholars who write any satisfactory papers in 
Japan.’       (Kinsui 1986:620(59)) 
 
(177) a. [kore-to it-ta      kiroku-o      das-ana-k-at-ta]             sensyu-o      
  [any remarkable  record-Acc  set-Neg-Pred-be-Past]  player-Acc 
  sit-tei-ru. 
  know-Perf-Pres 
  ‘I know players who didn’t set any remarkable records.’ 
 b. *[kore-to it-ta      kiroku-o      dasi-ta]    sensyu-o     sir-tei-ru. 
    [any remarkable  record-Acc  set-Past]  player-Acc  know-Perf-Pres 
  (Intended:) ‘I know players who set some remarkable records.’ 
 c. [kore-to it-ta      kiroku-o      dasi-ta]    sensyu-o     sir-ana-i. 
  [any remarkable  record-Acc  set-Past]  player-Acc  know-Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘I don’t know players who set any remarkable records.’ 
          (Miyake 1995: 57(22b)) 
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Contrastively, an NPI in a non-restrictive relative clause is licensed by negation in the same 
clause but not by the matrix negation (Miyake 1995), as illustrated in (178) and (179). 
 
(178) a. [rokuna        siai-o        si-na-i]                         Tyson-ga      ki-ta. 
  [satisfactory fight-Acc  do-Neg-Pred.be.Pres]  Tyson-Nom  come-Past 
  ≈ ‘Tyson, who did not fight a satisfactory fight, came.’ 
 b. *[rokuna        siai-o        su-ru]     Tyson-ga      ki-ta. 
    [satisfactory fight-Acc  do-Pres]  Tyson-Nom  come-Past 
  (Intended:) ≈ ‘Tyson, who fought a satisfactory fight, came.’ 
 c. *[rokuna        siai-o        su-ru]                           Tyson-ga      ko-na-k-at-ta. 
    [satisfactory fight-Acc  do-Neg-Pred.be.Pres]  Tyson-Nom  come-Neg-Pred-be-Past 
  (Intended:) ≈ ‘Tyson, who fought a satisfactory fight, didn’t come.’ 
 
(179) a. [kore-to it-ta       kiroku-o     das-ana-k-at-ta]           sono sensyu-o       
  [any remarkable  record-Acc  set-Neg-Pred-be-Past] that   player-Acc 
  sit-tei-ru. 
  know-Perf-Pres 
  ≈ ‘I know the player, who didn’t set any remarkable records.’ 
 b. *[kore-to it-ta       kiroku-o     dasi-ta]   sono sensyu-o       
    [any remarkable  record-Acc  set-Past] that   player-Acc 
  sit-tei-ru. 
  know-Perf-Pres 
  (Intended:) ≈ ‘I know the player, who set some remarkable records.’ 
 c. *[kore-to it-ta      kiroku-o      dasi-ta]   sono  sensyu-o       
    [any remarkable  record-Acc  set-Past] that    player-Acc 
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  sir-ana-i. 
know-Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
  (Intended:) ≈ ‘I don’t know the player, who set some remarkable records.’ 
          (Miyake 1995: 57(23b)) 
 
These data are consistent with the hypothesis that restrictive relative clauses are in the scope of 
matrix negation, while non-restrictive relative clauses are not.
84,85
 
  
4.4.2 Tense in non-restrictive relative clauses are not in the scope of matrix tense 
 Another fact is that while tense in a restrictive relative clause (can) depend on the matrix 
tense, tense in a non-restrictive relative clause does not depend on the matrix tense (Miyake 1995). 
Let us look at (180), where the matrix tense is past and the tense embedded in a restrictive 
relative clause is present. It has the simultaneous interpretation in which the time of the boy’s 
crying and the time of Mariko’s talking to him coincide.86 
                                                          
84
 Another analysis (Miyake 1995) assumes percolation of the NPI feature. According to the analysis, NPIs 
in a non-restrictive relative clause cannot make the whole DP which contains the non-restrictive relative 
clause an NPI. 
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 NPIs in a complement clause under an attitude verb are not licensed by Neg above the attitude verb, 
irrespective of the complementizer type. 
       (i) *Tarô-wa  [rokuna         sensyu-ga     ki-ta-{no-o/to}]                  sinzi-tei-na-i. 
   Taro-Top [satisfactory  player-Nom come-Past-{Fin-Acc/Rep}] believe-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
   (Intended) ‘Taro doesn’t believe that satisfactory players came.’ 
It predicts that if non-restrictive relative clauses are under the scope of an attitude verb, NPIs in them are 
not licensed by Neg above the attitude verb. The prediction is borne out. When the NPI in (i) is further 
embedded in a non-restrictive relative clause as in (ii), the result is ungrammatical. 
       (ii) *Tarô-wa  [[rokuna         siai-o        su-ru]    Tyson-ga     ki-ta-{no-o/to}]                   
   Taro-Top [[satisfactory  fight-Acc do-Pres] Tyson-Nom come-Past-{Fin-Acc/Rep}] 
   sinzi-tei-na-i. 
   believe-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
   ‘Taro doesn’t believe that Tyson, who fights satisfactory games, came.’ 
(When the non-restrictive relative clause in (ii) is attached to the matrix ForceP, the NPI in it is surely not 
licensed by Neg, because Neg is below Force.) I thank Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.) for a relevant question. 
86
 It is not always the case that restrictive relative clauses allow a simultaneous interpretation. For example, 
let us consider (i). If a simultaneous interpretation is always available for present tense embedded in a 
restrictive relative clause, the embedded tense in (i) could be present tense. The unacceptability of 
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(180)  Mariko-wa naiteiru             otokonoko-ni  hanasikaketa 
  M-top         cry-teiru-pres   boy-to              talk-past 
  ‘Mariko talked to a boy who is (now) crying’ (the speech time interpretation) 
  ‘Mariko talked to a boy who was crying (at the time of her talking to him)’ 
        (the simultaneous interpretation) 
         (Kusumoto 1999: 89(128)) 
 
Now, let us consider (181a) and (181b). (181a) contains a restrictive relative clause, while (181b) 
contains a non-restrictive relative clause. Interestingly, (181b) lacks a simultaneous interpretation: 
To assert (181b), the speaker must have a belief that Mr. Iwasaki is studying chipmunks at the 
speech time. In contrast, to assert (181b), the speaker does not need to have a belief that the 
person is studying chipmunks at the speech time. 
 
(181) a. [simarisu-o         kenkyûsi-tei-ru]  hito-ga           happyôsi-ta.  
  [chipmunk-Acc  study-Perf-Pres]  person-Nom  present-Past 
  ‘A person who is studying chipmunks made a presentation.’ 
  ‘A person who was studying chipmunks made a presentation’ 
 b. [simarisu-o         kenkyûsi-tei-ru]  Iwasaki san-ga       happyôsi-ta. 
  [chipmunk-Acc  study-Perf-Pres]  Mr. Iwasaki-Nom  present-Past 
                                                                                                                                                                             
embedded present tense in (i) shows that a simultaneous interpretation is not always available for present 
tense in a restrictive relative clause. 
     (i) [handôtai-o                 sirabe-tei-{ta/*ru}]                 kenkyûsya-ga 
 [semiconductor-Acc  investigate-Perf-{Past/Pres}]  researcher-Nom 
 toranzisutâ-o  hatumeisi-ta. 
 transistor-Acc  invent-Past 
 ‘Researchers who were testing semiconductors invented the transistor.’ 
What is observed (and relevant) in this subsection is that there is a context in which present tense in a non-
restrictive relative clause lacks a simultaneous interpretation which present tense in a restrictive relative 
clause has. 
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  ‘Mr. Iwasaki, who is studying chipmunks, made a presentation.’ 
  ??‘Mr. Iwasaki, who was studying chipmunks, made a presentation.’  
 
To check the intuition, let us consider the following continuations. (182a) can follow (181a), 
whereas (182b) cannot follow (181a). Note that (182b) is odd if the speaker believes that Mr. 
Iwasaki is studying chipmunks at the speech time. The goodness of continuation (182a) shows 
that the speaker does not need to have a belief that the person is studying chipmunks at the speech 
time of (181a). 
 
(182) a. … ano hito-wa        ima-demo simarisu-o         kenkyûsi-tei-ru no-ka   nâ 
       that person-Top now-even  chipmunk-Acc study-Perf-Pres  Fin-Q  SFP 
  ‘… Is the person studying chipmunks even now?’ 
 b. … #Iwasaki san-wa    ima-demo simarisu-o         kenkyûsi-tei-ru  no-ka   nâ 
         Mr. Iwasaki-Top  now-even  chipmunk-Acc study-Perf-Pres  Fin-Q  SFP 
  ‘… Is Mr. Iwasaki studying chipmunks even now?’ 
 
The lack of the simultaneous interpretation suggests that a non-restrictive relative clause is not in 
the scope of the matrix tense. 
 
4.4.3 Indeterminate phrases in non-restrictive relative clauses are not licensed by the matrix 
Q 
 In Japanese, indeterminate phrases such as dare ‘who’ and nani ‘what’ in a restrictive 
relative clause can be licensed by a matrix interrogative element ka (or Q): 
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(183)  anata-wa [dare-ga       kai-ta]         hon-o       yomi-masi-ta     ka? (Miyake 1995) 
you-Top  [who-Nom  write-Past] book-Acc  read-Polite-Past Q 
  (lit.: ‘Did you read a book [who wrote]?’) 
  ‘Whose book did you read?’ 
 
However, if indeterminate phrases are in a non-restrictive relative clause, they are not licensed by 
a matrix interrogative element: 
 
(184)  *anata-wa [dare-ga       kai-ta]        sono hon-o        yomi-masi-ta     ka? (Miyake 1995) 
    you-Top  [who-Nom  write-Past] that   book-Acc  read-Polite-Past Q 
  (lit.: ‘Did you read the book, [who wrote]?’) 
 
The following pair of restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses shows the same pattern. 
 
(185) a. anata-wa [nani-o        kai-ta]        sakka-o       sit-tei-ru-no              Q?  (Miyake 1995) 
  you-Top  [what-Acc  write-Past] writer-Acc  know-Perf-Pres-Fin Q 
  (lit.: ‘Do you know authors [that wrote what]?’) 
  ‘What authors do you know? What did they write?’ 
 b. *anata-wa [nani-o        kai-ta]        Murakami Haruki-o       sit-tei-ru-no               Q? 
    you-Top  [what-Acc  write-Past] M.              H.        -Acc  know-Perf-Pres-Fin Q 
  (lit.: ‘Do you know Haruki Murakami, [that wrote what]?’)  (Miyake 1995) 
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 These data suggest that non-restrictive relative clauses are not in the c-commanding 
domain of the matrix Q.
87
 
 
4.4.4 Presupposition and non-restrictive relative clauses 
 The content of a topic DP is taken for granted. The restrictive relative clause inside of a 
topic DP is no exception: if a topic DP contains a restrictive relative clause, the content of the 
relative clause must be taken for granted. In contrast, non-restrictive relative clauses which are 
prima facie inside of a topic DP, namely non-restrictive relative clauses with their host nouns 
marked with a topic-marker wa, do not follow this pattern: they can represent information which 
is not taken for granted. In this section I show it. 
 First, let us consider a discourse which begins with the following utterance, which is a 
variant of an English sentence in Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000)
88
. 
 
(186)  watasi-ga sensyû      Ithaca-kara  New York-e-no       hikôki-no      naka-de      at-ta   
  I-Nom      last.week Ithaca-from  New York-to-Gen  airplane-Gen inside-Loc meet-Past 
  zyosei-no       koto-nituite  ohanasisi-ta-i                koto-ga       ari-mas-u 
  woman-Gen thing-about   tell-want-Pred.be.Pres thing-Nom  exist-Polite-Pres 
  ‘Let me tell you something about a woman I met while flying from Ithaca to New York 
last week.’   (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000): 351(37)) 
 
                                                          
87
 Another analysis (Miyake 1995), which assumes that what is relevant to the licensing of indeterminate 
phrases is a [+WH] feature which indeterminate phrases have and that the [+WH] feature can percolate to 
dominating nodes, is that an indeterminate phrase in a non-restrictive relative clause cannot make the whole 
nominal phrase which contains the non-restrictive relative clause have a [+WH] feature. 
88
 Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet’s original English sentence appears in (190). 
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It makes clear that nothing special about the woman is taken for granted. Now, let us suppose that 
(186) is followed by (187). It sounds quite awkward. 
 
(187)  *[Ithaca-kara   New York-e-no     hikôki-no       kinai-de      nimotu-o  
    [Ithaca-from  New York-to-Gen airplane-Gen  inside-Loc  luggage-Acc 
  nakusi-tesimat-ta]  zyosei-wa      totemo        hara-o tate-tei-masi-ta 
  lose-do-Past         woman-Top  very.much  get.upset    -Perf-Polite-Past 
  ‘The woman who lost her luggage on the flight from Ithaca to New York was pretty 
upset.’  
   (The English sentence is a modified version of Del Gobbo 2003:93(113a)) 
  
The badness of (187) is expected: A topic-marked element needs to be in the common ground, 
but the information represented by the topic-marked subject is new information which is difficult 
to accommodate. Hence (187) is bad. Sentences in which the DP is not a topic, such as (188), are 
fine as a continuation of (186). 
 
(188)  [Ithaca-kara   New York-e-no     hikôki-no       kinai-de      nimotu-o  
  [Ithaca-from  New York-to-Gen airplane-Gen  inside-Loc  luggage-Acc 
  nakusi-tesimat-ta]  zyosei-ga         totemo        hara-o tate-tei-masi-ta 
  lose-do-Past         woman-Nom   very.much  get.upset    -Perf-Polite-Past 
  ‘A woman who lost her luggage on the flight from Ithaca to New York was pretty 
upset.’ 
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 In (187), the new information is provided by a restrictive relative clause. Now let us 
consider a non-restrictive relative clause, as in (189), which is an analogue of (187). Importantly, 
(189) can follow (190).
89
  
 
(189)  [Ithaca-kara   New York-e-no     hikôki-no       kinai-de      nimotu-o  
  [Ithaca-from  New York-to-Gen airplane-Gen  inside-Loc  luggage-Acc 
  nakusi-tesimat-ta] {sono zyosei/kanozyo}-wa   totemo        hara-o tate-tei-masi-ta 
  lose-do-Past         {that  woman/she}-Top        very.much  get.upset   -Perf-Polite-Past 
  ‘{The woman/She}, who lost her luggage on the flight from Ithaca to New York, was 
pretty upset.’  
   (The English sentence is a modified version of Del Gobbo 2003:93(113a)) 
   
(190)  watasi-ga sensyû      Ithaca-kara  New York-e-no      hikôki-no      naka-de      at-ta   
  I-Nom      last.week Ithaca-from  New York-to-Gen  airplane-Gen inside-Loc meet-Past 
  zyosei,   Jill Jensen-no    koto-nituite  ohanasisi-ta-i                koto-ga        
  woman, Jill Jensen-Gen  thing-about   tell-want-Pred.be.Pres thing-Nom  
  ari-mas-u 
  exist-Polite-Pres 
  ‘Let me tell you something about Jill Jensen, a woman I met while flying from Ithaca 
to New York last week.’ 
   (The English sentence is from Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000: 351(37)) 
 
                                                          
89
 In this respect, Japanese and Chinese non-restrictive relative clauses differ. In Chinese, a similar 
discourse is awkward (Del Gobbo 2003: 96). 
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By (190), it is clear that the information that Jill Jensen lost her luggage on the flight, which is the 
content of the non-restrictive relative clause in (189), is not in the common ground. Although the 
non-restrictive relative clause, which represents new information, is prima facie in a topic-marked 
DP (that is, the non-restrictive relative clause modifies a host noun marked with a topic marker 
wa), the whole sentence is felicitously assertable. A plausible account of it is that the non-
restrictive relative clause is not (or is not interpreted) in the topic-marked DP. 
 
4.4.5 Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are embeddable under an attitude verb 
 Up to here, we have seen data which are in accordance with a hypothesis that Japanese 
non-restrictive relative clauses are outside of the scope of (i) matrix negation, (ii) matrix tense, 
(iii) matrix Q, and (iv) topic. In this subsection, let us consider the region ‘above CP’. I argue that 
non-restrictive relative clauses can be in the scope of an attitude verb. 
  First, let us consider the following sentence, in which a non-restrictive relative clause 
appears in a complement clause of a verb of saying. 
 
(191)  Hanakoi-wa   [kinô          kanozyoi-wa [NRRC kanozyoi-no otôto-to          
  Hanakoi-Top [yesterday  shei-Top       [         shei-Gen      brother-with 
  ason-dei-ta]        Tarô-o       mi-ta-to]          it-tei-ta.          
  play-Perf-Past] ] Taro-Acc  see-Past-Rep]  say-Perf-Past 
  Demo boku-wa  [Tarô-ga      kinô         itinitizyû hitori-de ie-ni         i-ta         
  but      I-Top       Taro-Nom  yesterday all.day     alone       home-at  be-Past  
  no]-o        sit-tei-ru. 
  Fin]-Acc  know-Perf-Pres 
  (lit.) ‘Hanakoi said that shei saw Taro, who was playing with heri brother, yesterday. 
But I know that Taro was alone at home all day yesterday.’ 
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  ≈ ‘Hanakoi said that shei saw Taro yesterday and that he was playing with heri brother. 
But I know that Taro was alone at home all day yesterday.’ 
 
If the content of the non-restrictive relative clause, ‘who was playing with her brother,’ is not 
embedded and takes a scope out of the attitude verb, the speaker must believe that Taro was in the 
park. Then, the continuation, ‘But I know that Taro was alone at home […]’ should lead to 
infelicity. However, the sentence is utterly fine. It indicates that the content of a non-restrictive 
relative clause can be embedded under the verb of saying. 
 One might wonder that the local speaker-orientation of the content of the non-restrictive 
relative clause is maybe due to partial quotation and does not reflect the scopal relation between 
the verb of saying and the non-restrictive relative clause. That is, if the complement clause of the 
verb of saying or the non-restrictive relative clause is a (partial) quotation of Hanako’s saying, 
then one can keep a hypothesis that the content of non-restrictive relative clauses is always 
(global) speaker-oriented (cf. Anand 2007, Sæbø 2011). For (191), however, such an analysis is 
impossible. Note that (191) uses third-person pronoun kanozyo (‘she’) for reference to Hanako. If 
the whole complement clause of the verb of saying or the non-restrictive relative clause is a 
quotation of Hanako’s saying, the reference to Hanako should be done using a first-person 
pronoun (or a phonetically null pronoun). The use of a third-person pronoun indicates that the 
clauses cannot be quotations. 
 Can the content of a non-restrictive relative clause be embedded under attitude predicates 
other than a verb of saying? Let us consider the following example, in which a non-restrictive 
relative clause appears in a to-complement clause of a verb of believing. 
 
(192)  Tarôi-wa   [ [NRRC karei-no  titioya-o      mituke-ta] Tanaka-san-ga 
  Taroi-Top [ [        hei-Gen   father-Acc  find-Past]  Tanaka-Ms.-Nom  
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  asita           kuru-to]      sinzi-tei-ru. 
tomorrow  come-Rep]  believe-Perf-Pres 
  Sikasi watasi-wa [Tanaka-san-ga       zitu-wa   Tarô-no     titioya-o  
  but      I-Top         Tanaka-Ms.-Nom  factually  Taro-Gen  father-Acc 
  mituke-tei-na-i                        no]-o         sit-tei-ru             
  find-Perf-NEG-Pred.be.Pres  Fin]-Acc  know-Perf-Pres 
  (lit.) ‘Taroi believes that Ms. Tanaka, who found hisi father, will come tomorrow. But I 
know that factually Ms. Tanaka has not found Taro’s father.’ 
  ≈ ‘Taroi believes that Ms. Tanaka will come tomorrow and that she found hisi father. 
But I know that factually she has not found his father.’ 
 
Note that if the content of the non-restrictive relative clause is not embedded, the continuation 
should lead to infelicity. The goodness of this example shows that the content of a non-restrictive 
clause is embeddable in this case also. 
 Let us consider another example. Constant (2011) uses the following Chinese example to 
argue that Chinese non-restrictive relative clauses are scopeless. In this example, the content of 
the non-restrictive clause, ‘(Lisi) had actually been at home all along’, is not in the teacher’s 
thought. 
 
(193)  Lăoshī  yĭwéi                 shì  yīzhí        zài  jiā-ji           de   Lĭsì  zùo-le   èzùojù. 
  teacher  think.wrongly  be   all.along  at    home-Loc  DE  Lisi  do-Pfv  prank 
  ‘The teacher thought that it was Lisi, who had actually been at home all along, who had 
done the prank.’      (Constant 2011: (31)) 
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A Japanese counterpart of (193) is (194).
90
 
 
(194)  sensei-wa      [ [NRRC  ie-ni        zutto         i-ta]       Risi-ga     sono itazura-o  
  teacher-Top  [ [          home-at  all.along  be-Past] Lisi-Nom that   prank-Acc 
  si-ta-to]           gokaisi-tei-ru. 
  do-Past-Rep]  think.wrongly-Perf-Pres 
  (lit.) ‘The teacher thought wrongly that it was Lisi, who had been at home all along, 
who had done the prank.’  
  a. ≈ ‘The teacher thought that Lisi had been at home all along and that he had done the 
prank.’ 
  b. ≈ ‘The teacher thought that Lisi had done the prank. Lisi was at home all along.’ 
  
Different from the Chinese non-restrictive relative clause, this Japanese counterpart allows 
embedding, as shown in interpretation (194a). The two interpretations, (194a) and (194b), are due 
to de dicto/de re ambiguity. 
 In the above examples, a to-clause is used for the complement clause of the attitude verb. 
If no-clause is used, however, the content of the non-restrictive relative clause resists being 
embedded. For example, (195), which uses a no-complement, sounds awkward, compared to 
(192) (see footnote 90 also). 
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 Note that this example uses a to-complement clause. If a no-complement clause is used, the meaning of 
the sentence differs from the English sentence very much: 
      (i) sensei-wa      [ [NRRC  ie-ni        zutto         i-ta]       Risi-ga     sono itazura-o  
 teacher-Top  [ [          home-at  all.along  be-Past] Lisi-Nom that   prank-Acc 
 si-ta-no]-o             gokaisi-tei-ru. 
 do-Past-Fin]-Acc  think.wrongly-Perf-Pres 
 ≈ ‘The teacher thought wrongly about the fact that Lisi had been at home all along and that he had 
 done the prank.’ 
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(195)  ??Tarôi-wa   [ [NRRC karei-no  titioya-o      mituke-ta]  Tanaka-san-ga 
    Taroi-Top [ [NRRC hei-Gen   father-Acc  find-Past]  Tanaka-Ms.-Nom  
  asita           kuru-no]-o         sinzi-tei-ru. 
  tomorrow  come-Fin]-Acc  believe-Perf-Pres 
  Sikasi watasi-wa [Tanaka-san-ga       zitu-wa   Tarô-no     titioya-o  
  but      I-Top         Tanaka-Ms.-Nom  factually  Taro-Gen  father-Acc 
  mituke-tei-na-i                        no]-o         sit-tei-ru             
  find-Perf-NEG-Pred.be.Pres  Fin]-Acc  know-Perf-Pres 
  (lit.) ‘Taroi believes that Ms. Tanaka, who found hisi father, will come tomorrow. But I 
know that factually Ms. Tanaka has not found Taro’s father.’ 
  ≈ ‘Taroi believes that Ms. Tanaka will come tomorrow and that she found hisi father. 
But I know that factually she has not found his father.’ 
 
 These data indicate that the content of Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses is 
embeddable under to-complements of attitude verbs. 
 
4.4.6 Pragmatics of Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses 
 In the previous section, we saw that Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are 
embeddable under a to-complement of an attitude verb. It suggests that Japanese non-restrictive 
relative clauses do not have conventional implicature semantics which Potts (2005) proposes for 
English non-restrictive relative clauses. (Conventional implicature semantics predicts that the 
content of non-restrictive relative clauses is not embeddable.) Against Potts’s (2005) analysis of 
English non-restrictive relative clauses as conventional implicatures using a multidimensional 
semantics, Schlenker (2010, 2013a,b) proposes a unidimensional analysis for English and French 
non-restrictive relative clauses. According to Schlenker, the content of non-restrictive relative 
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clauses is ‘translucent’91. Pragmatic properties of non-restrictive relative clauses which 
Schlenker’s analysis tries to explain include (i) non-at-issueness, (ii) non-triviality, and (iii) non-
controversiality. Let us see whether Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses have these properties 
one by one. 
 Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses have the property, non-at-issueness. To see it, let 
us use the P family test, which is a test for non-at-issueness (backgroundedness), as Chierchia and 
McConnell-Ginet (2000) and Kadmon (2001) argue. The following examples show that the 
content of Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are not-at-issue. 
 
(196) a. Negation 
  Tarô-wa   [NRRC Epikutêtosu-no senmonka-de a-ru]        Sikano-ni     
  Taro-Top [NRRC Epictetus-Gen   expert-Pred    be-Pres]  Sikano-Dat 
  aw-ana-k-at-ta. 
  meet-Neg-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘Taro didn’t meet Sikano, who was an expert in Epictetus.’ 
  ⇒ Sikano was an expert in Epictetus. 
 b. Conditional 
  [NRRC Epikutêtosu-no senmonka-de a-ru]        Sikano-ga       nagaikisi-tei-ta 
  [NRRC Epictetus-Gen   expert-Pred    be-Pres]  Sikano-Nom  live.long-Perf-Past 
  ra, kare-wa  sutoatetugaku-no  hon-o         kai-ta         darou. 
  if  he-Top    Stoicism-Gen        book-Acc  write-Past  Mod 
                                                          
91
 Translucency is defined as follows. 
    (i) Translucency (Schlenker 2013a: (24)) 
If an NRR is uttered in a global context set C, it should be possible to add to C unsurprising 
assumptions to obtain a context C
+
 in which the NRR is ‘locally trivial’, i.e. entailed by its local 
context given C
+
. 
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  ‘If Sikano, who was an expert in Epictetus, lived long, he would have written a book on 
Stoicism.’ 
  ⇒ Sikano was an expert in Epictetus. 
 
 Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses, however, do not seem to have the non-triviality. 
To see that, let us consider the following example from Schlenker (2013a), after Potts (2005). 
 
(197)  Armstrong survived cancer. #Lance, who survived cancer, won the Tour de France. 
 
Different from the English example, its Japanese counterpart is acceptable: 
 
(198)  Âmusutorongu-wa gan-o           ikinobi-ta.    [NRRC gan-o            ikinobi-ta]  
  Armstrong-Top     cancer-Acc  survive-Past  [NRRC cancer-Acc  survive-Past] 
  Ransu-wa    Tûru do Furansu-de  kat-ta. 
  Lance-Top  Tour  de France-at     win-Past 
  (lit.) ‘Armstrong survived cancer. Lance, who survived cancer, won the Tour de 
France.’ 
 
This suggests that the content of Japanese non-restrictive relative clause can be trivial. However, 
the conclusion might be too hasty. If the predicate in the non-restrictive relative clause expresses 
a time-independent state, the sentence becomes bad. For example, the following example sounds 
strange. Note that its first sentence excludes the possibility that strength of legs of the person 
under discussion did not change very much during the time under discussion. The badness of this 
example indicates that Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses also have the property of non-
triviality. 
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(199)  Âmusutorongu-wa  kyakuryoku-ga          tuyo-k-at-ta. 
  Armstrong-Top       strength.of.leg-Nom strong-Pred-be-Past    
  #[NRRC kyakuryoku-ga           tuyo-k-at-ta]        Ransu-wa 
    [NRRC strength.of.leg-Nom  strong-Pred-be-Past]  Lance-Top   
  Tûru do Furansu-de  kat-ta. 
  Tour  de France-at     win-Past 
  (lit.) ‘Armstrong had strong legs. Lance, who had strong legs, won the Tour de France.’ 
 
I think that an account for the acceptability of (198) is to posit that Ransu modified by the relative 
clause is type-shifted from an individual to the set of all the stages of the individual (in line with 
Paul 1994 and Del Gobbo 2003), and the relative clause is restricting the set of stages. In this 
analysis, the second sentence in (198) is interpreted as ‘a stage of Lance that has survived cancer 
won the Tour de France’. It is in accordance with the intuition that (198) can be used only if 
Lance won the Tour de France after he survived cancer. 
 Finally, Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses have the property, non-controversiality 
also. Let us consider (200), which is a Japanese counterpart of Schlenker’s (2013b: 24(59)) 
example. It shows that Japanese behaves similarly to English: if the information of the non-
restrictive relative clause is surprising, the sentence becomes odd. 
 
(200)  (Context: The news isn’t out yet that Obama has committed a crime.) 
  One expects the Commander-in-chief to have an exemplary behavior. However 
 a. [saikôsirêkan-de                   a-ru]      Obama-ga     tatta ima  tuma-o     korosi-ta. 
  [Commander-in-chief-Pred be-Pres] Obama-Nom just  now wife-Acc  murder-Past 
  ‘Obama, who is the Commander-in-chief, has just murdered his wife.’ 
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 b. (#)[tatta ima  tuma-o     korosi-ta]       Obama-ga      saikôsirêkan-da. 
     [just  now wife-Acc  murder-Past] Obama-Nom  Commander-in-chief-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘Obama, who has just murdered his wife, is the Commander-in-chief.’ 
 
 The above data suggest that pragmatically Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are 
considerably similar to English ones. They show (i) non-at-issueness, (ii) non-triviality, and (iii) 
non-controversiality. 
 
4.5 Analysis of Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses 
 Let us now make a formal analysis of Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses.  
 We have seen that semantically Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are out of the 
scope of (i) matrix negation, (ii) matrix tense, (iii) matrix Q, and (iv) matrix topic, and (v) can be 
in the scope of (a to-complement of) an attitude predicate. Following these observations, I 
propose that a Japanese non-restrictive relative clause is attached to ForceP.
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 For the Japanese non-restrictive relative clause, I present the following semantics of non-
restrictive relative clauses, in line with Schlenker (2013b): the meaning of a non-restrictive 
relative clause is treated as parataxis, which is (as a first approximation) conjunction. (In (201), 
for simplicity I use the label ‘NRR’ and ‘CP’ for the non-restrictive relative clause and ForceP, 
respectively. The subscript CPi on NRR expresses the CP to which the NRR attaches.) 
 
(201) a. Let node CPi dominate the LF position of DP. 
  [[ [CPi … DP NRRCPi … ] ]]
g
 = # unless for some DP d and some index k, DP = dk. 
  If  #, [[ [CPi … DPk NRRCPi … ] ]]
g
 = [[ [CPi … DPk …] ]]
g
  [[ NRRCPi ]]
g
(g(k)) 
                                                          
92
 Note that to complementizer selects for a ForceP. 
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  (where # represents presupposition failure) 
 b.  is the operation of parataxis. As a first approximation, 
  [[ [CPi … DPk …] ]]
g
  [[ NRRCPi ]]
g
(g(k)) = 1 iff [[ [CPi … DPk …] ]]
g
 = 1 and 
[[ NRRCPi ]]
g
(g(k)) = 1. 
       (based on Schlenker 2013b: 20(45)) 
 
 For example, let us consider (202). 
 
(202)  [Amherst-ni sum-u]         Sikano san-ga      byôki-da. 
[Amherst-Loc live-Pres] Mr. Sikano-Nom  sick-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘Mr. Sikano, who lives in Amherst, is sick.’ 
 
Its meaning is calculated as follows (for ease of presentation, I use its English counterpart). 
 
(203) a. Mr. Sikanok, [λxi xi lives in Amherst], is sick. 
 b. [[ (a) ]]
g
  # since Mr. Sikano carries an index, k. And  
  [[ (a) ]]
g
 = [[ Mr. Sikanok is sick ]]
g
  [[ λxi xi lives in Amherst ]]
g
(g(k)) 
 
For indices on a proper noun, I posit the meaning of proper nouns given in (204), as in Schlenker 
(2013). 
 
(204)  If p is a proper name carrying an index i, 
  [[ pi ]]
g
 = # unless g(i) = [[ p ]]
g
. If  #, [[ pi ]]
g
 = [[ p ]]
g
 = g(i) 
        (based on Schlenker 2013b:21(47)) 
 
125 
From this, [[ Mr. Sikanok ]]
g
 = [[ Mr. Sikano ]]
g
 = g(k). Letting [[ Mr. Sikano ]]
g
 be Mr. Sikano,  
the calculation (203b) continues as follows. 
 
(205)  [[ Mr. Sikanok is sick ]]
g
  [[ λxi xi lives in Amherst ]]
g
(g(k)) 
  = is-sick(Mr. Sikano)  (λx. lives-in-Amherst(x))(Mr. Sikano) 
  = is-sick(Mr. Sikano)  lives-in-Amherst(Mr. Sikano) 
 
4.6 The Experiencer restriction in embedded non-restrictive relative clauses 
 Now let us turn to the Experiencer restriction in non-restrictive relative clauses. As seen 
in (171), an Experiencer in a non-restrictive relative clause is restricted to the speaker if the host 
noun which the relative clause modifies is in a matrix clause. In this section, I show that an 
Experiencer in non-restrictive relative clauses is restricted to the local speaker if the relative 
clause is in the scope of a verb of saying, but not restricted if the relative clause is in the scope of 
a non-communicational attitude verb. 
 First, let us consider the following examples, where an Experiencer adjective is in a non-
restrictive relative clause which is in the scope of a verb of saying.
93
 These examples differ in the 
choice of the host noun of the non-restrictive relative clause. The host nouns in (206a), (206b), 
and (206c) refer to Hanako, Taro, and the speaker, respectively. These examples indicate that the 
Experiencer restriction is active in this environment and that the Experiencer must be the local 
speaker. 
 
                                                          
93
 In principle, non-restrictive relative clauses can attach to either embedded ForceP (i.e., in the scope of 
attitude verbs) or matrix ForceP (i.e., outside of the scope of attitude verbs). The second sentence in the 
examples guarantees that the non-restrictive relative clause under discussion is embedded in the scope of 
attitude verbs. 
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(206) a. Tarôi-wa  [[NRRC karei-no   hahaoya-no   nyûsu-o    kii-te 
Taroi-Top [[NRRC hei-Gen   mother-Gen  news-Acc hear-ing   
  {??uresi-k-at/uresi-gat}-ta]              Hanako-ga      sore-o   si-ta-to]            
  {??glad-Pred-be/glad-GAR}-Past]  Hanako-Nom  it-Acc  do-Past-Rep] 
  it-tei-ru. 
  say-Perf-Pres 
  Sikasi, Hanako-wa   Tarô-no     hahaoya-no  nyûsu-o     kii-tei-na-i. 
  But      Hanako-Top  Taro-Gen mother-Gen  news-Acc  hear-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
  (lit.) ‘Taroi says that Hanako, who {??was glad/behaved as feeling glad} at hearing hisi 
mother’s news, did it. But Hanako has not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’ 
  ≈ ‘Taroi says that Hanako {??was glad/behaved as feeling glad} at hearing hisi 
mother’s news and did it. But Hanako has not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’ 
 
 b. Tarôi-wa  [[NRRC karei-no   hahaoya-no   nyûsu-o    kii-te        
  Taroi-Top [[NRRC hei-Gen   mother-Gen  news-Acc hear-ing   
  {uresi-k-at/??uresi-gat}-ta]              karei-ga   sore-o   si-ta-to]            
  {glad-Pred-be/??glad-GAR}-Past]  hei-Nom  it-Acc  do-Past-Rep] 
  it-tei-ru. 
  say-Perf-Pres 
  Sikasi, hontô-wa Tarôi-wa    karei-no  hahaoya-no  nyûsu-o       
  But      fact-Top  Taroi-Top  hei-Gen   mother-Gen  news-Acc 
  kii-tei-na-i. 
  hear-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
  (lit.) ‘Taroi says that hei, who {was glad/??behaved as feeling glad} at hearing hisi 
mother’s news, did it. But actually Taroi didn’t hear hisi mother’s news.’ 
127 
  ≈ ‘Taroi says that hei {was glad/??behaved as feeling glad} at hearing hisi mother’s 
news and did it. But actually Taro didn’t hear his mother’s news.’ 
 c. Tarôi-wa  [[NRRC karei-no   hahaoya-no   nyûsu-o    kii-te        
  Taroi-Top [[NRRC hei-Gen   mother-Gen  news-Acc hear-ing   
  {?uresi-k-at/(?)uresi-gat}-ta]              watasi-ga   sore-o   si-ta-to]            
  {glad-Pred-be/??glad-GAR}-Past] I-Nom         it-Acc  do-Past-Rep] 
  it-tei-ru. 
  say-Perf-Pres 
  Sikasi, watasi-wa  Tarô-no     hahaoya-no  nyûsu-o     kii-tei-na-i. 
  But      I-Top         Taro-Gen mother-Gen  news-Acc  hear-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
  (lit.) ‘Taroi says that I, who {?was glad/(?)behaved as feeling glad} at hearing hisi 
mother’s news, did it. But actually I didn’t hear Taro’s mother’s news.’ 
  ≈ ‘Taroi says that I {?was glad/(?)behaved as feeling glad} at hearing hisi mother’s 
news and did it. But I didn’t hear his mother’s news.’ 
  
   Second, let us consider the following examples, where an Experiencer adjective is in a 
non-restrictive relative clause which is in the scope of a non-communicational attitude verb. The 
host nouns in the non-restrictive relative clauses in (207a) and (207b) refer to Hanako and the 
speaker, respectively. The goodness of these examples indicates that the Experiencer restriction is 
not active in non-restrictive relative clauses if the relative clauses are in a complement clause of 
non-communicational attitude verb. 
 
(207) a. Tarôi-wa  [[NRRC karei-no  hahaoya-no   nyûsu-o     kii-te       uresi-k-at-ta]  
  Taroi-Top [[NRRC hei-Gen   mother-Gen  news-Acc hear-ing  glad-Pred-be-Past] 
  Hanako-ga      sore-o   si-ta-to]          {omot/sinzi}-tei-ru. 
  Hanako-Nom  it-Acc  do-Past-Rep]  {think/believe}-Perf-Pres 
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  Sikasi, Hanako-wa   Tarô-no     hahaoya-no  nyûsu-o     kii-tei-na-i. 
  But      Hanako-Top  Taro-Gen mother-Gen  news-Acc  hear-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
  (lit.) ‘Taroi {thinks/believes} that Hanako, who was glad at hearing hisi mother’s news, 
did it. But Hanako has not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’ 
  ≈ ‘Taroi {thinks/believes} that Hanako was glad at hearing hisi mother’s news and did 
it. But Hanako has not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’ 
 
 b. Tarôi-wa  [[NRRC karei-no  hahaoya-no   nyûsu-o     kii-te       uresi-k-at-ta]  
  Taroi-Top [[NRRC hei-Gen   mother-Gen  news-Acc hear-ing  glad-Pred-be-Past] 
  watasi-ga      sore-o   si-ta-to]            {omot/sinzi}-tei-ru. 
  Hanako-Nom  it-Acc  do-Past-Rep]  {think/believe}-Perf-Pres 
  Sikasi, Hanako-wa   Tarô-no     hahaoya-no  nyûsu-o     kii-tei-na-i. 
  But      Hanako-Top  Taro-Gen mother-Gen  news-Acc  hear-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
  (lit.) ‘Taroi {thinks/believes} that I, who was glad at hearing hisi mother’s news, did it. 
But I have not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’ 
  ≈ ‘Taroi {thinks/believes} that I was glad at hearing hisi mother’s news and did it. But I 
have not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’ 
 
 To summarize, an Experiencer in non-restrictive relative clauses is (i) restricted to a 
speaker if the non-restrictive relative clause is not in the scope of an attitude predicate, (ii) 
restricted to a local speaker if the non-restrictive relative clause is in the scope of a verb of saying, 
and (iii) not restricted if the non-restrictive relative clause is in the scope of a non-
communicational verb. 
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4.7 Analysis of the Experiencer restrictions in non-restrictive relative clauses 
 In section 4.4, we looked at data which support the claim that non-restrictive relative 
clauses are interpreted to be attached to ForceP. Now, note that the distribution of the Experiencer 
restriction on Experiencer adjectives in non-restrictive relative clauses found in the previous 
section indicates a correlation between the Experience restriction and presence of assertion. In 
this section, I illustrate that with the semantics of non-restrictive relative clause given in section 
4.5, the Experiencer restriction is derived in a natural way, by assuming that the speech act 
operator is distributive with respect to the parataxis operator . 
 To see how it works, let us consider the following sentence. On the surface, the non-
restrictive relative clause in (208) is embedded in a DP which is in a matrix clause. In this case, 
the Experiencer is restricted to the speaker. 
 
(208)  #[NRRC uresi-k-at-ta]           Tarô-ga       sore-o si-ta. 
     [NRRC glad-Pred-be-Past] Taro-Nom   it-Acc do-Past 
  (Intended:) ‘Taro, who was glad, did it.’ 
 
I maintain that the Experiencer restriction is caused by the restriction on the situation pronoun in 
the non-restrictive relative clause by an illocutionary operator. Precisely, the meaning of (208) is 
calculated as follows. First, the matrix predicate is translated as in (209). 
 
(209)  Tarok, [λxi xi was glad], did it. 
 b. [[ (a) ]]
g
  # since Taro carries an index, k. And  
  [[ (a) ]]
g
 = [[ Tarok did it ]]
g
  [[ λxi xi was glad ]]
g
(g(k)) 
       = [[ Tarok did it ]]
g
  [[ λxi xi was glad ]]
g
(Taro) 
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What matters here is the second conjunct. I posit that the non-restrictive relative clause contains a 
Topic and a topic situation, sTop′, as a restrictive relative clause does. So, more precisely, the 
second conjunct is represented as in (210). Here, tense is ignored and part of calculation (121) is 
used. 
 
(210)  [[ λxi s′ [ Topic [ xi was glad ]] ]]
g
(Taro)  
  = λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). [s ≈ s′ & t*  τ(s) & gladness is at s](Taro)  
  = λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ s′ & t*  τ(s) & gladness is at s] 
 
Assertive illocutionary operator is added to (209):
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(211)  Assert( [[ Tarok did it ]]
g
  [[ λxi xi was glad ]]
g
(Taro) ) 
 
I assume that Assert is, as a first approximation, distributive with respect to the conjunction:  
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 Maybe illocutionary operators are not distinguished by their illocutionary forces, and there is only a 
single operator, say, SA (Speech Act). Note that at ForceP, declarative sentences and interrogative 
sentences have different meanings. So, it is not necessary to assume different illocutionary operators which 
produce different objects from a single object. Suppose that SA works as Assert when it takes a declarative 
sentence radical, as Quest when it takes an interrogative sentence radical, and so on. What is good about 
having such a single speech act operator is that it enables us to account for the fact that non-restrictive 
relative clauses in questions have assertive illocutionary force, as in (i). 
        (i) [uresi-{*k-at/gat}-ta]             kimi-ga     ko-na-i                           no  ka? 
 [glad-{*Pred-be/GAR}-Past] you-Nom come-Neg-Pred.be.Pres Fin Q 
 ‘Will you, who {*was/behaved as feeling} glad, not come?’ 
Let us suppose that the speech act operator is distributive with respect to the conjunction: 
        (ii) SA(α  β ) = SA(α)  SA(β) 
In the case of (i), the sentential type of the matrix clause is an interrogative, but that of the non-restrictive 
relative clause (with its argument filled by the referent of the host noun, following Schlenker’s rule) is a 
declarative. Therefore, schematically we obtain the following: 
        (iii) SA (will you not come?  you behaved as feeling glad)  
 = SA(will you not come?)  SA(you behaved as feeling glad) 
 = Quest(will you not come?)  Assert(you behaved as feeling glad) 
If, instead of SA, we assume that Quest, an interrogative illocutionary operator, is at the top of (i), then it 
would combine with an interrogative matrix clause and with the non-restrictive relative clause, which 
represents a declarative sentence radical. Then the latter combination, namely Quest and a declarative 
sentence radical, should be undefined. 
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(212)  Assert( α  β ) = Assert(α)  Assert(β) 
 
Then, (211) becomes (213): 
 
(213)  Assert( [[ Tarok did it ]]
g
  [[ λxi xi was glad ]]
g
(Taro) ) 
  = Assert([[ Tarok did it ]]
g
)  Assert([[ λxi xi was glad ]]
g
(Taro) ) 
  = Assert([[ Tarok did it ]]
g
)  Assert(λs:l(s)=μ(Taro).[s≈s′ & t*  τ(s) & gladness is at 
s]) 
 
The second conjunct is already calculated in (121). According to it, the final result of the 
calculation of the second conjunct is given as follows. 
 
(214)  Assert(λs:l(s)=μ(Taro).[s≈s′ & t*  τ(s) & gladness is at s])  
  = λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop & t*   τ(s) & gladness is 
at s] 
As argued in section 3.6.1, it means that Taro is the speaker when the LF has a truth-value. This 
is the desired Experiencer restriction. 
 Now, let us consider the Experiencer restriction in a non-restrictive relative clause 
embedded under a verb of assertion.  
 
(215)  #[ [NRRC uresi-k-at-ta]           Tarô-ga      sore-o si-ta-to]  Hanako-ga       it-ta. 
    [ [NRRC glad-Pred-be-Past] Taro-Nom   it-Acc do-Past] Hanako-Nom  say-Past 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanako said that Taro, who was glad, did it.’ 
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In this case, the calculation goes similarly to the above case. The difference is that instead of 
Assert, a verb of assertion takes (209). Let us look as the relevant part: 
 
(216)  [[ say [ that Taro, who was glad, did it ] ]]
g
 
  = [[ say ]]
g
 ([[ Taro, who was glad, did it  ]]
g
) 
  = [[ say ]]
g
 ([[ Tarok did it ]]
g
  [[ λxi xi was glad ]]
g
(Taro) ) 
 
Similarly to Assert, let us posit that attitude verbs are distributive with respect to . Then we 
obtain (217). 
 
(217)  [[ (216) ]]
g
 = [[ say ]]
g
([[ Tarok did it ]]
g
  [[ say ]]g([[ λxi xi was glad ]]
g
(Taro) ) 
 
The second conjunct is the same as the LF which was considered in section 3.7.1. According to 
the calculation given there, Taro must be the local speaker in order for the LF to have a truth-
value. This is the desired Experiencer restriction. 
 Finally, let us consider the Experiencer restriction in a non-restrictive relative clause 
embedded under a verb of non-assertion, as in (218). 
 
(218)  [ [NRRC uresi-k-at-ta]           Tarô-ga     sore-o si-ta-to]  Hanako-wa    sinzi-tei-ta. 
  [ [NRRC glad-Pred-be-Past] Taro-Nom  it-Acc do-Past] Hanako-Top  believe-Perf-Past 
  ‘Hanako believe that Taro, who was glad, did it.’ 
 
The calculation goes similarly to the above cases. In this case, the operator which embeds the 
conjunct [[ λxi xi was glad ]]
g
(Taro) is sinzi-ru ‘believe’, and its lexical entry is given in (86). The 
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point is that a verb of non-communication does not impose a restriction on the res situation, so the 
Experiencer restriction does not emerge. 
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 CHAPTER 5
FEATURE-CHECKING ANALYSIS  
5.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I give an analysis of the Experiencer restriction which involves checking 
of a morphosyntactic feature. It can be seen as a refinement of Tenny’s (2006) double feature-
checking analysis. She proposes that the Experiencer restriction involves checking of two 
morphosyntactic features, [+sentient] ([+sen]) and [+discourse participant]. In the double-feature 
checking analysis, Experiencer DPs are assigned the two features by Experiencer adjectives and 
raise for feature-checking. (Experiencer raising is proposed by Stowell (1986), Campbell and 
Martin (1989), Sato and Kishida (2009), Landau (2010), among others, based on Experiencers’ 
special properties such as backward anaphora.) The feature [+sen] is checked at a phrase in the 
right-periphery called the Sentience/Evidentiality Phrase,
95
 and the feature [+discourse 
participant] is checked at a SAP above it. [Spec, SAP], to which Experiencer DPs raise, is the 
place for the speaker, so the Experiencer restriction emerges.
96
 Because only sentient individuals 
can experience their feelings, epistemologically it is natural that Experiencer adjectives assign a 
sentience feature to Experiencer DPs. But it is not obvious that Experiencer adjectives assign 
[+discourse participant] feature to Experiencer DPs, and it turns out to be problematic, as shown 
in the next chapter. In this chapter I present a single-feature checking analysis of the Experiencer 
restriction, in which only a [+sen] feature is checked. I argue that the checking occurs at the 
phrase called the epistemic modal phrase (ModP), where epistemic modals occur.
97
 In the spirit of 
Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2006, 2007a,b), I assume that there is a semantic coordinate h 
                                                          
95
 The Sentience/Evidentiality Phrase is introduced by Speas and Tenny (2003). 
96
 The two-feature checking analysis is reviewed and examined in the next chapter. 
97
 I do not follow her in adopting the Sentience/Evidentiality Phrase because no test for presence of a 
Sentience/Evidentiality Phrase is given. 
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for the perspective holder from whose point of view events are described and that epistemic 
modals are dependent on it. Corresponding to the norm of assertion proposed by Stephenson 
(2007b:66), the assertive SAP sets the value of the coordinate h to the speaker. I propose that the 
Experiencer restriction emerges because the Japanese phonetically null epistemic modal epis, 
which works as a semantic binder of agreeing Experiencer DPs,
98
 has a presupposition that the 
domain of the λ-operator is restricted to the perspective holder. 
 The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I show that clauses in which 
Experiencers are restricted allow insertion of an epistemic modal in section 5.2.
99
 Based on it, I 
argue in section 5.3 and 5.4 that such sentences contain an epistemic modal head (Mod), which is 
placed lower than a speech act head (SA), and an assertive SA sets the semantic parameter h to 
the speaker. In section 5.5, I present a feature checking analysis of the Experiencer restriction in 
which the modal head has a [+sen] feature which agrees with the corresponding feature on 
Experiencer DPs. At the end of this chapter (section 5.6), I compare this analysis and the 
situation-based analysis presented in the previous chapters and suggest that the latter is favored 
by the principle of parsimony. 
 
5.2 The epistemic modal and the Experiencer restriction 
 In this section, I argue that clauses which restrict Experiencers always have an epistemic 
modal projection, by showing that such clauses always allow insertion of an epistemic modal, 
darô. Note that it is not mysterious that the epistemic modal projection is related to the 
Experiencer role. Both are related to sentience. Furthermore, Stephenson’s (2006, 2007a,b) work 
                                                          
98
 It is because epistemic modals and Experiencer DPs have [+sen] feature and agreement occurs. A probe 
works as a semantic binder of the agreeing goal (Kratzer 2009).  
99
 There is an exception: complements of verbs of vivid memory report do not allow insertion of an 
epistemic modal. It is set aside here and will be mentioned in section 5.6. 
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shows that the unpronounced Experiencer of predicates of personal taste is related to the 
individual whose knowledge is relevant to the interpretation of epistemic modals. 
  
5.2.1 Epistemic modal expressions in Japanese 
 The following three words are the most frequently used epistemic modal expressions in 
Japanese.
100,101
 
 
(219) a. darô (‘probably’, ‘seem’102) 
 b. kamosirena-i (‘it is epistemically possible that’) 
 c. nitigaina-i (‘it is epistemically necessary that’) 
 
Darô is a functional element, while kamosirena-i and nitigaina-i are lexical predicates (Inoue 
2007). This difference is reflected in the fact that darô does not show inflection, while 
kamosirena-i and nitigaina-i does.
103
 Let us look at (220a,b), for example. They show that 
addition of darô to a simple sentence does not increase the number of occurrences of tense in the 
sentence. 
 
(220) a. Tarô-wa   soko-ni   it-ta. 
  Taro-Top there-to   go-Past 
                                                          
100
 Etymologically, these expressions are derived as follows. 
         (i) darô = de (Pred) - ar (‘be’) - ô (conjectural) 
        (ii) kamosirena-i = ka (Q) - mo (‘also’) - sir (‘know’) - e (ability) - na (Neg) - i (Pred.be.Pres) 
       (iii) nitigaina-i = ni (Pred) - tigaw (‘different’) - na (Neg) - i (Pred.be.Pres) 
101
 Their polite forms, desyô, kamosiremasen, and nitigaiarimasen are also frequently used. 
102
 For a detailed analysis of the meaning of darô, see, e.g., Hara and Davis (2013). 
103
 In general, Japanese modals can be divided into ‘genuine’ and ‘quasi’-modals (see, e.g., Inoue 2007; 
Kizu 2009). Addition of a genuine modal does not change the number of tense in a sentence, while addition 
of a quasi modal does. In this terminology, darô is a genuine modal, while kamosirena-i and nitigaina-i are 
quasi-modals. 
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  ‘Taro went there.’ 
 b. Tarô-wa   soko-ni  it-ta       darô. 
  Taro-Top there-to go-Past  seem 
  ‘It seems that Taro went there.’ 
   
Contrastively, addition of kamosirena-i and nigitaina-i introduces tense which indicates the time 
of epistemic judgment, as shown in (221a-d).  
 
(221) a. Tarô-wa   soko-ni  it-ta        {kamosirena/nitigaina} 
  Taro-Top there-to  go-Past  {be epistemically possible/be epistemically necessary} 
  -i. 
  -Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘It is {epistemically possible/epistemically necessary} that Taro went there.’ 
 b. Tarô-wa   soko-ni  it-ta        {kamosirena/nitigaina} 
  Taro-Top there-to  go-Past  {be epistemically possible/be epistemically necessary} 
  -k-at-ta. 
  -Pred-be-Past 
  ‘It was {epistemically possible/epistemically necessary} that Taro went there.’ 
 c. Tarô-wa   soko-ni  i-ru        {kamosirena/nitigaina} 
  Taro-Top there-to  go-Pres  {be epistemically possible/be epistemically necessary} 
  -i. 
  -Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘It is {epistemically possible/epistemically necessary} that Taro is there.’ 
 d. Tarô-wa   soko-ni  i-ru         {kamosirena/nitigaina} 
  Taro-Top there-to  go-Pres  {be epistemically possible/be epistemically necessary} 
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  -k-at-ta. 
-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘It was {epistemically possible/epistemically necessary} that Taro was there.’ 
 
In the following, I use the term an ‘epistemic modal’ only for darô, which belongs to a functional 
category, excluding kamosirena-i and nitigaina-i, which belong to a lexical category. Following 
Koizumi (1991, 1993), Kishimoto (2011), and Sato (2011), I call the functional category of darô 
‘Mod(al)’. 
 
5.2.2 Root clauses 
 First, let us consider a declarative root clause, as in (222). As we saw in the previous 
chapters, it shows the Experiencer restriction in reportive style. 
 
(222)  {watasi/#Tarô}-wa uresi-k-at-ta             yo   
  {I/Taro}-Top          glad-Pred-be-Past    SFP 
  ‘{I/#Taro} was glad.’ 
 
As shown in (223), it allows insertion of darô. 
 
(223)  {watasi/Tarô}-wa   uresi-k-at-ta  darô. 
  {I/Taro}-Top glad-Pred-be-Past  Mod 
 a. ‘It seems that {#I/Taro} was glad.’ 
 b. ‘{I/Taro} would have been glad.’ 
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The English translations show that if (223) is interpreted in a counterfactual context, both the 
speaker and Taro can be the Experiencer, but if it is interpreted in a factual context, only Taro is 
allowed as the Experiencer. That the speaker cannot be the Experiencer in that case is related to 
the general fact that it is strange to use darô for an event which the speaker 
experienced/witnessed (and retains its memory). What is relevant here is that insertion of darô 
produces an acceptable sentence. 
 An interrogative root clause shows the same pattern. Let us consider (224), for example. 
It shows the Experiencer restriction. 
 
(224)  {kimi/#Tarô}-wa  uresi-k-at-ta            (ka)   
  {you/#Taro}-Top glad-Pred-be-Past    Q 
  ‘{Are you/#Is Taro} glad?’ 
 
The interrogative root clause allows insertion of darô, as in (225). 
 
(225)  {kimi/Tarô}-wa  uresi-k-at-ta             darô (ka)   
  {you/Taro}-Top   glad-Pred-be-Past  Mod   Q 
 a. ‘Does it seem that {#you were/Taro was} glad?’ 
 b. ‘Would {you/Taro} have been glad?’ 
 
As in the case of the declarative root clause, the point here is that the resulting sentence, (225), is 
acceptable. It is not relevant here that insertion of darô lifts the Experiencer restriction. 
 In nonreportive style, root clauses do not show the Experiencer restriction: 
 
(226)  (Context: In third-person narrative) 
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  Tarô-wa     uresi-k-at-ta. 
Taro-Top   glad-Pred-be-Past  
  ‘Taro was glad.’ 
 
As shown in (227), insertion of darô is possible in nonreportive style also. 
 
(227)  (Context: In third-person narrative) 
  Tarô-wa     uresi-k-at-ta           darô. 
  Taro-Top   glad-Pred-be-Past  Mod 
  ‘Taro was probably glad.’ 
 
5.2.3 To-complement clauses under verbs of saying 
 We have seen that the Experiencer restriction is active in to-complement clauses under a 
verb of saying like yu-u ‘say’ (section 2.3.2.1). This section shows that they allow insertion of 
darô. 
 For example, let us take sentence (228). Its embedded clause contains a third person 
pronoun which refers to the local speaker, Hanako, so it represents indirect discourse. 
 
(228)  #Hanakoi-wa   [(sore-o     kiite)       kanozyoi-no itoko-wa       uresi-k-at-ta      
    Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hearing)  shei-Gen       cousin-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past 
  -to]    {it-ta/saken-da/…}. 
  -Rep] {say-Past/shout-Past/…} 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanakoi {said/shouted/…} that heri cousin had been glad (to hear that).’ 
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This sentence is not felicitous because the Experiencer in the embedded clause does not refer to 
the local speaker. This embedded clause allows insertion of darô, as shown in (229). As a result 
of insertion of an epistemic modal, the Experiencer restriction is lifted and the sentence can be 
felicitously asserted. 
 
(229)  Hanakoi-wa   [(sore-o     kiite)      kanozyoi-no   itoko-wa     uresi-k-at-ta      
  Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hearing)  shei-Gen        cousin-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past 
  darô-to]    {it-ta/saken-da/…}. 
  Mod-Rep] {say-Past/shout-Past/…} 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanakoi {said/shouted/…} that heri cousin had been glad (to hear that).’ 
 
 Another way to distinguish indirect discourse from direct discourse is to embed a WH-
element in the complement clause. By the scope of the WH-element, we can tell whether the 
complement clause is direct or indirect discourse. For example, let us consider (230). Here, a 
WH-element nani (‘what’) is embedded under a verb of saying, but it can take a matrix scope 
(note that a question marker ka is at the sentence-final position). In this interpretation of the WH-
element, the embedded clause must represent indirect discourse. 
 
(230)  #Hanako-wa   [Tarô-wa     nani-ga       uresi-k-at-ta      
    Hanako-Top [Taro-Top   what-Nom  glad-Pred-be-Past 
  -to]    {it-ta/saken-da/…}            (ka) 
  -Rep] {say-Past/shout-Past/…}   Q 
  (lit. Hanako {said/shouted/…} that Taro was glad about what’) 
  (Intended:) ‘What did Hanako {say/shout/…} that Taro was glad about? 
 
Insertion of darô into the complement clause makes the sentence felicitously assertable as before: 
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(231)   Hanakoi-wa   [Tarô-wa    nani-ga        uresi-k-at-ta      
  Hanakoi-Top [Taro-Top   what-Nom  glad-Pred-be-Past 
  darô-to]    {it-ta/saken-da/…}           (ka) 
  Mod-Rep] {say-Past/shout-Past/…}   Q 
  (lit. Hanakoi {said/shouted/…} that Taro was glad about what’) 
  ‘What did Hanako {say/shout/…} that Taro was glad about?’ 
 
It confirms that a to-complement clause under a verb of saying allows insertion of darô. 
 
5.2.4 To-complement clauses under verbs of thinking/believing/knowing 
 To-complement clauses under a verb of thinking or believing allow insertion of Mod 
darô, as in (232), similarly to to-complement clauses under verbs of saying. 
 
(232)  Hanakoi-wa     [kanozyoi-no  itoko-wa      uresi-k-at-ta           darô-to] 
Hanakoi-Top   [shei-Gen        cousin-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past  Mod-Rep] 
  {omot/?sinzi}-tei-ta. 
  {think/believe}-Perf-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi {thought/?believed} that heri cousin had been probably glad.’ 
 
Note that to-complement clauses under verbs of thinking/believing without darô do not show the 
Experiencer restriction (as in (49a)), while to-complement clauses under verbs of saying without 
darô show the Experiencer restriction (as in (228)). 
 To-complement clauses under a verb of knowing lift the Experiencer restriction as in 
(49b), and resist insertion of Mod darô, as shown by the awkwardness of (233). 
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(233)  ??Hanakoi-wa     [kanozyoi-no  itoko-wa      uresi-k-at-ta            darô-to]           
      Hanakoi-Top   [shei-Gen        cousin-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past  Mod-Rep] 
  sit-tei-ta. 
  know-Perf-Past 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanakoi knew that heri cousin had been probably glad.’ 
 
5.2.5 No-complement clauses under verbs of saying 
 Next, let us consider no-complement clauses. They lift the Experiencer restriction, as 
shown in (42), (48), and (50), and they do not allow insertion of darô, as shown in (234) and 
(235). 
 
(234)  Hanakoi-wa   [(sore-o     kii-te)      kanozyoi-no   itoko-ga                     
        Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hear-ing) shei-Gen       cousin-Nom 
  uresi-gat-ta-(*darô)-no]-o               iw-ana-k-at-ta. 
glad-GAR-Past-(*Mod)-Fin]-Acc   say-Neg-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi did not say that (*it was probable that) heri cousin behaved as being glad (to 
hear that).’ 
 
(235)  Hanakoi-wa   [kanozyoi-no   itoko-ga         uresi-k-at-ta          (*darô)-no]-o        
  Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen         cousin-Nom  glad-Pred-be-Past (*Mod)-Fin]-Acc 
  sit-tei-ru. 
  know-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Hanakoi knows that (*it is probable that) heri cousin was glad.’ 
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This observation is not a surprise, for no-clauses are Finite phrases (FinP), which are smaller than 
ModP (section 2.1.2). 
 
5.2.6 Restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses 
 Restrictive relative clauses do not restrict the Experiencer, while non-restrictive relative 
clauses restrict the Experiencer in some environments (see the previous chapter for the details): 
 
(236)  [RRC sono nyûsu-o     kii-te      uresi-k-at-ta]           hito-wa 
  [RRC that  news-Acc  hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past]  people-Top 
  kinô          sono gi’in-no                   zimusyo-ni it-ta        yo 
  yesterday  that   assemblyman-Gen  office-to     go-Past  SFP 
  ‘The people who were glad to hear the news went to the assemblyman’s office 
yesterday.’ 
 
(237)  #[NRRC sono nyûsu-o     kii-te     uresi-k-at-ta]           Tarô-wa 
    [NRRC that  news-Acc  hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past]  Taro-Top 
  kinô          sono gi’in-no                   zimusyo-ni it-ta        yo 
yesterday  that   assemblyman-Gen  office-to     go-Past  SFP 
  (Intended:) ‘Taro, who was glad to hear the news, went to the assemblyman’s office 
yesterday.’ 
 
Interestingly, as Masuoka (1997), Kishimoto (2011), and Sato (2012) point out, restrictive 
relative clauses do not allow insertion of darô, as in (238), whereas non-restrictive relative 
clauses do, as in (239). It does not depend on the environment where the relative clause appears. 
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(238)  *[RRC sono nyûsu-o     kii-te     uresi-k-at-ta            darô]   hito-wa 
  [RRC that  news-Acc  hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past  Mod]  people-Top 
  kinô          sono gi’in-no                   zimusyo-ni it-ta        yo 
  yesterday  that   assemblyman-Gen  office-to     go-Past  SFP 
  (Intended:) ‘The people who seem to have been glad to hear the news went to the 
assemblyman’s office yesterday.’ 
 
(239) a. [NRRC sono nyûsu-o     kii-te     uresi-k-at-ta            darô]  Tarô-wa 
  [NRRC that  news-Acc  hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past  Mod]  Taro-Top 
  kinô          sono gi’in-no                   zimusyo-ni it-ta        yo 
  yesterday  that   assemblyman-Gen  office-to     go-Past  SFP 
  ‘Taro, who seems to have been glad to hear the news, went to the assemblyman’s office 
yesterday.’ 
 
 b. Tarôi-wa  [[NRRC karei-no  hahaoya-no   nyûsu-o     kii-te       uresi-k-at-ta           darô]  
  Taroi-Top [[NRRC hei-Gen   mother-Gen  news-Acc hear-ing  glad-Pred-be-Past  Mod] 
  Hanako-ga      sore-o   si-ta-to]          {omot/sinzi}-tei-ru. 
  Hanako-Nom  it-Acc  do-Past-Rep]  {think/believe}-Perf-Pres 
  Sikasi, Hanako-wa   Tarô-no     hahaoya-no  nyûsu-o     kii-tei-na-i. 
  But      Hanako-Top  Taro-Gen mother-Gen  news-Acc  hear-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres 
  (lit.) ‘Taroi {thinks/believes} that Hanako, who was probably glad at hearing hisi 
mother’s news, did it. But Hanako has not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’ 
  ≈ ‘Taroi {thinks/believes} that Hanako was probably glad at hearing hisi mother’s news 
and that she did it. But Hanako has not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’ 
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5.2.7 Adversative conjunctive clauses 
 Finally, let us consider adversative conjunctive clauses which are headed by ga and 
ke(re)do (both mean ‘though’).104 They behave similarly to non-restrictive relative clauses, so we 
can analyze them straightforwardly with adapting the analysis of the non-restrictive relative 
clause presented in the previous chapter, as shown in section 5.5.3 below. When a matrix clause 
is in reportive style, an Experiencer in an adversative conjunctive clause is restricted to the 
speaker, as shown in (240) and (241).
105,106,107
 
                                                          
104
 Not all adversative conjunctive clauses behave similarly. Different from adversative conjunctive clauses 
headed by ga and ke(re)do, adversative conjunctive clauses headed by noni ‘though’ lift the Experiencer 
restriction (Minami 1967, Akmajian and Kitagawa 1981, Tenny 2006) and do not allow insertion of darô 
(Minami 1967, 1974, Akmajian and Kitagawa 1981). 
105
 To my knowledge, Minami (1967) is the first that observed that the Experiencer restriction is active in 
ga and keredo adversative conjunctive clauses. He does not make reportive/nonreportive distinction in the 
paper, but all his examples are in reportive style. 
106
 Akmajian and Kitagawa (1981:109-110) also claim that keredo (and ga) clauses impose the Experiencer 
restriction. However, their claim is derived based on inappropriate data. Concretely, they give the following 
example for keredo, and based on its badness, they argue that keredo clauses show the Experiencer 
restriction (they judge the sentence “?*” as shown in (i), though my judgment is “*”). 
     (i) ?*Sono  kodomo wa      netu-de       kurusi-i            keredo       nak-anakat-ta. 
     that    child       topic  fever-with  suffer-present  KEREDO  cry-not-past   
    (Intended: ‘The child, although he is suffering with fever, did not cry.’) 
       (Akmajian & Kitagawa 1981:110(151a)) 
(The intended meaning is not given in the original text, so I added it.) A factor which makes the sentence 
bad is the choice of the tense in the keredo clause. In fact, the badness of (i) does not disappear even if we 
replace the Experiencer NP sono kodomo ‘the child’ with a first person pronoun as in (ii) or the 
Experiencer predicate kurusi-i with a gar-counterpart, kurusi-gar-u as in (iii), which is not expected if the 
badness of (i) is due to the Experiencer restriction: 
    (ii) *watasi wa      netu-de       kurusi-i            keredo       nak-anakat-ta. 
   I          topic  fever-with  suffer-present  KEREDO  cry-not-past   
 (Intended: ‘I, although I am suffering with fever, did not cry.’) 
    (iii) *Sono  kodomo wa      netu-de       kurusi-gat-tei-ru                 keredo       nak-anakat-ta. 
   that    child       topic  fever-with  suffer-GAR-Perf-present  KEREDO  cry-not-past   
 (Intended: ‘The child, although he is behaving as suffering with fever, did not cry.’) 
The badness of (ii) and (iii) undermines the claim that (i) shows that the Experiencer restriction is active in 
keredo clauses. 
 To show that the Experiencer restriction is active in keredo clauses, we need to change the 
embedded present tense in (i) to past tense, as in (iv). 
    (iv) *REP/√NR Sono  kodomo  wa      netu-de       kurusi-k-at-ta           keredo       nak-anakat-ta. 
                  that    child       topic  fever-with  suffer-Pred-be-past  KEREDO  cry-not-past   
 ‘The child, although he was suffering with fever, did not cry.’ 
Sentence (iv) is unacceptable in conversation, namely in reportive style, while it is acceptable in third-
person narrative, namely in non-reportive style. For (iv), if we replace the Experiencer NP with a first 
person pronoun or the Experiencer adjective with its gar-counterpart, we obtain an acceptable sentence: 
    (v) watasi  wa       netu-de       kurusi-k-at-ta           keredo       nak-anakat-ta. 
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(240) a. [ACC {#Tarô/watasi}-wa  (sore-o     kii-te)         uresi-kat-ta-ga,]                    Hanako-wa  
  [ACC {#Taro/I}-Top          (that-Acc  hear-ing)  glad-Pred-be-Past-though]   Hanako-Top 
  kanasi-gat-ta            zo. 
  worried-GAR-Past  SFP 
  ‘Though {#Taro/I} was glad (to hear that), Hanako behaved as being sad.’ 
 b. [ACC Tarô-wa   (sore-o     kii-te)        uresi-gat-ta-ga,]              Hanako-wa  
  [ACC Taro-Top (that-Acc  hear-ing)  glad-GAR-Past-though]   Hanako-Top 
  kanasi-gat-ta     zo. 
  sad-GAR-Past  SFP 
  ‘Though Taro behaved as being glad (to hear that), Hanako behaved as being sad.’ 
 
(241) a. ??[ACC kono ko-wa      hito-ri-de     sabisi-i                      keredo]  
  ??[ACC this   child-Top one-CL-by  lonely-Pred.be.Pres  though] 
  dare-mo ason-de    yar-imas-en            wa. 
  WH-    play-Con  YAR-Polite-Neg   SFP 
  (Intended:) ‘Though this child is alone and feels lonely, no one plays with her.’ 
         (based on Minami 1967:41) 
 b. [ACC kono ko-wa      hito-ri-de     sabisi-gat-tei-ru             keredo]  
  [ACC this   child-Top one-CL-by  lonely-GAR-Perf-Pres  though] 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 I            topic  fever-with  suffer-Pred-be-past  KEREDO  cry-not-past   
 ‘I, although I was suffering with fever, did not cry.’ 
    (vi) Sono  kodomo  wa      netu-de       kurusi-gat-tei-ta           keredo       nak-anakat-ta. 
 that    child        topic  fever-with  suffer-GAR-Perf-past  KEREDO  cry-not-past   
 ‘The child, although he was behaving as suffering with fever, did not cry.’ 
(iv), (v), and (vi) indicate that the Experiencer restriction is active in keredo clauses in reportive style. This 
shows that keredo clauses behave in the same manner as ga (‘though’) clauses (with respect to the 
Experiencer restriction). 
107
 Sentence-final discourse particles zo and wa in these examples are similar to yo. These sentence-final 
discourse particles can appear only in reportive style. 
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  dare-mo ason-de    yar-imas-en          wa. 
  WH-   play-Con  YAR-Polite-Neg  SFP 
  ‘Though this child is alone and behaving as feeling lonely, no one plays with her.’ 
 
In these examples, (a)-sentences contain Experiencer adjectives, while (b)-sentences contain gar-
verbs, which do not show the Experiencer restriction. (240a) and (241a) suggest that the 
Experiencer argument of Experiencer adjectives is restricted to the speaker in adversative 
conjunctive clauses. The goodness of (240b) and (241b) suggests that the badness of (240a) and 
(241a) is in fact due to the Experiencer restriction and not to some other reasons. 
 When a matrix clause is in nonreportive style, the Experiencer restriction in adversative 
conjunctive clauses is lifted: 
 
(242)  (Context: In third-person narrative) 
  [ACC Tarô-wa   (sore-o     kii-te)        uresi-kat-ta-{ga/keredo}]                   Hanako-wa 
[ACC Taro-Top (that-Acc  hear-ing)  glad-Pred-be-Past-{though/though}] Hanako-Top 
  kanasi-gat-ta. 
sad-GAR-Past 
  ‘Though Taro was glad (to hear that), Hanako behaved as being sad.’ 
 
 Adversative conjunctive clauses behave similarly to non-restrictive relative clauses in 
embedded clauses also. For example, (243) shows that an adversative conjunctive clause activates 
the Experiencer restriction in a to-complement clause under a verb of saying while it does not in a 
to-complement clause under a verb of thinking or in a no-complement clause. 
 
(243) a. Tarôi-wa   [Hanakoj-ga     [ACC ej  karei-no  hahaoya-no   nyûsu-o     kii-te        
  Taroi-Top [Hanako-Nom  [ACC ej   hei-Gen   mother-Gen  news-Acc hear-ing   
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  uresi-k-at-ta            kedo]    sore-o   si-ta-to]         {*it/omot}-tei-ru. 
  glad-Pred-be- Past though]  it-Acc  do-Past-Rep]  {*say/think}-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Taroi {*says/thinks} that Hanakoj did it though shej was glad at hearing hisi mother’s 
news.’ 
 
 b. Tarôi-wa   [Hanakoj-ga     [ACC ej  karei-no  hahaoya-no   nyûsu-o     kii-te        
  Taroi-Top [Hanako-Nom  [ACC ej   hei-Gen   mother-Gen  news-Acc hear-ing   
  uresi-k-at-ta            kedo]    sore-o   si-ta-no]-o              
  glad-Pred-be- Past though]  it-Acc  do-Past-Fin]-Acc 
  {iw-ana/sinzi-na}-k-at-ta. 
  {say-Neg/believe-Neg}-Pred-be-Past. 
  ‘Taroi did not {say/believe} that Hanakoj did it though shej was glad at hearing hisi 
mother’s news.’ 
 
 Irrespective of the environment, darô can be inserted into adversative conjunctive clauses 
(Minami 1974, Akmajian and Kitagawa 1981: 108-109). For example, (244) shows that darô can 
be inserted in an adversative conjunctive clause which is in a root clause in reportive or 
nonreportive style, and (245) shows that darô can be inserted in an adversative conjunctive clause 
in a to-complement clause under a verb of thinking. 
 
(244)  (In reportive and nonreportive styles) 
  [ACC Tarô-wa   (sore-o     kii-te)        uresi-kat-ta           darô-{ga/keredo}]          
  [ACC Taro-Top (that-Acc  hear-ing)  glad-Pred-be-Past Mod-{though/though}]    
  Hanako-wa   kanasi-gat-ta. 
Hanako-Top sad-GAR-Past  
  ‘Though Taro was probably glad (to hear that), Hanako behaved as being sad.’ 
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(245)  Tarôi-wa   [[ACC Hanakoj-wa    karei-no  hahaoya-no   nyûsu-o     kii-te        
  Taroi-Top [[ACC Hanako-Top   hei-Gen   mother-Gen  news-Acc hear-ing   
  uresi-k-at-ta            darô-kedo]     Yoshio-wa   kanasi-gat-ta-to]        omot-tei-ru. 
  glad-Pred-be- Past Mod-though]  Yoshio-Top  sad-GAR-Past-Rep]  think-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Taroi thinks that Yoshio behaved as feeling sad though it is probable that Hanako was 
glad at hearing hisi mother’s news.’ 
 
5.2.8 Interim summary 
 A summary of the above data is given in table 1 below. Importantly, the Experiencer 
restriction is active only in clauses where insertion of darô is possible. In other words, all the 
environments that show the Experiencer restriction are those which allow insertion of darô. It 
should be noted that the converse does not hold: some environments which allow insertion of 
darô, e.g., to-complement clauses under a verb of thinking/believing, do not show the 
Experiencer restriction.  
 
  Table 1. Availability of darô and the Experiencer restriction across clausal types 
 Insertion of darô is 
possible 
The Experiencer 
restriction is active 
root clauses in reportive style yes yes 
root clauses in nonreportive style yes no 
adversative conjunctive clauses in 
nonreportive style 
yes no 
to-complement clauses under a 
verb of saying 
yes yes 
to-complement clauses under a 
verb of thinking/believing 
yes no 
to-complement clauses under a 
verb of knowing 
no no 
no-complement clauses under a 
verb of saying/knowing 
no no 
 
(Table continues) 
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 (Table continued) 
 Insertion of darô is 
possible 
The Experiencer 
restriction is active 
restrictive relative clauses no no 
non-restrictive relative clauses 
whose superordinate clause is a 
root clause in reportive style 
yes yes 
non-restrictive relative clauses 
whose superordinate clause is a 
root clause in nonreportive style 
yes no 
non-restrictive relative clauses 
whose superordinate clause is 
under an attitude verb 
yes yes if they are in a to-
clause under a verb of 
saying 
adversative conjunctive clauses 
whose superordinate clause is a 
root clause in reportive style 
yes yes 
adversative conjunctive clauses 
whose superordinate clause is a 
root clause in nonreportive style 
yes no 
adversative conjunctive clauses 
whose superordinate clause is 
under an attitude verb 
yes yes if they are in a to-
clause under a verb of 
saying 
 
5.3 The Experiencer restriction and SAP 
 Syntactically, the allowance of insertion of darô indicates that there is a projection of 
Mod (Koizumi 1991, 1993). Can we find other factors which lead to the Experiencer restriction, 
in addition to the presence of a ModP? The most plausible candidate is presence of a SAP. Note 
that the Experiencer is always restricted to the speaker or addressee of the context, if present, 
which are notions related to speech act. As explained in CHAPTER 2, root clauses in reportive 
style have a SAP while those in nonreportive style don’t. In reportive style, root clauses allow 
sentence-final discourse particles in them: 
 
(246)  (Context: In conversation) 
  {watasi/#Tarô}-wa  uresi-k-at-ta            ({wa/sa/na/yo/ne}). 
  {I/#Taro}-Top         glad-Pred-be-Past  ({SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP}) 
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  ‘{I/#Taro} was glad.’  
 
Sentence-final discourse particles are related to a SAP (Tenny 2006, Saito and Haraguchi 2012), 
so it is not a surprise that they can appear in root clauses in reportive style. On the other hand, 
nonreportive style does not allow insertion of sentence-final discourse particles, as shown in 
(247). It is understandable if root clauses in nonreportive style lack a SAP (Tenny 2006). 
 
(247)  (Context: In third-person narrative) 
  Tarô-wa    uresi-k-at-ta           (*{wa/sa/na/yo/ne}). 
  Taro-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past  (*{SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP}) 
  ‘Taro was glad.’  
 
In this section, I argue that clauses which contain a phonetically null epistemic Mod restrict the 
Experiencer to the speaker of the speech act which is realized as the closest SA. 
 It is not necessary that a SA and an Experiencer are in the same clause for the 
Experiencer restriction. For example, an adversative conjunctive clause does not allow insertion 
of a sentence-final particle, though its matrix clause does: 
 
(248)  [Tarô-wa   (sore-o     kii-te)        uresi-gat-ta       (*{wa/sa/na/yo/ne})-ga,]   
  [Taro-Top (that-Acc  hear-ing)  glad-GAR-Past (*{SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP})-though]   
  Hanako-wa    kanasi-gat-ta    ({yo/ne}). 
  Hanako-Top  sad-GAR-Past  ({SFP/SFP}) 
  ‘Though Taro behaved as being glad (to hear that), Hanako behaved as being sad’ 
 
Similarly, a non-restrictive relative clause does not allow insertion of a sentence-final particle, 
though its matrix clause does: 
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(249)  [(sore-o     kii-te)        uresi-gat-ta        (*{wa/sa/na/yo/ne})]                Tarô-wa 
[(that-Acc  hear-ing)  glad-GAR-Past  (*{SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP})]  Taro-Top 
  tobidasi-te     it-ta        ({wa/sa/na/yo/ne}) 
  run.away-ing go-Past  ({SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP}) 
  ‘Taro, who behaved as being glad (to hear that), ran away.’ 
 
In these clauses, an Experiencer is restricted to the matrix speaker, as seen in the previous 
sections. Note that in the case of adversative conjunctive clauses, if the whole sentences are put in 
nonreportive style, the Experiencer restriction disappears (see (242)). It is expected if a SA at the 
root is relevant with the Experiencer restriction in adversative conjunctive clauses. Then, it is also 
expected that non-restrictive relative clauses do not show the Experiencer restriction in 
nonreportive style. This expectation is fulfilled: let us consider the following sentence which 
contains a non-restrictive relative clause again. 
 
(250)  #[sono nyûsu-o     kii-te     uresi-k-at-ta]           Taro-wa 
    [that  news-Acc  hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past]  Taro-Top 
  kinô          sono gi’in-no                   zimusyo-ni it-ta        yo 
  yesterday  that   assemblyman-Gen  office-to     go-Past  SFP 
  ‘Taro, who was glad to hear the news, went to the assemblyman’s office yesterday.’ 
 
This sentence, which shows the Experiencer restriction, is in reportive style, as indicated by 
availability of a sentence-final particle yo. If non-restrictive clauses are used in nonreportive style, 
the Experiencer restriction is lifted: 
 
(251)  (Context: In narrative) 
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  [sono nyûsu-o     kii-te     uresi-k-at-ta]           Taro-wa 
[that  news-Acc  hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past] Taro-Top  
  Hanako-ni    hanasikake-ta  (*{wa/sa/na/yo/ne}). 
  Hanako-Dat  talk.to-Past      (*{SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP}) 
  ‘Taro, who was glad to hear the news, talked to Hanako.’ 
 
This suggests that a SA at the root is relevant to the Experiencer restriction in non-restrictive 
relative clauses. 
 To-complement clauses under a verb of saying also do not allow a sentence-final particle 
(Saito and Haraguchi 2012), as in (252).
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(252)  Hanakoi-wa   [(sore-o     kiite)       kanozyoi-no itoko-wa       uresi-gat-ta    
Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hearing)  shei-Gen       cousin-Top  glad-GAR-Past 
  (*{wa/sa/na/yo/ne})-to]                     {it-ta/saken-da/…}. 
  (*{SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP})-Rep] {say-Past/shout-Past/…} 
  ‘Hanakoi {said/shouted/…} that heri cousin had behaved as being glad (to hear that).’ 
 
In the case of to-complement clauses under a verb of saying, however, the Experiencer is 
restricted to the local speaker. Let us suppose that to-complement clauses contain a SAP (between 
a ForceP and a ReportP). The badness of sentence-final particles inside of to-complement clauses 
is probably due to meaning conflict: sentence-final particles are linked to the matrix context (as 
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 When to-complement clauses represent direct discourse, sentence-final particles are available, as in (i). 
     (i) Hanako-wa   “Yosiko-wa   uresi-gat-ta       ({wa/yo/ne})”-to             {it-ta/saken-da/…} 
 Hanako-Top “Yosiko-Top glad-GAR-Past ({SFP/SFP/SFP})”-Quot {say-Past/shout-Past/…} 
 ‘Hanako {said/shouted/…}, “Yosiko behaved as being glad.”’ 
But in this case, to does not embed the projections for sentence-final particles. Rather, it takes a phonetic 
sequence, Yosiko-ga uresi-gat-ta ({wa/yo/ne}). 
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first and second person pronouns), and so their modification of embedded speech act causes 
mismatch. (The reason why this case is treated differently from adversative conjunctive clauses 
and non-restrictive relative clauses is that to-clauses under a verb of saying allow insertion of an 
interrogative marker ka (as in (23)), while the other clauses not.) 
 The only one problematic case is to-complement clauses under a verb of 
thinking/believing. They do not restrict the Experiencer, though they are c-commanded by a SA 
at the root and a SA in the embedded clause. Because a SA and the Experiencer need not be in the 
same clause for the Experiencer restriction (see (248) and (249)), it appears that dropping of the 
supposition that to-complement clauses contain a SAP does not help. We will see a solution in the 
next section. 
 The above arguments can be summarized as follows: all and only clauses which allow 
insertion of darô restrict the Experiencer to the speaker related to the closest SA, except to-
complement clauses under verbs of thinking/believing/knowing. Supposing that there is a 
phonetically null Mod Mod if Mod is not overtly occupied, this summary can be restated as 
follows. 
 
(253)  All and only clauses which contain Mod restrict Experiencers in them to the speaker 
related to the closest SA, except to-complement clauses under verbs of non-
communicational attitudes, where the Experiencer restriction is inactive. 
 
5.4 Assertive speech acts and a semantic parameter 
 In this section, let us consider speech acts further and see that assertion requires the 
speaker to empathize with a covert Experiencer, if there is one, in English. Based on it, I propose 
that assertion in Japanese requires the speaker to empathize with an Experiencer, whether it is 
covert or overt. 
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 For example, let us consider the following conversation, which involves a predicate of 
personal taste, ‘taste good’. 
 
(254) A: This soup tastes good. 
 B: No, it doesn’t taste good. 
 
Here, A and B disagree without making false assertion. Importantly, B’s assertion cannot be 
interpreted as an assertion about A’s taste. It represents B’s taste or the taste of people who are 
like B. This fact suggests that the speaker needs to empathize with a covert Experiencer, if any, in 
assertion.
109
 This point is stated by researchers of predicates of personal taste in different ways, 
but the core is similar: 
 
“The other important piece of my pragmatic proposal is the norm of assertion. I suggest 
that it is what Lasersohn would call autocentric. Specifically, I propose that in order for a 
speaker A to assert a sentence S, it must be the case that for all of A’s doxastic 
alternatives w′,t′,x, S is true at the index w′,t′,x. […] this means that A must believe 
that S is true as judged by A.” (Stephenson 2007b: 66) 
 
“Sentences with predicates of personal taste in truth-directed contexts [e.g., assertions] 
(and without an overt subject being specified) always express first-person-based 
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 A different approach to this observation is to impose a restriction on the condition of 
confirmation/denial by the hearer. See von Fintel and Gillies (2011) for such an analysis of an epistemic 
modal, might. I do not take this approach here, because it does not help to account for the restriction on the 
overt Experiencer argument of Experiencer adjectives, which do not involve a hearer’s judgment. For 
example, let us consider assertions (i) and (ii) made by Taro: 
      (i) watasi-wa uresi-i.       ‘I am glad.’ 
      (ii) #Hanako-wa uresi-i.   (Intended:) ‘Hanako is glad.’ 
Assertion (ii) is always unacceptable, irrespective of the hearer’s judgment. In other words, the badness of 
(ii) is independent of confirmation/denial by the hearer of the information conveyed by the sentence. 
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genericity, generalizing from a first-personal subjective experience to anyone meeting the 
contextually given restriction.” (Moltmann 2010: 214) 
 
“(43) states how we propose to treat PPTs [= predicates of personal taste]. 
    (43)  Proposal 
PPTs such as tasty are used to make statements about whether something is tasty 
to people in general, based on first person experience. 
The idea is this: when I say This cake is tasty, I commit myself to finding the cake tasty. 
That’s why I cannot coherently follow up with, . . . but I don’t like it. But this is not all I 
do. I also generalize beyond my own experience to the likely experience of anyone with 
whom I empathize who might eat the cake and claim that they would find it tasty too. 
This is why PPTs are interpreted generically, at least when there is no overt PP.” 
(Pearson 2013a: 121)
110
 
 
 Now, to account for the Experiencer restriction, I propose that assertion’s requirement of 
the speaker’s empathy to an Experiencer is stronger in Japanese than in English: in Japanese, 
assertion requires the speaker to empathize with an Experiencer, whether it is covert or overt. 
Formally, this is analyzed as a result of agreement between Experiencer NPs and Mod in 
Japanese, which does not occur in English. (In both languages, assertion sets the value of h to the 
speaker.) A formal analysis is presented in the next section. 
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 Actually, the assertion This cake is tasty can be followed by but I don’t like it with respect to some other 
property than tastiness (Rajesh Bhatt, p.c.). In that case, however, the continuation, but I don’t like it, does 
not indicate the speaker’s non-commitment to finding the cake tasty. Therefore, the purport of Pearson’s 
argument is not affected by such a case. 
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5.5 Single-feature checking analysis 
 In this section, I present an analysis which supposes that Mod agrees with an Experiencer, 
and mediates the value of Experiencer determined by SA (namely, the speaker) to the 
Experiencer. The idea of agreement between the epistemic modal and the Experiencer follows 
Tenny’s (2006) proposal of agreement between the Sentience/Evidential head and the 
Experiencer DP. In Tenny’s analysis, Experiencer adjectives assign their Experiencer arguments 
features [+sentient] and [+discourse participant], and the features are checked by a 
Sentience/Evidentiality head and an SA head, respectively. In the analysis which I present below, 
only one feature, [sen] (which is the same as [+sentient] feature), is assigned to an Experiencer 
DP and it is checked with [sen] on a Mod head. I call this analysis a single-feature checking 
analysis.
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 Partly following Tenny’s double-feature checking analysis, I propose as follows. 
 
(255) a. Experiencer adjectives assign their Experiencer DP a feature [sen], which indicates that 
the referent of the DP can have epistemic states.
112
  
 b. Mod has a feature [sen]. 
 c. If there is an Experiencer DP in the local domain of Mod, the Experiencer DP raises to 
[Spec,ModP] and their feature [sen] agree.
113
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 In Tenny’s analysis, the Experiencer, which raises to [Spec,Sen/EvidP] for checking [+sentient] feature, 
further raises to [Spec,SAP] to check [+discourse participant], if there is no intervening Sen/EvidP. One of 
the reasons why I do not take the double-feature checking analysis is that it predicts island sensitivity which 
is not observed: if an Experiencer is in a syntactic island and the closest SAP is outside of the island, then 
the two-feature analysis predicts that the Experiencer is not restricted. However, there are syntactic islands 
which do not contain SAP which show the Experiencer restrictions, namely adversative conjunctive 
adjuncts and nonrestrictive relative clauses. Another reason is related to the use of [+discourse participant], 
which is treated in the next chapter. 
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 It follows Tenny (2006:264): “The feature [+sentient] indicates that the entity referred to can have 
epistemic states.” 
113
 If there is no Experiencer in the local domain of Mod, agreement of [sen] does not occur. In such a case, 
feature [sen] on Mod remains unchecked. I suppose that failure of agreement of [sen] feature on Mod is 
unproblematic, based on Preminger’s (2009, 2011) claim that failure to Agree does not lead to crash.  
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In the spirit of Lasersohn (2005), Stephenson (2006, 2007a,b) and others, I suppose that the truth-
value of a sentence depends not only on the assignment function g, possible world w, and context 
c, but also on a parameter for an Experiencer of the sentence, h. I suppose that an SA head sets h 
to the denotation of a phonetically null pronoun in [Spec,SAP] as in (256). The null pronoun is 
proposed in Speas (2004).  
 
(256)  [[ [SAP pro [SA  ϕ ] ] ]]
g,w,c,h
 = λx. [[ ϕ ]]g,w,c,h→x ([[ pro ]]g,w,c,h) 
 
Speas claims that the pronoun refers to the speaker. In the spirit of Speas (2004), I suppose that a 
speaker can assert a sentence S only if the phonetically null pronoun in [Spec,SAP] at the root of 
S is bound to the speaker, as in (257) (which will be revised below). 
 
(257)  One can assert an SAP only if [Spec,SAP] is occupied by a phonetically null pronoun 
that is bound to the speaker. (To be revised) 
 
I suppose that the trace of a moved DP is a variable, as is usually supposed (e.g., as in Heim and 
Kratzer 1998). Mod, which agrees with an Experiencer DP, binds the trace of the moved 
Experiencer DP, based on the claim that syntactic feature checking accompanies semantic 
binding. In Heim and Kratzer (1998), movement of a DP introduces a λ-binder which binds the 
trace of the DP, but here I do not posit a λ-binder distinct from the one which corresponds to Mod. 
It might be considered to be rather ad hoc, but the same kind of analysis of movement of a DP to 
the left-periphery is required in other analyses also (e.g., McKenzie 2011 and Constant 2014), and 
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so it seems that such a semantic treatment is legitimate.
114
 With these suppositions, I propose that 
a phonetically null Mod Mod is a semantic binder of the trace of its agreeing Experiencer DP 
with a presupposition that its domain is {h}, as in (258). Here, [n] represents an index feature, and 
α and β are arbitrary elements. 
 
(258)  [[ Mod[n][sen]  [α  [n][sen] β] ]]
g,w,c,h
 = λx: x=h. [[ α [n][sen] β ]]g[n→x],w,c,h   
           agreement 
 
In the following, let us see how this analysis works. Condition (257) will be revised in the course 
of analysis. 
 
5.5.1 Analysis of a root clause 
 First, let us consider an assertive root clause in conversation (259). 
 
(259)  (Context: In conversation) 
  Hanako-wa    uresi-k-at-ta          yo 
  Hanako-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past SFP 
  ‘Hanako was glad.’ 
 
This sentence is felicitously assertable only if Hanako is the speaker. If Hanako is not the speaker, 
it is unacceptable. Let us see how it is derived in the single-feature checking analysis. 
                                                          
114
 I thank Seth Cable (p.c.) for this point. 
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 The TP of (259) has the following structure (in the following, I omit irrelevant 
projections). The Experiencer predicate uresi-k ‘glad-Pred’ assigns a feature [sen] to the 
Experiencer DP Hanako (which has an index feature [n]). 
 
(260)                    TP 
               
           VP    T    
      
               PredP             V -ta 
      Past 
   DP   Pred′               -ar          
             ‘be’ 
    Hanako[n][sen]     AP            Pred   
             |    | 
            A   -k 
             |  
         uresi- 
         ‘glad’
 
The TP is c-commanded by a Mod. It is supposed that a Mod has a feature [sen] and an index 
feature [n], and they agree with the corresponding features on the Experiencer DP, which raises to 
[Spec,ModP]. 
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(261)              ModP 
    
   DP                Mod′ 
                     
    Hanako[n][sen]               TP        Mod 
               
           VP    T        Mod[n][sen]  
      
               PredP             V -ta 
     Past 
   DP     Pred′            -ar          
              ‘be’ 
    Hanako[n][sen]      AP            Pred   
             |    | 
            A   -k 
             |  
         uresi- 
         ‘glad’
               
                                   agreement 
 
The ModP is c-commanded by an SA. 
 
(262)               SAP 
    
             proi                        SA′ 
                                  
                          ModP            SA 
                           
                          DP              Mod′            
                              
         Hanako[n][sen]           TP       Mod 
               
              Hanako[n][sen]-wa uresi-k-at-taMod[n][sen] 
 
                                agreement 
 
[Spec,SAP] is occupied by a phonetically null pronoun proi which is bound to the speaker, 
following (257). 
 Now, let us calculate the logical form of (262). In the following, I use English 
translations in place of Japanese words and ignore the past tense. 
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(263)  [ proi  SA[ Hanako[n][sen]Mod[n][sen]  [ Hanako[n][sen] was glad ] ] ] 
  
Here, the elements in this logical form have the following meaning: 
 
(264) a. [[ Hanako[n][sen] ]]
g,w,c,h
 = g(n) if g(n) = Hanako. Undefined otherwise. 
 b. [[ was glad ]]
g,w,c,h
 = λx.x was glad in w 
 c. [[ Mod[n][sen] ψ ]]
g,w,c,h
 = λx:x=h.[[ψ]]g[n→x],w,c,h 
 d. [[ [ForceP pro [SA  ϕ] ] ]]
g,w,c,h
 = λx. [[ ϕ ]]g,w,c,h→x ([[ pro ]])    
 e. [[ proi ]]
g,w,c,h
 = g(i) if g(i) = sp(c). Undefined otherwise (from (257)) 
 
The calculation of (263) goes as follows. 
 
(265)  [[ (263) ]]
g,w,c,h
  
  = (λx. [[ Hanako[n][sen] Mod[n][sen]  [ Hanako[n][sen] was glad ] ]]
g,w,c,h→x
)    
     ([[ proi ]]) 
  = (λx. [[ Hanako[n][sen] Mod[n][sen]  [ Hanako[n][sen] was glad ] ]]
g,w,c,h→x
)(g(i)) 
      if g(i) = sp(c). Undefined otherwise.      
  = [[ Hanako[n][sen] Mod[n][sen]  [ Hanako[n][sen] was glad ] ]]
g,w,c,g(i)
 
      if g(i) = sp(c). Undefined otherwise. 
  = λx: x=g(i). (x was glad in w)([[ Hanako[n][sen] ]]g,w,c,g(i))    
     if g(i) = sp(c). Undefined otherwise.      
  = λx: x=g(i). (x was glad in w)(g(n))    
     if g(i) = sp(c) and g(n) = Hanako. Undefined otherwise.   
  = g(n) was glad in w           
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     if g(i) = sp(c), g(n) = Hanako, and g(n)=g(i). Undefined otherwise. 
 
Thus, the SAP means that Hanako was glad in w, if Hanako is the speaker. Otherwise the logical 
form is undefined. This is the desired result. If Hanako is not the speaker, the sentence has no 
truth-value, so it is not felicitously assertable. 
 
5.5.2 Clauses without ModP 
 Clauses such as no-complement clauses and restrictive relative clauses do not contain 
ModP, as indicated by the fact that they cannot contain Mod darô. When they contain an 
Experiencer, agreement between the Experiencer and Mod does not happen, so the Experiencer is 
not restricted. In other words, an Experiencer DP with features [n] and [sen] in such a clause is 
interpreted as g(n) and [sen] indicates that g(n) can have epistemic states (from (255a)), but 
nothing forces the value g(n) to be the speaker in the sentence. 
 
5.5.3 Non-restrictive relative clauses and adversative conjunctive clauses 
 Let us consider non-restrictive relative clauses. As we saw above, they can contain Mod 
darô, so they have ModP. To see how the Experiencer restriction of the non-restrictive relative 
clause emerges, let us consider (266). 
 
(266)  (Context: The speaker is not Taro.) 
  #[sore-ga     uresi-k-at-ta]           Tarô-wa  tobidasi-ta. 
    [that-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past]  Taro-Top  run.away-Past 
   (Intended:) ‘Taro, who was glad about that, ran away.’ 
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I posit the following structure for the non-restrictive relative clause in (266). The Experiencer 
adjective sore-ga uresi-k- ‘be glad about that’ assigns feature [sen] to a covert relative pronoun 
wh. The relative pronoun raises to [Spec,ModP] to check the features [sen] and [n], and then 
raises to yield a predicate of type e,t, with insertion of a λ-abstractor below it. 
 
(267)             ModP 
    
          DP  ModP 
  
  wh[n][sen]λj     ModP 
    
                 DPj                 Mod′ 
                
           wh[n][sen]                        TP        Mod 
                         
                 VP             T            Mod[n][sen]  
      
                 PredP            V          -ta 
     Past 
     DP       Pred′          ar-          
                  ‘be’ 
          wh[n][sen]             AP Pred   
                        | 
                   DP              A  -k 
      
                     sore-ga      uresi- 
                     ‘that-Nom’    ‘glad’
                      Agreement 
 
The LF of (267) is calculated as follows (I use English translations). I suppose that the 
relative pronoun lacks meaning, but its traces are interpreted as variables, following Heim and 
Kratzer (1998). 
 
(268)  [[ wh[n][sen] λj wh[n][sen]j [ Mod[n][sen] [ wh[n][sen] was glad about that ]]
g,w,c,h
 
  = λx.[[ j  [ Mod[n][sen] [ wh[n][sen]  was glad about that ] ]]
g[j→x],w,c,h 
  = λx.[ ([[ Mod[n][sen] [ wh[n][sen]  was glad about that ]]
g[j→x],w,c,h
)([[ j ]]
g[j→x],w,c,h
)] 
  = λx.[ ([[ Mod[n][sen] [ wh[n][sen]  was glad about that ]]
g[j→x],w,c,h
)(x)] 
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  = λx.[ λy: y=h. (y was glad about that in w)(x) ] 
  = λx. [x was glad about that in w] if x=h, undefined otherwise. 
 
From the fifth line to the sixth line in (268), I used the following lexical entry for the predicate, 
was glad about that. 
 
(269)  [[ was glad about that ]]
g,w,c,h
 = λx. x was glad about that in w 
 
 I posit that the non-restrictive relative clause is attached to a ForceP (see the analysis in 
the previous chapter), as in (270) (ignoring word order). 
 
(270)                                        SAP 
  
                  proi                                                     SA′ 
                                                 
                                                       ForceP                                            SA 
                       
            ForceP                         ForceP 
                    
                       TP        Mod       wh[n][sen] sore-ga uresi-k-at-ta Mod[n][sen] 
                ‘who was glad about that’ 
       Tarok-wa tobidasi-taMod[n][sen]         Agreement 
         ‘Tarok ran away’ 
 
The calculation of the non-restrictive relative clause is executed, following rule (201), which is 
reproduced below. 
 
(201) a. Let node CPi dominate the LF position of DP. 
  [[ [CPi … DP NRRCPi … ] ]]
g
 = # unless for some DP d and some index k, DP = dk. 
  If  #, [[ [CPi … DPk NRRCPi … ] ]]
g
 = [[ [CPi … DPk …] ]]
g
  [[ NRRCPi ]]
g
(g(k)) 
  (where # represents presupposition failure) 
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 b.  is the operation of parataxis. As a first approximation, 
  [[ [CPi … DPk …] ]]
g
  [[ NRRCPi ]]
g
(g(k)) = 1 iff [[ [CPi … DPk …] ]]
g
 = 1 and 
[[ NRRCPi ]]
g
(g(k)) = 1. 
       (based on Schlenker 2013: 20(45))  
 
Using it, the topmost ForceP is calculated as follows. 
 
(271)  [[ [ForceP  Tarok [ForceP who was glad about that ] ran away ] ]]
g,w,c,h
 
  = [[ Tarok ran away ]]
g,w,c,h
  [[ who was glad about that ]]g,w,c,h(g(k)) 
 
The first conjunct yields (273), with lexical entry (272) for ran away.  
 
(272)  [[ ran away ]]
g,w,c,h
 = λx. x ran away in w 
 
(273)  [[ Tarok ran away ]]
g,w,c,h
 
  = (λx. x ran away in w)([[Tarok ]]
g,w,c,h
)       (using (272)) 
  = (λx. x ran away in w)(g(k))   if g(k) = Taro. Undefined otherwise.  (using (264a)) 
  = g(k) ran away in w  if g(k) = Taro. Undefined otherwise.  
 
The second conjunct yields (274). 
 
(274)  [[ who was glad about that ]]
g,w,c,h
(g(k)) 
  = (λx. x was glad about that in w)(g(k))    if x=h, undefined otherwise. (using (268)) 
  = g(k) was glad about that in w        if g(k)=h, undefined otherwise.  
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Combining (273) and (274), we obtain the translation of the whole ModP, (271) 
 
(275)  [[ [ForceP  Tarok [ForceP who was glad about that ] ran away ] ]]
g,w,c,h
 
  = [[ Tarok ran away ]]
g,w,c,h
  [[ who was glad about that ]]g,w,c,h(g(k)) 
  = g(k) ran away in w, if g(k) = Taro. Undefined otherwise  
       g(k) was glad about that in w, if g(k)=h, undefined otherwise. 
 
From (201), the truth condition of the whole ForceP is that it is true if and only if g(k) ran away in 
w, g(k) was glad about that in w, g(k) = Taro, and g(k) = h. In short, it means that Taro was glad 
about that and he ran away in w and Taro = h. 
 Finally, the value of h at ModP (in ForceP) is set by SAP. It is the speaker, as is 
calculated in (276). 
 
(276)  [[  proi  [ SA[ForceP ForceP  [ForceP NRR] ] ]  ]]
g,w,c,h
 
  = (λx. [[ [ForceP ForceP  [ForceP NRR] ] ]]
g,w,c,h→x
)([[ proi ]])  (using (256a)) 
  = [[ [ForceP ForceP  [ForceP NRR] ]  ]]
g,w,c,g(i)
  if g(i) = sp(c). Undefined otherwise. (using 
(264e)) 
 
Consequently, combination of (275) and (276) yields the final result: the whole sentence, (266), is 
true if and only if Taro was glad about that and he ran away and Taro is the speaker. The 
condition that Taro is the speaker is not satisfied in the given context, so the sentence is not 
acceptable. 
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 The Experiencer restriction in adversative conjunctive clauses is explained similarly to 
the Experiencer restriction in non-restrictive relative clauses. For illustration, let us consider the 
following sentence. 
 
(277)  #Tarô-wa   uresi-k-at-ta-kedo,              boku-wa uresi-ku    na-k-at-ta               yo                          
    Taro-Top glad-Pred-be-Past-though  I-Top       glad-Pred Neg-Pred-be-Past  SFP 
  (Intended:) ‘Though Taro was glad, I was not glad.’ 
  
(277) has the following structure (here, projections which are irrelevant to the present discussion 
are omitted, and word order is not observed). 
 
(278)             SAP 
 
                                  proi               SA′ 
 
             ForceP                                                 SA 
               | 
                         ConnP            ForceP                     yo 
 
   ModP                       Conn  boku-wa uresi-ku na-k-at-ta 
            ‘I was not glad’ 
     NP               Mod′                            kedo 
            ‘though’ 
    Tarô   Mod[n][sen]  PredP 
    Taro             
                       NP               Pred′ 
       
     Tarô[n][sen] Pred           AP 
                         |             
            Agreement         -k              uresi- 
                  ‘glad’ 
   
[[ [ModP Tarô-wa uresi-k-at-ta ] ]]
g,w,c,h
 is calculated as in (279). 
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(279)           ModP: Taro was glad in w if Taro = h. Undefined otherwise. 
         
     NP               Mod′: λx: x=h. x was glad in w 
  
    Tarô   Mod[n][sen] PredP: x was glad in w 
    Taro   λx: x=h       
                       NP              Pred′: λx. x was glad in w 
       
     Tarô[n][sen] Pred           AP: λx. x was glad in w 
             x            |             
            Agreement         -k              uresi- 
                  ‘glad’ 
   
I suppose that adversative conjunctors such as kedo ‘though’ have the following meaning (t1 and 
t2 are of type t). 
 
(280)  [[ kedo ]]
g,w,c,h
 = λt1.λt2. t1  t2 
 
The operation , which represents a conjunction as a first approximation, actually represents a 
discourse relation (Schlenker 2013a: 41). In the case of a non-restrictive relative clause, it is 
supposed that all discourse relations that are available for parataxis in discourse are possible, if 
there is no element which specifies a discourse relation in the non-restrictive relative clause. 
Schlenker (2013a) does not discuss adversative conjunction and uses  only for non-restrictive 
relative clauses. But in the literature, the relation between two sentences which are conjoined by 
an adversative conjunctor such as but is often captured as a discourse relation of Contrast
115
 
(Asher and Lascarides 2003, among many others), which is a discourse relation between 
                                                          
115
 Adversative conjunction may involve other discourse relations also. For example, in the case of (i), not 
only Contrast but also Background holds between the two sentences (Asher and Lascarides 2003:465).  
   (i) John loves sport. But he hates football. (Asher and Lascarides 2003:168(41b)) 
The discourse relation of Background is defined as follows. 
   (ii) Background(α, β): “This relation holds whenever one constituent provides information about the 
        surrounding state of affairs in which the eventuality mentioned in the other constituent occurred.”  
        (Asher and Lascarides 2003: 460) 
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structurally similar but semantically dissimilar sentences (Asher and Lascarides 2003).
116
 It is not 
fundamentally different from (some of
117
) the other discourse relations available for parataxis, so 
it seems to be reasonable to suppose that the relation between an adversative conjunctive clause 
and a matrix clause also can be represented by , similarly to that between a non-restrictive 
relative clause and a matrix clause. Using (279) and (280), [[ ForceP ]]
g,w,c,h
 is calculated as in 
(281).  
 
(281)             SAP 
 
                                  proi               SA′ 
 
             ForceP                                                 SA 
        Taro was glad in w  sp(c) was glad in w  
          if Taro = h and sp(c) = h. # otherwise. 
                
                         ConnP            ForceP                      
             λt2. Taro was glad in w  t2              sp(c) was glad in w 
               if Taro = h. # otherwise.           if sp(c) = h. # otherwise. 
 
     ModP:                      Conn  boku-wa uresi-ku na-k-at-ta 
   Taro was glad in w if Taro = h  ‘I was not glad’ 
              if Taro = h. # otherwise            kedo 
              ‘though’ 
  Tarô-wa uresi-k-at-ta       λt1.λt2. t1  t2           
       ‘Taro was glad’    
 
The calculated [[ ForceP ]]
g,w,c,h
 shows that it is undefined unless Taro = h and sp(c) = h. The 
condition that Taro = h and sp(c) = h cannot be satisfied unless Taro is the speaker. This explains 
the infelicity of (277). 
                                                          
116
 Formally, Asher and Lascarides (2003) define Contrast as follows, using Segmented Discourse 
Representation Theory (SDRT). 
    (i) “Contrast(a, b) can hold only if Ka and Kb are structurally similar and semantically dissimilar.” (Asher 
         and Lascarides 2003: 152) 
 Here, Ka and Kb mean the Segmented Discourse Representation Structures (SDRSs) of sentences a and b, 
respectively. For other definitions of the discourse relation of Contrast in other frameworks, see Mann and 
Thompson (1988), Umbach (2004), and Spenader and Maier (2009), among others. 
117
 For example, the discourse relation of parallelism is a relation between structurally similar and also 
semantically similar sentences. 
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5.5.4 To-complement clauses under verbs of saying 
 Let us consider a to-clause under verb of saying yu-u ‘say’. 
 
(282)  #Hanako-wa   [Taro-wa   uresi-k-at-ta-to]              it-ta.                  
    Hanako-Top [Taro-Top glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep]  say-Past 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanako said that Taro had been glad.’ 
 
The to-clause has two interpretations, namely indirect discourse interpretation and direct 
discourse (=direct quotation) interpretation. The analysis of the Experiencer restriction in the case 
of the direct quotation interpretation reduces to the analysis of the Experiencer restriction of a 
root clause, #Taro-wa uresi-k-at-ta (‘Taro was glad’), which was analyzed in section 5.5.1. So I 
focus on the Experiencer restriction in the case of the indirect discourse interpretation in this 
section. 
 Let us consider the to-clause, (283), in (282). Its syntactic structure is given in (284), 
where most of the projections which are irrelevant to the following argument are omitted. 
 
(283)  Taro-wa    uresi-k-at-ta-to 
  Taro-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep 
  ‘that Taro was glad’ 
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(284)               RepP 
  
       SAP         Rep 
                | 
  proi                              SA′        -to             
     
     ModP                       SA   
              
      NP               Mod′                             
     
     Tarô  Mod[n][sen]     PredP 
     Taro              
                        NP               Pred′ 
        
     Tarô[n][sen] Pred           AP 
                          |             
          Agreement            -k             uresi- 
                  ‘glad’ 
 
The calculation goes in the same way as the case of the root clause, which is given in section 
5.5.1. First, [[ ModP ]]
g,w,c,h
 is calculated as follows. 
 
(285)               RepP 
  
       SAP         Rep 
                | 
  proi                              SA′        -to             
     
              ModP:              SA 
  Taro was glad in w if Taro = h. # otherwise. 
          
      NP               Mod′: λx: x=h. x was glad in w 
   
     Tarô  Mod[n][sen]      PredP: x was glad in w 
     Taro    λx: x=h        
                        NP               Pred′: λx. x was glad in w 
        
      Tarô[n][sen] Pred         AP: λx. x was glad in w 
              x            |           
            Agreement          -k            uresi- 
                 ‘glad’ 
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Second, [[ SAP ]]
g,w,c,h
 is calculated as in (286), using the result of the calculation of 
[[ ModP ]]
g,w,c,h
. 
 
(286)  [[ SAP ]]
g,w,c,h
  
  = [[ [SAP  proi  [ SA ModP ] ] ]]
g,w,c,h
  
  = λx.([[ ModP ]]g,w,c,h→x) ([[ proi ]]
g,w,c,h
) 
  = λx. (Taro was glad in w if Taro = x. # otherwise)([[ proi ]]
g,w,c,h
) 
 
What is the referent of proi in the case of a to-clause under a verb of saying? Let us recall (257), 
which is reproduced below. 
   
(257)  One can assert an SAP only if [Spec,SAP] is occupied by a phonetically null pronoun 
that is bound to the speaker. (To be revised) 
 
In other words, the referent of proi in the case of a to-clause under a verb of saying is the speaker 
who asserted the content of the to-clause, namely the local speaker. Therefore, the calculation of 
[[ SAP ]]
g,w,c,h
 continues as follows. 
 
(287)  [[ SAP ]]
g,w,c,h
 
  = λx. (Taro was glad in w if Taro = x. # otherwise)([[ proi ]]
g,w,c,h
)    (from (286)) 
  = λx. (Taro was glad in w if Taro = x. # otherwise)(Hanako) 
  =  Taro was glad in w if Taro = Hanako. # otherwise.    
 
Taro is not Hanako, so it shows that the LF of the SAP is not defined. It is in accordance with the 
non-assertability of (282). 
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5.5.5 To-complement clauses under verbs of thinking/believing/knowing 
 Next, let us consider the exceptional case mentioned in section 5.2.7, namely to-
complement clauses under verbs of thinking/believing/knowing. They do not restrict an 
Experiencer, although they contain ModP and SAP. For example, (288) is felicitously assertable. 
 
(288)  Hanako-wa   [Taro-ga     uresi-k-at-ta-to]               {omot/sinzi/sit}-tei-ta.                  
  Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep]  {think/believe/know}-Perf-Past 
  ‘Hanako {thought/believed} that Taro was glad.’ 
 
Note that the condition on the selection of proi in [Spec, SAP], (257), does not cover these to-
complement clauses, since the content of thinking/believing/knowing is not asserted (in other 
words, thinking, believing, and knowing are not assertive speech acts). Here, extending (257), let 
us suppose (289) for the referent of the phonetically null pronoun in [Spec,SAP]:
118
 
 
(289) a. If an individual A asserts a SAP, the referent of the phonetically null pronoun in 
[Spec,SAP] must be A.  
 b. Otherwise, the referent of the phonetically null pronoun in [Spec,SAP] can be any 
individual. 
 
With (289), the Experiencer restriction does not emerge in to-clauses under verbs of 
thinking/believing/knowing. 
                                                          
118
 This analysis is due to Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.). 
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 For illustration, let us consider (288). The to-clause, (283), has the syntactic structure 
given in (284), reproduced below.  
 
(283)  Taro-wa    uresi-k-at-ta-to 
  Taro-Top  glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep 
  ‘that Taro was glad’ 
 
(284)               RepP 
  
       SAP         Rep 
                | 
  proi                              SA′        -to             
     
     ModP                       SA   
              
      NP               Mod′                             
     
     Tarô   Mod[n][sen]     PredP 
     Taro               
                        NP               Pred′ 
        
      Tarô[n][sen] Pred          AP 
                           |           
            Agreement           -k           uresi- 
                  ‘glad’ 
 
[[ SAP ]]
g,c,w,h
 is calculated as in (286): 
 
(286)   [[ SAP ]]
g,w,c,h
  
  = [[ [SAP  proi  [ SA ModP ] ] ]]
g,w,c,h
  
  = λx.([[ ModP ]]g,w,c,h→x) ([[ proi ]]
g,w,c,h
) 
  = λx. (Taro was glad in w if Taro = x. # otherwise)([[ proi ]]
g,w,c,h
) 
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From (289b), [[ proi ]]
g,w,c,h
 can be any individual, so it can be Taro. When [[ proi ]]
g,w,c,h
 is Taro, 
[[ SAP ]]
g,w,c,h
 has a truth value. 
 
(290)  [[ SAP ]]
g,w,c,h
 
  = λx. (Taro was glad in w if Taro = x. # otherwise)([[ proi ]]
g,w,c,h
) (from (286)) 
  = λx. (Taro was glad in w if Taro = x. # otherwise)(Taro) 
  = Taro was glad in w 
 
From this calculation, it is also clear that [[ SAP ]]
g,w,c,h
 is not defined when the referent of proi is 
not Taro. It is, however, not relevant to the assertability of (288). The availability of proi whose 
referent is Taro guarantees that [[ SAP ]]
g,w,c,h
 has a truth value for some proi, and it guarantees 
the assertability of  (288). 
 
5.5.6 Interrogatives 
 Finally, let us consider an interrogative, as in (291a,b). In the previous section, we 
considered declarative sentences. Note that in the case of interrogatives, the Experiencer must be 
the addressee: 
 
(291) a. {kimi-wa/}  uresi-i                     (ka)? 
{you-Top/}  glad-Pred.be.Pres  (Q) 
‘Are you glad?’ 
 b. #Tarô-wa    uresi-i                     (ka)? 
  Taro-Top  glad-Pred.be.Pres  (Q) 
(Intended:) ‘Is Taro glad?’ 
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They can be treated by extending (289) to cover interrogatives as in (292). 
 
(292) a. If an individual A asserts a SAP, the referent of the phonetically null pronoun in 
[Spec,SAP] must be A. 
 b. If individual A asks individual B a SAP, the referent of the phonetically null pronoun 
in [Spec,SAP] must be B.  
 c. Otherwise, the referent of the phonetically null pronoun in [Spec,SAP] can be any 
individual. 
 
5.6 Comparison between the feature-checking analysis and the situation-based analysis 
 Up to this point, the feature-checking analysis presented above is good at explaining the 
Experiencer restriction in various environments. However, there is a case which cannot be 
explained by the feature-checking analysis. It is the complement clause of vivid memory report. 
The situation-based analysis presented in CHAPTER 3 can account for the Experiencer restriction 
in this environment also (see section 3.8), so the principle of parsimony favors the situation-based 
analysis.  
 The key data is that an Experiencer is restricted in a no-complement clause of verbs of 
vivid memory report, while it is not restricted in a no-complement clause of verbs of knowing. 
Let us compare (294) and (293). 
 
(293)  Under a verb of vivid memory report 
  Hanako-wa   [Tarô-ga      uresi-{gat/#k-at}-ta               no]-o      (ariarito)                   
  Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom  glad-{GAR/#Pred-be}-Past Fin]-Acc  (vividly) 
  {oboe-tei/omoidasi}-ta. 
  {memorize-Perf/recall}-Past 
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  ‘Hanako (vividly) {remembered/recalled} that Taro {behaved as being/#was} glad.’ 
 
(294)  Under a verb of knowing 
  Hanako-wa    [ Tarô-ga      uresi-{gat/k-at}-ta               no]-o   
  Hanako-Top  [ Taro-Nom  glad-{GAR/Pred-be}-Past  Fin]-Acc 
  sit-tei-ta. 
  know-Perf-Past 
  ‘Hanako knew that Taro {behaved as being/was} glad.’ 
 
No-complement clauses do not allow insertion of Mod, as shown in (295) and (296). Therefore, 
they do not contain ModP.  
 
(295)  Under a verb of vivid memory report 
  *Hanako-wa   [Tarô-ga      uresi-{gat/k-at}-ta              darô-no]-o      (ariarito)                   
    Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom  glad-{GAR/Pred-be}-Past Mod-Fin]-Acc  (vividly) 
  {oboe-tei/omoidasi}-ta. 
  {memorize-Perf/recall}-Past 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanako (vividly) {remembered/recalled} that Taro {probably behaved as 
being/was probably} glad.’ 
 
(296)  Under a verb of knowing 
  *Hanako-wa    [ Tarô-ga       uresi-{gat/k-at}-ta               darô-no]-o   
    Hanako-Top  [ Taro-Nom  glad-{GAR/Pred-be}-Past  Mod-Fin]-Acc 
  sit-tei-ta. 
  know-Perf-Past 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanako knew that Taro {probably behaved as being/was probably} glad.’ 
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Hence agreement between the Experiencer DP in these no-complement clauses and Mod does not 
occur. It means that the Experiencer DP has an index feature and [sen] feature. Without 
agreement, the index feature on the Experiencer DP is not restricted to the referent of the 
phonetically null pronoun in [Spec,SAP]. The [sen] feature just indicates that the referent of the 
bearer of the feature can have epistemic states (see (255a)), and so it does not yield the 
Experiencer restriction under discussion. 
 This accounts for the absence of the Experiencer restriction in no-complement clauses 
under a verb of knowing, (294), but it does not account for the presence of the Experiencer 
restriction in no-complement clauses under a verb of vivid memory report. As explained in 
section 3.8 of CHAPTER 3, the situation-based analysis can account for the Experiencer 
restriction in no-complement clauses under a verb of vivid memory report, so it is favored by the 
principle of parsimony. 
 
  
181 
 CHAPTER 6
PREVIOUS FORMAL ANALYSES OF THE EXPERIENCER RESTRICTION 
6.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I look at some previous formal analyses and point out problems which 
they face: (i) Kamio’s (1995, 1997a,b) account based on his theory of territory of information, (ii) 
Tenny’s (2006) feature-checking account using morphosyntactic features [+sentient] and 
[+discourse participant], and (iii) Fujii’s (2006, 2007) proposal of the reflexive subject 
requirement for Experiencer adjectives. 
 
6.2 Kamio’s territory-of-information analysis 
 In this section, I look at Kamio’s (1995, 1997a,b) analysis of the Experiencer restriction 
based on his (1990, 1995, 1997a,b, 2002) theory of territory of information. 
 When a speaker makes an assertion, he needs evidence for the truth of the asserted 
content.
119
 An aim of the theory of territory of information is to clarify the notion of evidence 
necessary for assertion. The theory  employs a notion of the speaker’s and hearer’s ‘territory of 
information’, which is based on a notion of psychological ‘closeness’ of conveyed information to 
the speaker/hearer, and explains the conditions for specific utterance forms (e.g., sentences 
without any modals/evidentials, sentences with a modal/evidential, sentences with a tag question, 
and so on). For example, he claims that information which is within the speaker’s territory of 
information but not within the hearer’s territory of information is conveyed by sentences without 
a modal or evidential. 
                                                          
119
 It is stated, for example, in Searle’s (1969) speech act theory as a preparatory condition for assertion: 
“the speaker has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of proposition p”. 
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 I explain the theory of territory of information briefly in section 6.2.1. Based on it, it is 
argued in section 6.2.2 that his analysis works for the Experiencer restriction in root clauses, but, 
as Tenny (2006:280) and Kamio himself (1995: 251f n.13) note, it is not clear how it can be 
extended to account for the behavior of the Experiencer in complex sentences. 
 
6.2.1 The closeness of information and territory of information  
 This section introduces the theory of territory of information by Kamio (1990, 1995, 
1997a,b, 2002). 
 The theory of territory of information tries to understand functions of different sentential 
forms in terms of psychological ‘closeness’ of conveyed information to the speaker and the hearer. 
The basic postulate of the theory is the following. 
 
(297)  There are two linear psychological scales, one for the speaker and the other for the 
hearer, which measure the distance between the speaker/hearer and a given piece of 
information: 
                    information 
  Speaker |——|——————————| 
       1                    0 
          information 
  Hearer   |————————|————| 
       1              0 
  A given piece of information is located on these scales and can take any value between 
(and including) 1 and 0.     (Kamio 1995: 236f) 
 
He states that the meaning of values 1 and 0 is given as follows.
120
 
                                                          
120
 Note, however, that it is not clear what he means by the explanation for the value 1: what does knowing 
information “completely” (or possessing full knowledge) mean? He does not explicate it. 
183 
 
(298) a. That a given piece of information takes the value 1 on the psychological scale for the 
speaker (or for the hearer) represents a situation in which the speaker assumes that he 
(or the hearer) knows the information completely and thus possesses its full knowledge.  
 b. That a given piece of information takes the value 0 on the psychological scale for the 
speaker (or for the hearer) represents a situation in which the speaker assumes that he 
(or the hearer) possesses no knowledge of the information. 
        (Kamio 1997b:147, slightly modified) 
 
Based on this notion of the psychological distance of information to the speaker/hearer, the term 
of the speaker’s/hearer’s territory of information is defined. In short, if the speaker assumes that a 
piece of information is close enough to him (or to the hearer), the information is said to be within 
the speaker’s (or the hearer’s) territory of information. Formally, Kamio defines the term of the 
territory of information as follows. 
 
(299)  There are two conceptual categories called the speaker’s and the hearer’s territory of 
information. A given piece of information that is closer to the speaker than n belongs to 
the speaker’s territory of information, and that which is closer to the hearer than n 
belongs to the hearer’s territory of information, where n is a specified value between 1 
and 0 and designates the outer boundary of both territories. (Kamio 1997a: 17(24)) 
 
 What kind of information is close to the speaker/hearer? In the case of Japanese, Kamio 
claims that information which satisfies one or more conditions of (300a-d) is considered to be 
close to the speaker/hearer. 
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(300)  Information which is considered to be close to the speaker/hearer in the case of 
Japanese 
 a. information obtained through the speaker’s/hearer’s internal direct experience 
 b. information embodying detailed knowledge which falls into the range of the 
speaker’s/hearer’s professional or other expertise 
 c. information obtained through the speaker’s/hearer’s external direct experience 
 d. information about persons, objects, events and facts close to the speaker/hearer 
including such information about the speaker/hearer him/herself 
         (Kamio 1997a:39(1)) 
 
Here, ‘internal direct experience’ means internal feelings like emotion and other mental activities 
such as memory and belief. In contrast, ‘external direct experience’ means experience obtained 
using the five senses. Information (300d) includes, for example, the speaker’s/hearer’s plans, 
behavior, and geographical locations. It is “personal data in a broad sense” (Kamio 1997a:18). 
 In addition to (300), Kamio proposes the following meta-conditions. 
 
(301)  Conditions which determine closeness of information to the speaker/hearer in the 
case of Japanese 
 a. information subject to condition [(300b)] and [(300d)] is considered less close to the 
speaker/hearer if he/she does not have an adequate basis for asserting it. 
 b. information which is difficult for the speaker/hearer to have access to is considered less 
close to him/her. 
 c. new information conveyed to the speaker is generally considered less close to him/her 
until considerable processing has taken place. 
         (Kamio 1997a: 41(4)) 
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 Kamio claims that utterance forms used by a speaker reflect the speaker’s assumption of 
the psychological closeness of the conveyed information to the speaker and the hearer. His 
proposal is summarized as follows. 
 
  Table 2. Cases and utterance forms (Japanese) (Kamio 1997a: 42, table 2) 
Case Definition of case Utterance form 
A 1=Speaker>Hearer<n direct form 
B 1=H≥S>n direct-ne form 
BC 1=S>H>n daroo form 
CB H>S>n daroo form 
C 1=H>S<n indirect-ne form 
D n>S≥H indirect form 
 
For example, in Case A, a speaker assumes that he knows a piece of information ‘completely’ 
(see (298a)) and the information is within his territory of information, but it is not within the 
hearer’s territory of information. In this case, the speaker uses a direct form (i.e., the unmarked 
form, in which no modal, evidential, or other hedging expressions are used) to convey the 
information. Contrastively, in Case D, a speaker assumes that a piece of information is not within 
the speaker’s or hearer’s territory of information and is not psychologically closer to the hearer 
than to the speaker. In this case, the speaker uses an indirect form (a sentence with a modal or 
evidential, or other hedging elements which “attenuate the directness of the direct form” (Kamio 
1997a:6)). 
 For illustration, let us consider (302) and (303). In the case of (302), the information that 
the speaker’s sister made a cake yesterday is obtained by the speaker’s seeing the situation, so it 
is close to the speaker (see condition (300a)). But (the speaker assumes that) it is not close to the 
hearer, namely that the hearer does not know the information. Therefore, the direct form is used 
in (302).  
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(302)  (Context: The speaker saw his sister made a cake yesterday. The speaker assumes that 
the hearer does not know that.) 
  boku-no  imôto-ga     kinô           kêki-o       tukut-ta       yo. 
  I-Gen      sister-Nom  yesterday  cake-Acc  make-Past   SFP 
  ‘My sister made a cake yesterday.’ 
 
In the case of (303), the information that Taro returned back yesterday is not closer to the hearer 
than to the speaker, but it is not within the speaker’s territory of information (or the hearer’s). 
Therefore, the speaker uses an evidential marker sôda to make a sentence in the indirect form. 
 
(303)  (Context: The speaker heard that Taro returned back yesterday, and he thinks that it is 
plausible. The speaker assumes that the hearer does not know the information.) 
  Tarô-ga      kinô           kaet-te           ki-ta           sôda       yo. 
  Taro-Nom  yesterday  return-Conn  come-Past  Hearsay  SFP 
  ‘I heard that Taro returned back yesterday.’ 
 
6.2.2 Analysis of the Experiencer restriction in the theory of territory of information 
 This section first presents the explanation of the Experiencer restriction in root clauses in 
the theory of territory of information, following Kamio (1995, 1997a), and then looks at a 
difficulty of this approach to the Experiencer restriction. 
 According to the theory of territory of information, information of internal feelings of a 
speaker is within the speaker’s territory of information, but not in the hearer’s territory of 
information. Therefore, a speaker uses the direct form to convey information of his internal 
feelings, as in (304). 
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(304)  boku-wa  samu-k-at-ta            yo. 
  I-Top       cold-Pred-be-Past   SFP 
  ‘I was cold.’ 
 
On the other hand, information of internal feelings of a third person is not within the speaker’s or 
the hearer’s territory of information. Hence, the direct form is not natural, as in (305). 
 
(305)  Tarô-wa   samu-k-at-ta         {#/sooda}      yo. 
  Taro-Top cold-Pred-be-Pres {#/Hearsay}  SFP 
  ‘{#/I heard that} Taro was cold.’ 
 
This is Kamio’s explanation of the Experiencer restriction in root clauses. 
 This approach to the Experiencer restriction works for root clauses, but is insufficient to 
account for (the absence or presence of) the Experiencer restriction in non-root clauses (Tenny 
2006:280). It is because the theory of territory of information given in Kamio (1990, 1995, 
1997a,b, 2002) explains only the forms of the matrix clause and does not treat non-root clauses 
such as relative clauses. Kamio himself (1995: 251f n.13) acknowledges that a comprehensive 
explanation of the Experiencer restriction “must await much further research”. 
 
 
6.3 Analysis using checking of features [+sentient] and [+discourse participant] (Tenny 
2006) 
 Tenny (2006) aims to account for the Experiencer restriction not only in root clauses but 
also in non-root ones, based on Speas and Tenny’s (2003) proposal of syntax of sentience and 
checking of morphosyntactic features relevant to it, [+sentient] and [+discourse participant]. In 
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section 6.3.1, I present a review of the analysis, and then in section 6.3.2 I point out a serious 
problem which the analysis bears.  
 
6.3.1 A feature-driven analysis 
 To account for the Experiencer restriction, Tenny (2006) proposes that (i) Experiencer 
adjectives lexically mark their Experiencer argument with two morphosyntactic features, (ii) 
those features are checked at specifier positions of higher projections in the left periphery, and 
(iii) the Experiencer raised to the specifier position of the higher projection, which is the place 
associated with feature [+speaker], is required to be the speaker. 
 First, let us see the idea on morphosyntactic features behind Tenny’s proposal. Based on 
cross-linguistic research, Harley and Ritter (2002) claim that first person, second person, and 
third person pronouns are characterized by two types of morphosyntactic features (for discourse 
participants and for speaker/addressee distinction). Tenny proposes to add a feature for sentient 
individuals to their picture, as in (306).
121
 The feature [+sentient] means that the bearer can have 
epistemic states. She attributes the introduction of the sentience feature to personal 
communication with Ritter on Harley and Ritter’s work and Hanson (2003). 
 
                                                          
121
 Harley and Ritter (2002) assume that features are monovalent (p.485), but Tenny tacitly assumes that 
they are bivalent.  
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(306)  Adaptation of Harley and Ritter (left branch only) (Tenny 2006: 264(50)) 
               Referring Expression (pronoun) 
      
     +Sentient      −Sentient 
                   it 
    +Discourse Participant         −Discourse Participant 
             he, she 
  +Speaker −Speaker (+Addressee) 
         I        you  
          
 Second, let us look at the idea of Sentience/Evidentiality projection. As seen in the 
previous chapters, it has been claimed that there is a Speech Act projection at the top of the left 
periphery, which encodes illocutionary force (Rizzi 1997, 1999, Cinque 1999 among others). 
Based on cross-linguistic study, Cinque (1999) and Speas and Tenny (2003) propose that there is 
a projection in the left periphery for evidentiality. Tenny calls it Sentience/Evidentiality Phrase. 
Concretely, Tenny bases her analysis on Speas and Tenny’s (2003) syntax of sentience: Different 
from Rizzi and others, Speas and Tenny (2003) propose that the Speech Act projection, the 
speaker, and the addressee are configurationally related as the VP and thematic roles are (cf. Hale 
and Keyser 1993, 1998, 1999). In their proposal, the Speech Act projection has inner and outer 
(starred) projections as Larson (1988) proposes for VPs, and the positions for the speaker and the 
addressee are supposed as in (307): 
 
(307)  The Speech Act Projection in declaratives (based on Tenny 2006: 260(41)) 
                sa*P 
      
                sa*         speaker 
     
              sa      speech act* 
    
             sa  utterance content 
    
  addressee      speech act     
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The structure given in (307) is for declarative clauses. In the case of interrogatives, Speas and 
Tenny assume that a process similar to passivization occurs, in which the addressee argument is 
raised to the specifier position of the Speech Act projection, as in (308).
122
 What is important is 
that the addressee is closer than the speaker to utterance context in this structure. 
 
(308)  The Speech Act Projection in interrogatives (based on Tenny 2006: 263(49)) 
                              sa*P 
             
                       sa*    speaker 
            
                     sa   speech act* 
     
              sa                 addressee 
    
             sa utterance content 
    
   t speech act head     
 
 
 
 
As for the ‘utterance content’ in (307) and (308), Speas and Tenny propose that it is realized as a 
Sentience/Evidentiality projection
123
. It also has inner and outer projections, as in (309). 
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 I do not go into the detail, because it does not matter in the following arguments. 
123
 The terms, ‘Sentience/Evidentiality projection’, ‘Evidentiality projection’, and ‘Sentience Projection’ 
are interchangeably used in the following. 
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(309)  The Evidentiality Projection (Tenny 2006: 261(42)) 
      Sentience Phrase (sen*P) 
      (=Evidentiality Phrase) 
      
                Sen* seat of knowledge 
     
              sen        Sen* 
     
             sen  proposition 
             ⁞
  context          sentience head ⁞  
         CP/IP   
 
Here, the ‘seat of knowledge’ is the individual who is “responsible for evaluating the truth of a 
proposition based on some kind of evidence, or who holds the evidence for the truth of the 
proposition in their head” (Tenny 2006:259). Combining the Speech Act projection and the 
Sentience/Evidentiality projection, we obtain the following structure for declarative sentences. 
 
(310)  Declarative (based on Tenny 2006: 263(48)) 
                    sa*P 
          
                    sa*            speaker 
          [+disc.part.] 
                    sa               sa*    [+speaker] 
    
             sa                    SenP          
    
  addressee       sa         sen*    seat of knowledge 
  [+disc.part.]  
  [−speaker]             sen 
            
        sen          IP 
            
 
 Third, let us look at the idea of a feature-driven minimalist syntax. In Chomsky (1995) 
and others, movement is associated with checking of features. An element (Probe) with an 
uninterpretable feature seeks an element (Goal) with a feature which matches the Probe’s feature 
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which is the closest to the Probe in the Probe’s c-commanding domain. If the Probe finds a Goal, 
the Goal moves to the specifier position of the projection of the Probe and checking of features 
(matching and deletion, if possible) occurs.
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 Based on these ideas, Tenny (2006) makes the following proposal. 
 
(311) (i) Experiencer predicates lexically mark their experiencer argument with features 
[+sentient] and [+discourse participant]. 
 (ii) The [+sentient] feature is checked at the specifier of the Sentience/Evidentiality 
Projection and the [+discourse participant] feature is checked at the specifier of the 
Speech Act Projection. 
 
In her analysis, Experiencer adjectives such as samu-i ‘be cold’ and uresi-i ‘be glad’ assign 
features [+sentient] and [+discourse participant] to their Experiencer argument. The Experiencer 
NP with [+sentient] and [+discourse participant] raises to [Spec,Sen/EvidP] to check the feature 
[+sentient], and further raises to the closest [Spec,SAP] to check the feature [+discourse 
participant], if possible. (Here, I use SAP to collectively denote saP and sa*P.) The specifier 
position of SAP which is closest to Sen/EvidP is the position for the speaker in declaratives and 
the hearer in interrogatives (see (307) and (308)), and so the Experiencer restriction emerges.  
 Let us see how this proposal accounts for the Experiencer restriction in root clauses in 
reportive style. For example, let us consider (312). 
 
(312)  (Situation: Yoshio says to Hanako as follows.) 
                                                          
124
 The details differ among analyses. In recent analyses such as Chomsky (2000, 2001), instead of the 
notion of the checking domain, the EPP-feature is supposed to be the cause of movement. In either 
analysis, what triggers movement is feature-checking. 
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 a. boku-wa  samu-i                     yo. 
I-Top       cold-Pred.be.Pres   SFP 
  ‘I am cold.’ 
 b. #Tarô-wa    samu-i      yo. 
    Taro-Top  cold-Pred.be.Pres   SFP 
  (Intended:) ‘Taro is cold.’ 
 
The Experiencer adjective samu-i assigns features [+sentient] and [+discourse participant] to the 
experiencer arguments boku and Tarô in (312a,b), respectively. For checking of the [+sentient] 
feature, the Experiencer NP raises to [Spec, Sen/EvidP]. Then, for checking of the [+discourse 
participant] feature, the Experiencer NP raises to the closest [Spec,SAP], as in (313). 
 
(313)                           sa*P 
                    
                          sa*              speaker 
           [+disc.part.] 
                    sa                          sa*     [+speaker] 
      
             sa                    SenP           yo
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    
  addressee       sa         sen*    seat of knowledge 
  [+disc.part.]            [+sentient] 
  [−speaker]             sen 
            
       sen          IP 
            
       Exp-wa samu-i 
      [+sentient] 
      [+disc.part.] 
       
        (based on Tenny 2006:269(64)) 
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 Tenny supposes that sentence-final particle yo is a head of sa*. It is based on Kuroda’s (1973) 
observation that yo is acceptable only in reportive style. 
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In the case of declarative clauses, the closest specifier position of SAP is the position of the 
speaker as shown in (313), so boku ‘I’ is legitimate, but Tarô is not. This is why in declarative 
root clauses in reportive style only the speaker is allowed as an Experiencer. 
 
6.3.2 A problem on assignment of [+discourse participant] to the Experiencer argument 
 In the previous section, we saw that in Tenny’s analysis the Experiencer is restricted to 
the speaker as a result of assignment of the morphosyntactic feature [+discourse participant] to 
the Experiencer by Experiencer adjectives. I presented an example of a declarative root clause in 
reportive style to show how her analysis works. The use of the feature [+discourse participant], 
however, has a serious problem: as we will see in this section, it works well only with clauses in 
which the Experiencer is restricted to a speaker or addressee. 
 As reviewed in the previous section, Tenny makes the following claim. 
 
(314)  Experiencer predicates lexically mark their experiencer argument with the 
morphosyntactic features [+sentient, +discourse participant]. 
 
Tenny claims that the Experiencer restriction is lifted if the Experiencer does not raise to [Spec, 
SAP] to check the feature [+discourse participant] (I present her argument below). However, her 
proposal that Experiencer adjectives assign the feature [+discourse participant] to their 
Experiencer argument actually makes a different prediction: Experiencer arguments must be first 
person or second person whether feature-checking occurs or not. It is because pronouns which 
have the feature [+discourse participant] are first and second person pronouns (see (306)). Third 
person pronouns have a feature [−discourse participant], so they cannot bear the feature 
[+discourse participant]. 
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 Can third person pronouns be Experiencer arguments? Yes, in many cases. For example, 
let us consider no-complement clauses of a verb of knowing. As seen in previous chapters, the 
Experiencer restriction is lifted in the environment. As in (315), a third person Experiencer is 
allowed in such a no-complement clause. 
 
(315)  Hanako-wa   [kare-ga  uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o                 sit-tei-ru. 
  Hanako-Top [he-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc  know-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Hanako knows that he was glad.’ 
 
The third person pronoun kare has feature [−discourse participant], so the Experiencer adjective 
uresi-i ‘be glad’ cannot mark it with feature [+discourse participant]. Therefore, according to 
proposal (314), sentence (315) should be unacceptable, contrary to the fact. Clearly, this kind of 
reasoning applies to all environments where the Experiencer restriction is lifted. 
 Let us look at Tenny’s explanation of sentences in which third-person Experiencer 
arguments appear. Let us consider a declarative root clause in nonreportive style, (316). 
 
(316)  kare  wa    samui 
  He    Top  cold-Pres 
  ‘He is cold’ (non-reportive)    (Tenny 2006: 271(66)) 
 
In this sentence, the Experiencer argument of Experiencer adjective samu-i ‘be cold’ is a third-
person pronoun, kare ‘he’. Tenny’s own explanation of the acceptability of (316) is as follows 
(p.270). 
 
Kuroda (1973) noted that the person constraint on samui holds in the reportive mode but not 
in the non-reportive mode. We analyze a sentence in the non-reportive mode as having no 
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First/Second Person Phrase [= SAP]. The experiencer NP that bears the features [+sentience, 
+discourse participant] assigned by samui can raise to the Sentience/Evidentiality projection 
but cannot raise from there to a Speech Act projection. The [+discourse participant] feature 
cannot be activated, which means the person constraint cannot be activated. 
 
It is not clear what is meant by the last sentence. It seems that Tenny supposes that the feature 
[+discourse participant] “cannot be activated” unless the Experiencer NP raises to [Spec,SAP] to 
check it. But what does ‘activation’ here mean? Note that the feature [+discourse participant] on 
an NP is interpretable (which restricts the referent of the NP to discourse participants, namely a 
speaker or an addressee), and in general, interpretable features need no checking for their 
interpretability in minimalist syntax. Therefore, whether checking of the feature [+discourse 
participant] happens or not, the Experiencer should be restricted to the speaker or the addressee in 
her system. 
 In a nutshell, assignment of the morphosyntactic feature [+discourse participant] to an 
Experiencer argument by Experiencer adjectives leads to the restriction of the Experiencer to a 
speaker or an addressee. Such a proposal can explain the Experiencer restriction in root clauses in 
reportive style, where the Experiencer is restricted to a speaker (in the case of declaratives) or an 
addressee (in the case of interrogatives). In other environments, however, the Experiencer may be 
a non-discourse participant, and the proposal fails. 
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6.4 The reflexive subject requirement for Experiencer adjectives (Fujii 2006, 2007) 
 This section considers a unified analysis of the Experiencer restriction and exceptional 
Case-marking (ECM) of the Theme argument of Experiencer adjectives
126,127
 in to-complement 
clauses of verbs of thinking and feeling proposed by Fujii (2006, 2007). 
 A Theme argument of Experiencer adjectives, if present, is usually marked only with a 
Nominative Case marker (and I considered only such a case in the previous chapters). But it is 
marked with a Nominative Case marker or an Accusative Case marker in to-complement clauses 
of omo-u ‘think’ and kanzi-ru ‘feel’. Fujii (2006, 2007) argues that the Experiencer argument of 
Experiencer adjectives
128
 in these to-complement clauses are obligatorily controlled (OC) PRO (if 
an accusative-marked Theme argument is present), or reflexive zibun ‘self’ or its phonetically 
null counterpart (if Nominative-marked Theme argument is present).
129
 Extending this finding, he 
makes the following proposal (he calls it the ‘reflexive subject requirement for SubjExp 
predicates’): 
 
(317)  Reflexive subject requirement for Experiencer adjectives 
  Experiencer adjectives lexically select as their Experiencer argument 
 (i) OC PRO, 
 (ii) reflexive zibun, or  
 (iii) the null counterpart of zibun 
                                                          
126
 A terminological note: As in the previous sections, I use the term ‘Experiencer adjectives’ in this 
section. However, Fujii himself uses the term ‘Subject Experiencer (SubjExp) adjectives’ in his papers, 
borrowing it from Pesetsky (1995). Both terms ‘Experiencer adjectives’ and ‘SubjExp adjectives’ refer to 
the same class of adjectives. 
127
 Many Experiencer adjectives (e.g., urayamasi-i ‘be envious of’, uresi-i ‘be glad’) are ambiguous 
between intransitive and transitive adjectives. 
128
 A terminological note: In the following, I use the term Experiencer adjectives, as in the previous 
sections, but Fujii himself uses the term ‘Subject Experiencer (SubjExp) adjectives’ in his papers, 
borrowing it from Pesetsky (1995). Both terms refer to the same class of adjectives. 
129
 I do not agree with his judgment on the non-ECM case, but the difference is left aside to avoid irrelevant 
complications. 
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And he claims that it explains not only the Experiencer restriction in the to-complement clauses 
of omo-u and kanzi-ru, but also the Experiencer restriction in root clauses and to-complement 
clauses of verbs of saying and asking. 
 In the following, I first present his analysis in sections 6.4.1-6.4.4. Then, in section 6.4.5, 
I argue that the reflexive subject requirement, (317), is not consistent with the fact that overt non-
reflexive Experiencer is available in, for example, root clauses and no-complement clauses of 
verbs of believing and knowing. Also I argue that the claim that (317) explains the Experiencer 
restriction in root clauses is problematic because the explanation predicts that the Experiencer in 
no-complement clauses of verbs of believing and knowing is also restricted, contrary to the fact. 
These problems suggest that Experiencer adjectives do not have the selectional property proposed 
in (317). Finally, in section 6.4.6, I consider the data on the Experiencer restriction discussed in 
sections 6.4.1-6.4.5 with the situation-based and feature-checking analyses. 
 
6.4.1 Case-marking of the Theme argument of Experiencer adjectives 
 This section shows that a Theme argument of Experiencer adjectives, if present, is 
usually not marked with an Accusative Case marker, but it can be so in to-complement clauses of 
omo-u ‘think’ and kanzi-ru ‘feel’. 
 Adjectives in Japanese cannot mark their object with an accusative Case (Kuno 1973
130
 
and others). In root clauses (318a-d), the Theme argument of Experiencer adjectives is marked 
with a Nominative Case marker. 
                                                          
130
 Kuno (1973:81) claims that all transitive adjectives mark their object with ga (the Nominative Case 
marker in Japanese). However, as the following example shows, a transitive adjective kuwasi-i ‘be 
knowledgeable (about)’ marks its object with a Dative Case. 
     (i) kare-wa  kodaisi-ni                 kuwasi-i. 
 he-Top   ancient.history-Dat  knowledgeable-Pred.be.Pres 
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(318) a. watasi-wa    watasi-no  tomodati-{ga/*o}     urayamasi-i. 
  I-Top            I-Gen        friend-{Nom/*Acc} envious-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘I am envious of my friend.’ 
 b. watasi-wa   Hiroshima-{ga/*o}           natukasi-i. 
  I-Top           Hiroshima-{Nom/*Acc} nostalgic-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘I miss Hiroshima.’ 
 c. watasi-wa  Mari-{ga/*o}           nikurasi-i. 
  I-Top         Mari-{Nom/*Acc}  hateAdj-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘I hate Mari.’ 
 d. watasi-wa  Hanako-no    koto-{ga/*o}            uresi-i. 
I-Top         Hanako-Gen  event-{Nom/*Acc} glad-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘I am glad about Hanako’s news (good fortune, success, ..).’ 
 
Similarly, the Theme argument is marked with a Nominative Case in to-complement clauses of 
verbs of saying and knowing: 
 
(319) a. Hanakoi-wa   [ ei     watasi-no koto-{ga/*o}          uresi-i-to]                        it-tei-ta. 
  Hanakoi-Top [ ei     I-Gen       event-{Nom/*Acc} glad-Pred.be.Pres-Rep] say-Perf-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi said that shei was glad about my news (good fortune, success, ..).’ 
 b. Hanako-wa   [watasi-ga  Mari-{ga/*o}           nikurasi-i-to]                     sit-tei-ta. 
  Hanako-Top [I-Nom       Mari-{Nom/*Acc}  hateAdj-Pred.be.Pres-Rep] know-Perf-Past 
  ‘Hanako knew that I hated Mari.’ 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 ‘He is knowledgeable about ancient history.’ 
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However, it is marked with a Nominative or an Accusative Case marker in to-complement 
clauses of omo-u ‘think’ and kanzi-ru ‘feel’, as shown in (320). 
 
(320) a. Hiroshii-wa  [Δi   Mari-{ga/o}            nikurasi-i-to]                     {omot/kanzi}-tei-ta 
  Hiroshii-Top [Δi   Mari-{Nom/Acc}  hateAdj-Pred.be.Pres-Rep] {think/feel}-Perf-Past 
  ‘Hiroshii {thought/felt} that hei hates Mari.’  (based on Fujii 2007: 1(1b,c)) 
 b. Hanakoi-wa   [ Δi  watasi-no koto-{ga/o}           uresi-i-to]                       omot-tei-ta. 
  Hanakoi-Top [ Δi  I-Gen       event-{Nom/Acc} glad-Pred.be.Pres-Rep]  think-Perf-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi thought that shei was glad about my news (good fortune, success, ..).’ 
 
 In the following, I call the construction in which a Theme argument of an Experiencer 
adjective in a to-complement clause of omo-u ‘think’ or kanzi-ru ‘feel’ is marked with a non-
Accusative Case marker the ‘non-exceptionally Case marked to-omou/kanziru construction (non-
ECM TO/KC)’, and the construction in which a Theme argument of an Experiencer adjective in a 
to-complement clause of omo-u or kanzi-ru is marked with an Accusative Case marker the ‘long-
distance ECM construction’131. They are schematically represented in (321).  
 
(321) a. the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction (non-ECM TO/KC) 
  Subj  [  Exp-Nom   Theme-Nom  ExpAdj   to ]  {think/feel} 
 b. the long-distance ECM construction 
  Subj  [  Exp
132
          Theme-Acc   ExpAdj   to ]  {think/feel} 
 
                                                          
131
 The term, ‘long-distance ECM’, is borrowed from Fujii. 
132
 The Case marker of this Experiencer argument is not shown here because the argument is always 
phonetically null. 
201 
6.4.2 The Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction 
 This section presents Fujii’s analysis of the Experiencer argument in the long-distance 
ECM construction. 
 
6.4.2.1 The Experiencer restriction in the long-distance ECM construction 
 The Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction is restricted in an 
interesting way: it must be bound to the subject of the verb of thinking/feeling, namely the 
attitude holder, and must be phonetically null. Let us look at (322a,b) for illustration. They 
contain an accusative-marked Theme, so they are examples of the long-distance ECM 
construction. (322a) shows that the Experiencer must be bound to the subject to the matrix verb, 
Hanako. (322b) shows that the binding relation is insufficient to license the long-distance ECM 
construction. The Experiencer needs to be phonetically null. 
 
(322) a. Hanakoi-wa   [{∆i/*j/*Tarô-ga}     watasi-no koto-o        uresi-i-to]                        
  Hanakoi-Top [{∆i/*j/*Taro-Nom} I-Gen       event-Acc  glad-Pred.be.Pres-Rep] 
omot-tei-ru. 
think-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Hanakoi thinks that {shei/*j/*Taro} is glad about my news (good fortune, success, ..).’ 
 b. Atsukoi-wa  [{∆i/?*zibuni-ga/*kanozyoi-ga}     watasi-no  tomodati-o 
  Atsuko-Top            self-Nom  she          -Nom   my             friend-Acc 
  urayamasi-i     -to]   omotte    ita 
  envious    -Prs  -C    thinking  was 
  ‘Atsukoi thought that {∆i, ?*selfi, *shei} was envious of my friend.’ 
          (Fujii 2007: 4(6a)) 
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6.4.2.2 The Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction is OC PRO 
 Why is the Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction restricted as 
exemplified in (322)? Fujii (2006, 2007) claims as follows. 
 
(323)  The Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction is always OC PRO. 
 
It explains not only the binding by the subject of the verb of thinking/feeling but also the 
long-distance ECM: if OC PRO is invisible for Minimality (Bhatt 2005), the little v in the matrix 
clause can mark the Theme argument in the to-complement clause, as in (324). 
 
(324)  Case assignment in the long-distance ECM construction (in the head-initial word 
order) 
  Subj  T    v   {think/feel} [  PROExp  T[−finite]   ExpAdj   Theme-Acc  ] 
                        (invisible) 
    
 
As shown in (324), the embedded tense in the long-distance ECM construction is T[−finite], 
so it does not assign the Theme or the Experiencer argument the Nominative Case (it is argued 
that Nominative Case is assigned by T[+finite] (Takezawa 1987, Koizumi 1995)).
133
 That the 
embedded clause in the long-distance ECM construction does not contain T[+finite] is consistent 
with the fact that the predicate in the embedded clause in the long-distance ECM construction 
does not show inflection in tense, as the following contrasting pair indicates: 
 
(325) a. the long-distance ECM construction 
                                                          
133
 Another possibility is that the embedded clause does not contain TP and so Nominative Case is not 
assigned within the clause. 
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  Hiroshii-wa  [ Δi  boku-no kazoku-o    nikurasi-{i/*k-at-ta}-to] 
  Hiroshi-Top [ Δi  I-Gen    family-Acc hateAdj-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past}-Rep] 
omot-tei -ru 
  think-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Hiroshi thinks that he {hates/*hated} my family.’ 
 
 b. the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction 
Hiroshii-wa  [ Δi  boku-no  kazoku-ni   kuwasi-{i/kat-ta}-to] 
Hiroshi-Top [ Δi  I-Gen     family-Dat  familiar-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past}-Rep] 
  omot-tei-ru 
think-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Hiroshi thinks that he {is/was} knowledgeable about my family.’ 
 
As (325) shows, the long-distance ECM construction does not allow the past tense form. It 
suggests that the long-distance ECM construction does not have T[+finite]. The fact that i-ending 
(it is glossed as Pred.be.Pres throughout this dissertation) is allowed in this environment does not 
contradict with this supposition. It is because Japanese tense infection is impoverished and the 
present tense form and the nonfinite or tenseless form are the same for these adjectives (both 
are -i) (see e.g., Kusumoto 1999, Kawai 2006a). 
 In the next section, let us look at some pieces of evidence that the Experiencer argument 
is OC PRO which Fujii provides. 
 
6.4.2.3 Evidence for the claim that the Experiencer argument is OC PRO 
 To illustrate that the Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction is OC 
PRO, let us compare the Experiencer subject of Experiencer adjectives in the long-distance ECM 
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construction and a phonetically null pronoun pro which is a non-Experiencer subject of a non-
Experiencer adjective. In the following, Δ and  represent the Experiencer argument in the long-
distance ECM construction and a phonetically null pronoun, respectively. 
 First, ∆ must be c-commanded by its antecedent, while  does not have to be 
c-commanded by its antecedent. For example, let us look at sentences (326a,b). (326a) and (326b) 
embed a non-Experiencer adjective kibisi-i ‘be hard’ and an Experiencer predicate nikurasi-i ‘be 
envious of’, respectively. In these sentences, the NP Hiroshi in the matrix subject Hiroshi-no 
zyosyu ‘Hiroshi’s assistant’ does not c-command the embedded subject. Sentence (326a) 
illustrates that Hiroshi can be the antecedent of , while sentence (326b) illustrates that Hiroshi 
cannot be the antecedent of ∆. 
 
(326) a. Hiroshii-no  zyosyuj-wa    [i/j  Atsuko-ni    kibisi-i-to]   omotta. 
  Hiroshi’s     assistant-Top          Atsuko-Dat  hard-Prs-C  thought 
  ‘Hiroshii’s assistantj found that {Hiroshii, Hiroshi’s assistantj} was hard on Atsuko.’ 
 b. Hiroshii-no  zyosyuj-wa    [∆*i/j  Atsuko-o      nikurasi-i-to]   omotta. 
  Hiroshi’s     assistant-Top          Atsuko-Acc  hard-Prs-C       thought 
  ‘Hiroshii’s assistantj found that {Hiroshii, Hiroshi’s assistantj} hated Atsuko.’ 
          (Fujii 2006: 161 (8a,b)) 
 
 Second,  can be bound by a non-local antecedent, whereas ∆ cannot. Let us look at 
sentences (327a,b), that deeply embed a non-Experiencer adjective kuwasi-i ‘be familiar’ and an 
Experiencer adjective natukasi-i ‘be nostalgic’, respectively. The subject of the non-Experiencer 
adjective in (327a), , allows a non-local antecedent Mari, as shown in (327a), while the subject 
of the Experiencer adjective in (327a), ∆, does not, as shown in (327b). 
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(327) a. Marii-wa   Hiroshij-ni   [i/j  ano  mati-ni     kuwasi-i-to]     omotte  hosikatta 
  Mari-Top  Hiroshi-Dat          that  town-Dat familiar-Prs-C  to.think wanted 
  ‘Marii wanted Hiroshij to think that {shei, hej} knew a lot about that town.’ 
 b. Marii-wa  Hiroshij-ni  [∆*i/j  ano  mati-o     natukasi-i-to]      omotte  hosikatta  
  Mari-Top Hiroshi-Dat         that town-Acc nostalgic-Prs-C  to.think wanted 
  ‘Marii wanted Hiroshij to think that {*shei, hej} missed that town.’ 
          (Fujii 2006: 161f (9a,b)) 
 
It is expected if ∆ and  are OC PRO and pro, respectively.  
 Third, look at sentences (328a,b) in which an NP of the form NP-dake ‘only NP’ is the 
antecedent of ∆ and . As they show, ∆ must be interpreted covariantly (i.e., as in interpretation 
(i)), while  can be interpreted covariantly and invariantly (i.e., as in interpretation (ii)). 
 
(328) a. Hiroshii-dake-ga     [∆i  Mari-no     koto-o      nikurasi-i-to]   omot-tei-ru 
  Hiroshi-only-Nom         Mari-Gen thing-Acc hate-Prs-C       think-Asp-Prs 
  ‘Only Hiroshii thinks that [∆i hates Mari].’ 
  i.  Only Hiroshi is an x such that x thinks that x hates Mari. 
  ii. *Only Hiroshi is an x such that x thinks Hiroshi hates Mari. 
 b. Hiroshii-dake-ga     [i  Mari-no     koto-ni     kuwasi-i -to]    omot-tei-ru 
  Hiroshi-only-Nom         Mari-Gen thing-Dat  familiar-Prs-C  think-Asp-Prs 
  ‘Only Hiroshii thinks that [∆i hates Mari].’ 
  i.  Only Hiroshi is an x such that x thinks that x knows a lot about Mari. 
  ii. Only Hiroshi is an x such that x thinks Hiroshi knows a lot about Mari. 
         (Fujii 2006: 162 (11a,b)) 
 
206 
This indicates that ∆ must be interpreted as a bound variable, while  not. It is consistent with the 
claim that Δ is OC PRO while  is pro. 
 Fourth, ∆ must be interpreted de se, while  does not have to be so. For example, 
sentence (329a) is felicitous only if Mari had a thought de se, while sentence (329b) is felicitous 
even if Mari had a thought which is not de se. 
 
(329) a. Marii-wa   [∆i  Taro-o      nikurasi-i-to]   omotta 
  Mari-Top        Taro-Acc  hat-Prs-C         thought 
  ‘Marii thought that [∆i hated Taro].’ 
 b. Marii-wa   [i  Taro-ni      kibisi-i-to]   omotta 
  Mari-Top          Taro-Dat   hard-Prs-C  thought 
  ‘Marii thought that [i was hard on Taro].’ 
         (Fujii 2006: 162 (12a,b)) 
 
This is expected if ∆ is OC PRO, since OC PRO is interpreted de se (Chierchia 1989). 
 Based on these pieces of evidence, Fujii identifies ∆ as OC PRO. 
 
6.4.3 The Experiencer restriction in the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction 
 Fujii claims that the Experiencer is restricted also in the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru 
construction. I do not agree with him in this respect (see the previous chapters), but I follow his 
judgment in this section for the sake of presentation. 
 Let us look at (330). The Nominative Case marking on the Theme argument Nagoya 
shows that it is an example of the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction. 
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(330)  Marii-wa  [Hiroshij-ni   [ zibuni/j-ga  Nagoya-ga       natukasi-i-to]     omotte] hosikatta 
Mari-Top  Hiroshi-Dat    self-Nom   Nagoya-Nom  nostalgic-Prs-C  to.think wanted 
  ‘Marii wanted Hiroshij to think that {shei, hej} missed Nagoya.’ 
          (Fujii 2007: 15(36)) 
 
The goodness of (330) shows that the Experiencer argument of the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru 
construction can be the reflexive zibun ‘self’. 
 Next, let us compare (331) and (332), in which the Experiencer arguments are 
phonetically null. 
 
(331)  Non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction 
  Marii-wa  [Hiroshij-ni   [ ei/j  Nagoya-ga        natukasi-i-to]     omotte]  hosikatta 
  Mari-Top  Hiroshi-Dat           Nagoya-Nom  nostalgic-Prs-C  to.think  wanted 
  ‘Marii wanted Hiroshij to think that {shei, hej} missed Nagoya.’ 
          (Fujii 2007: 15(34)) 
 
(332)  Long-distance ECM construction 
  Marii-wa  [Hiroshij-ni   [ Δ*i/j   Nagoya-o       natukasi-i-to]     omotte]  hosikatta 
  Mari-Top  Hiroshi-Dat   Nagoya-Acc  nostalgic-Prs-C  to.think  wanted 
  ‘Marii wanted Hiroshij to think that {*shei, hej} missed Nagoya.’ 
          (Fujii 2007: 15(33)) 
 
They show that the null Experiencer argument Δ in long-distance ECM example (332) does not 
allow long-distance antecedents (as standard OC PRO), while the null Experiencer argument in 
the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru example (331) does. The latter allows the same interpretations as 
reflexive zibun (compare (331) and (330)). 
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 Based on these data, Fujii supposes as follows. 
 
(333)  The Experiencer argument in the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction is zibun or 
the phonetically null counterpart of zibun. 
 
6.4.4 The reflexive subject requirement (Fujii 2007) and the Experiencer restriction 
 Extrapolating the above claims (323) and (333), Fujii makes the following proposal 
(which he calls the ‘reflexive subject requirement’): 
 
(334)  The reflexive subject requirement for Experiencer adjectives 
  Experiencer adjectives lexically select as their Experiencer subject 
 (i) OC PRO, 
 (ii) reflexive zibun, or  
 (iii) the phonetically null counterpart of zibun 
 
And he claims that it explains the Experiencer restriction in root clauses and to-complement 
clauses of verbs of saying and thinking (in the case of the non-ECM construction), as well as the 
Experiencer restriction in the long-distance ECM construction. 
 To account for the Experiencer restriction in root clauses and to-complement clauses of 
verbs of saying and thinking, Fujii claims that the OC PRO is bound to the Speech Act head 
(when there is no intervening element). Concretely, he assumes the following structures for root 
clauses and to-complement clauses which contain an Experiencer adjective. 
 
(335) a. The root clause 
  [SaP Sa°(+author-@)i [TP PROi T° [AP tPRO Adj …   (Fujii 2006: 163(14)) 
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 b. The to-complement clause except in the long-distance ECM construction 
  (NPi says/thinks) [SaP Sa°(+author)i [TP zibuni/ei T° [AP  tzibun/e  Adj …    
 c. The to-complement clause in the long-distance ECM construction 
  (NPi thinks/feels) [SaP Sa°(+author)i [TP PROi T° [AP  tPRO  Adj …  
         (based on Fujii 2006: 163(13)) 
 
Here, the feature [+author] represents the attitude holder. In the case of root clauses, he/she is the 
external speaker
134
.  
 One might wonder why an overt Experiencer NP in root clauses such as (336) does not 
block Sa°’s binding of the OC PRO and lift the Experiencer restriction. 
 
(336)  *Tarô-wa    kanasi-i                 yo 
    Taro-Top  sad-Pred.be.Pres   SFP 
  (Intended:) ‘Taro is sad.’ 
 
To answer this question, Fujii supposes that surface experiencers in root clauses are left-
dislocated above the Speech Act projection. If it is correct, surface experiencers would not 
intervene Sa°’s local binding of the OC PRO, and the Experiencer restriction would emerge. 
 There is a large gap between the claims that the Experiencer argument in the long-
distance ECM construction is OC PRO and that the Experiencer argument in the non-ECM to-
omou/kanziru construction is zibun or its null counterpart and the reflexive subject requirement 
(334). The former claims are about Experiencer arguments in special environments, while the 
latter (the reflexive subject requirement) is about all Experiencer arguments. In the following 
sections, I argue that this extrapolation and the account of the Experiencer restriction is 
                                                          
134
 The external speaker (Sells 1987:456) is the person who utters the sentence. 
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problematic: (i) this extrapolation does not fit with the ‘surface Experiencer’ NP which can 
appear in root clauses and other environments, and (ii) the account of the Experiencer restriction 
predicts that no-complement clauses of verbs of believing and knowing restrict the Experiencer 
restriction, contrary to the fact. 
 
6.4.5 Problems of this analysis 
6.4.5.1 Root clauses 
 First, before showing that the reflexive subject requirement is problematic, let us revise 
Fujii’s analysis of the root clause (335a), because it has another problem, which is tangential to 
the correctness of the reflexive subject requirement. The point is that the Experiencer subject in 
root clauses cannot be OC PRO because the tense in root clauses is [+finite], different from the 
embedded tense in the long-distance ECM construction, which is [−finite]. It is clear by the fact 
that root clauses allow present/past-tense inflection as in (337), different from the to-complement 
clause in the long-distance ECM construction, (325a). 
 
(337)  watasi-wa  uresi-{i/k-at-ta}. 
  I-Top          glad-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past} 
  ‘I {am/was} glad.’ 
 
Therefore, the proposed structure (335a), in which the Experiencer subject is OC PRO, is not 
tenable. To satisfy both the Case condition and the reflexive subject requirement for Experiencer 
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adjectives, the Experiencer argument in root clauses must be zibun or its null counterpart, as in 
(338).
135
 Here, e represents the null counterpart of zibun. 
 
(338)  [SaP Sa°(+author-@)i [TP {zibuni/ei} T° [AP {tzibun/te} Adj … 
 
 There is a big difference between the root clause and the environments investigated in the 
previous three sections, namely the long-distance ECM construction and the non-ECM to-
omou/kanziru construction. It is the acceptability of a ‘surface Experiencer’ NP. Note that a first-
person pronoun is acceptable as a ‘surface Experiencer’ NP, as in (339).  
 
(339)   watasi-{wa/ga}   uresi-i. 
  I-{Top/Nom}      glad-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘I am glad.’ 
 
If analysis (338) is correct, sentences like (339) must have a null counterpart of zibun as the 
Experiencer subject, and the ‘surface Experiencer’ NP must be a non-argument. 
 
(340)  watasi-{wa/ga}   e    uresi-i. 
  I-{Top/Nom}            glad-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘I am glad.’ 
 
Can the null counterpart of zibun be bound to the ‘surface Experiencer’ NP (as well as the Speech 
Act head)? If the answer is yes, the Experiencer restriction would emerge. Let us look at (341), 
for example. 
                                                          
135
 I put aside the question of whether the reflexive raises to [Spec,TP]. 
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(341)  *Tarôi-{wa/ga}          ei      uresi-i. 
    Taro-{Top/Nom}             glad-Pred.be.Pres 
  (Intended:) ‘Taro is glad.’ 
 
If the null counterpart of zibun can be bound to the ‘surface Experiencer’ NP, the sentence should 
allow the interpretation that Taro is glad, contrary to the fact. Therefore, in this analysis, (342) 
must hold. 
 
(342)  The ‘surface Experiencer’ NP is not a potential binder of the null counterpart of zibun. 
 
 This analysis of root clauses with a ‘surface Experiencer’ NP is, however, problematic: it 
does not account for the fact that a ‘surface Experiencer’ NP and an Experiencer subject zibun 
cannot co-occur. Note that zibun and its null counterpart are interchangeable in to-complement 
clauses of the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction, as shown in (330) and (331). If a null 
counterpart of zibun is present in root clauses with a ‘surface Experiencer’ NP as in (340), it is 
expected that zibun can appear in the same place as e. But the expectation is not borne out. Such a 
replacement yields an unacceptable sentence, as shown in (343). 
 
(343)  *watasi-{wa/ga}   zibun-ga    uresi-i. 
    I-{Top/Nom}      self-Nom   glad-Pred.be.Pres 
  (Intended:) ‘I am glad.’ 
 
It is not clear how the proposal explains the badness of sentences like (343), while keeping (340) 
intact. (It should be noted that in Japanese sentences with multiple ga-marked NPs are 
unexceptional (Kuno 1973, 1978, Heycock 1993, Takahashi 1994, Ura 1996, 1999, Doron and 
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Heycock 1999, Akiyama 2004, Koizumi 2008, among others). So it is implausible that there is a 
PF constraint which forbids multiple appearances of ga-marked NPs in a sentence.) 
 
6.4.5.2 No-complement clauses 
 Another problem of the proposal is that it imposes a too severe restriction on the 
Experiencer argument. Because the reflexive subject requirement is a condition on the inherent 
selectional property of Experiencer adjectives, it is difficult to explain the fact that there are 
environments where the Experiencer restriction is absent.
136
 In this section, I consider no-
complement clauses and argue that the reflexive subject requirement makes a wrong prediction. 
 As shown in section 2.3.2, the Experiencer restriction is absent in no-complement clauses, 
as in (42) and (50), which are reproduced below. 
 
(42)  Hanakoi-wa   [(sore-o     kii-te)     kanozyo-no  itoko-ga         hontôwa 
        Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hear-ing) shei-Gen      cousin-Nom   actually   
  uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o                 iw-ana-k-at-ta. 
  glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc  say-Neg-Pred-be-Past 
  ‘Hanakoi did not say that heri cousin was actually glad (to hear that).’ 
 
(50)  Hanakoi-wa   [{zibuni/kanozyoi-no  itoko}-ga       uresi-k-at-ta           no]-o 
Hanakoi-Top [{selfi    /shei-Gen        cousin}-Nom glad-Pred-be-Pres  Fin]-Acc 
  sit-tei-ru. 
  know-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Hanakoi knows that {shei/heri cousin} was glad.’ 
                                                          
136
 Fujii mentions but does not analyze such environments as relative and nominalized clauses. See his 
footnote 2 (Fujii 2006:163n2). 
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Let us consider the following example, which shows that the embedded tense of the no-
complement clause is [+finite], namely that there is a distinction between present and past tense. 
 
(344)  Hanakoi-wa   [kanozyoi-no   itoko-ga         uresi-{i/k-at-ta}                             no]-o       
  Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen         cousin-Nom  glad-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past} Fin]-Acc 
  sit-tei-ru. 
know-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Hanakoi knows that heri cousin {is/was} glad.’ 
 
Because the tense is [+finite], if the reflexive subject requirement is correct, (344) must have a 
null counterpart of zibun as the Experiencer subject, which is bound to the ‘surface Experiencer’ 
NP kanozyo-no itoko ‘her cousin’, as in (345).  
 
(345)  Hanakoi-wa   [[kanozyoi-no   itoko]j-ga          ej    uresi-{i/k-at-ta}       
  Hanakoi-Top [[shei-Gen         cousin]j-Nom    ej   glad-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past}   
  no]-o       sit-tei-ru. 
  Fin]-Acc know-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Hanakoi knows that heri cousin {is/was} glad.’ 
 
This analysis has at least two problems. 
 First, an overt reflexive zibun cannot appear in place of the supposed null reflexive, as 
exemplified in (346). It is not clear how this fact is explained in this analysis. 
 
(346)  *Hanakoi-wa   [kanozyoi-no   itoko-ga         zibun-ga  uresi-{i/k-at-ta}            
    Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen         cousin-Nom  self-Nom glad-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past} 
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  no]-o       sit-tei-ru. 
  Fin]-Acc know-Perf-Pres 
  (Intended:) ‘Hanakoi knows that heri cousin {is/was} glad.’ 
 
 Second, the analysis that the null counterpart of zibun can be bound to the ‘surface 
Experiencer’ NP is not compatible with this analysis’s explanation of the Experiencer restriction 
in root clauses. As stated in (342) in the previous section, the analysis of the Experiencer 
restriction in root clauses requires the ‘surface Experiencer’ NP is not a potential binder of the 
null counterpart of zibun. The point is this: In this analysis, the Experiencer restriction in root 
clauses is supposed to be due to the binding of the Experiencer reflexive argument by the Speech 
Act head. To suppose that the null Experiencer reflexive can be bound to the ‘surface Experiencer’ 
NP undermines this analysis. 
 
6.4.6 Discussion 
 In this section, let us consider the above data and arguments from the perspective of the 
situation-based analysis and the feature-checking analysis. 
 First, let us reconsider the contrast between (340) and (343), which are reproduced below. 
 
(340)  watasi-{wa/ga}   e    uresi-i. 
  I-{Top/Nom}            glad-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘I am glad.’ 
 
(343)  *watasi-{wa/ga}   zibun-ga    uresi-i. 
    I-{Top/Nom}      self-Nom   glad-Pred.be.Pres 
  (Intended:) ‘I am glad.’ 
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This contrast is a mystery under the reflexive subject requirement. However, in the situation-
based and feature-checking analyses, which do not suppose the reflexive subject requirement, the 
difference between (340) and (343) in acceptability is not a mystery. In these analyses, the NP 
watasi-{wa/ga} is simply the Experiencer argument, and so (339), which is indistinguishable with 
(340) in sound, is fine, but (343) is ungrammatical because the reflexive zibun-ga is assigned no 
thematic role and violates the theta criterion. 
 
(339)  watasi-{wa/ga}   uresi-i. 
  I-{Top/Nom}      glad-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘I am glad.’ 
 
 Second, as for the presence of the Experiencer restriction in root clauses and the absence 
of it in some no-complement clauses, it was shown that the situation-based analysis and the 
feature-checking analysis are both viable from Chapter 3 to Chapter 5. 
 Third, the Experiencer restriction in the long-distance ECM construction, which was not 
discussed in the previous chapters, is accounted for by Fujii’s claim (323) (reproduced below). 
  
(323) The Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction is always OC PRO. 
 
To account for the Experiencer restriction, (323) can be simply added to the situation-based and 
feature-checking analyses without modifying them. 
 A more satisfactory move is to derive (323) from independently motivated principles. In 
Fujii’s proposal, (323) is supposed to be a consequence of the reflexive subject requirement, 
(334): 
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(334)  The reflexive subject requirement for Experiencer adjectives 
  Experiencer adjectives lexically select as their Experiencer subject 
 (i) OC PRO, 
 (ii) reflexive zibun, or  
 (iii) the phonetically null counterpart of zibun 
 
However, I argued in the previous section that the reflexive subject requirement is problematic. I 
would like to claim that (323) is a consequence of the Case theory, instead of the reflexive subject 
requirement. 
 My explanation of (323) begins with the fact mentioned in section 6.4.2.2 that i-ending of 
adjectives is ambiguous between an element which contains T[+finite] and one which doesn’t. 
When i-ending contains T[+finite], a Theme argument of transitive Experiencer adjectives is 
assigned a Nominative Case by it, and the non-ECM construction is produced. When i-ending 
does not contain T[+finite], however, a Theme argument of transitive Experiencer adjectives is 
not assigned a Case by i-ending (because T[+finite], not T[−finite], has the ability to assign a 
Nominative Case (Takezawa 1987, Koizumi 1995)). In this case, only if the Experiencer 
argument is OC PRO, the Theme argument of transitive Experiencer adjectives is assigned a Case. 
It is because OC PRO is invisible for the purpose of Minimality (Bhatt 2005) and so the little v of 
the matrix clause can assign an Accusative Case to the Theme argument, as in (324), reproduced 
below. 
 
(324)  Case assignment in the long-distance ECM construction (in the head-initial word 
order) 
  Subj  T    v   {think/feel} [  PROExp  T[−finite]   ExpAdj   Theme-Acc  ] 
                        (invisible) 
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If the Experiencer argument is not OC PRO, the Theme argument is not assigned a Case, and so 
the sentence is ungrammatical: It is a violation of the Case filter. 
 One puzzle which remains in this explanation is what differentiates Experiencer 
adjectives and non-Experiencer adjectives with respect to availability of long-distance ECM 
construction. Fujii (2006, 2007) notes that the long-distance ECM construction is not possible for 
non-Experiencer adjectives, as shown in (347). 
 
(347)  Taroi-wa   [Δi/j  yakyuu-{ga/*o}            uma     -i    -to]  omotta 
  Taro-Top           baseball-{Nom/Acc}  skillful -Prs-C    thought 
  ‘Taro thought that {he, someone else} was good at baseball.’ (Fujii 2006: 165(23)) 
 
He suggests that the difference is due to a constraint that an embedded T which is combined with 
an Experiencer adjectival root cannot have a tense feature, while an embedded T which is 
combined with a non-Experiencer adjectival root can. However, the suggestion is not tenable 
because an embedded T which is combined with an Experiencer adjectival root shows tense 
inflection, as exemplified in (348). 
 
(348)  Hiroshii-wa  [ Δi  boku-no kazoku-ga    nikurasi-{i/k-at-ta}-to] 
  Hiroshi-Top [ Δi  I-Gen    family-Nom  hateAdj-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past}-Rep] 
omot-tei -ru 
  think-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Hiroshi thinks that he {hates/hated} my family.’ 
 
At present, I do not have a solution for this problem which keeps assumption (323), namely that 
Experiencer arguments in the long-distance ECM construction are PRO.  
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 Therefore, instead of keeping (323), I would like to propose that the adjectival complex 
‘Adj-i-to’137 modifies the matrix verb omo-u ‘think’/kanzi-ru ‘feel’, only if the adjective takes 
Theme and Experiencer arguments, as omo-u and kanzi-ru do (cf. Kawai 2008
138
).
139,140
 In this 
                                                          
137
 This is the case of adjectives which take i-ending. For adjectives which take da-ending, the complex has 
the form, ‘Adj-da-to’. In the following, I use only -i just for simplicity. 
138
 Kawai (2008) proposes a similar analysis for ‘NP-ga NP-o Adj-ku omo-u’ sentences, in line with 
Koizumi (2006). According to his proposal, Adj-ku in such sentences is an adverbial which modifies omo-
u, and the construction is possible only if the adjective takes Theme and Experiencer arguments, as omo-u 
does.  
139
 This analysis is due to personal communication with Rajesh Bhatt.  
140
 There is another possible analysis which does not keep the PRO requirement on Experiencer arguments 
in the long-distance ECM construction. Let us suppose that the ‘long-distance ECM’ construction actually 
does not contain an Experiencer argument. Precisely, let us assume (i). 
 
 (i) a.  The Experiencer argument of Experiencer adjectives can be syntactically unrealized. 
 b.  If unrealized, the Experiencer is interpreted to be the attitude holder. 
 
What is good about this proposal? The key is that there is a generalization (‘Kuno’s generalization’) that 
only one-place adjectives are allowed in the ECM complement in Japanese (Kuno 1976, Kitagawa 1986, 
Kawai 2006a). If the generalization is applicable to adjectives with PRO arguments, then the ‘long-distance 
ECM’ is impossible for any transitive adjectives, whether Experiencer adjectives or non-Experiencer 
adjectives.  In this analysis, the reason why Experiencer adjectives seem to allow long-distance ECM on 
the Theme argument is that the prima facie long-distance ECM construction actually contains an 
intransitive adjective which lacks an Experiencer argument. Here, what divides transitive non-Experiencer 
adjectives and Experiencer adjectives is that the Experiencer argument of Experiencer adjectives can be 
syntactically unrealized. 
 Under the proposal (i), the Experiencer restriction found in section 6.4.2, which Fujii accounts for 
by the reflexive subject requirement, is accounted for by the condition that only one-place adjectives are 
allowed in ECM complements. Let us reconsider examples (322a,b), for illustration. 
 
(322) a.  Hanakoi-wa   [{∆i/*j/*Tarô-ga}     watasi-no koto-o        uresi-i-to]                        
      Hanakoi-Top [{∆i/*j/*Taro-Nom} I-Gen       event-Acc  glad-Pred.be.Pres-Rep] 
      omot-tei-ru. 
      think-Perf-Pres 
      ‘Hanakoi thinks that {shei/*j/*Taro} is glad about my news (good fortune, success, ..).’ 
 
 b.  Atsukoi-wa  [{∆i/?*zibuni-ga/*kanozyoi-ga}     watasi-no  tomodati-o 
      Atsuko-Top            self-Nom  she          -Nom  my           friend-Acc 
      urayamasi-i     -to]   omotte    ita 
      envious    -Prs  -C    thinking  was 
      ‘Atsukoi thought that {∆i, ?*selfi, *shei} was envious of my friend.’ 
        (Fujii 2007: 4(6a)) 
 
In these examples, the embedded Theme arguments are marked with accusative Case. Because of the 
condition that only one-place adjectives are allowed in ECM complements, the Experiencer argument must 
be syntactically unrealized. Therefore, overt Experiencers are unacceptable in these examples. The 
interpretation of the unrealized Experiencer is consistent with (i.b). 
 This analysis, however, has some problems. It is not clear how the generalization that only one-
place adjectives are allowed is explained theoretically. Furthermore, the generalization is more complicated 
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analysis, the ‘long-distance ECM’ construction does not involve ECM and is a simple clause with 
the following structure, (349). 
 
(349)  Subj-{Top/Nom}  Obj-Acc   [Adv  Adj-i-to]  {omo-/kanzi-} v  [T {-u/ru}] 
        Assignment of Acc Case 
 
The accusative Case of the object NP is assigned by the matrix v, with no argument between them. 
This analysis solves the above problem: the observation that transitive non-Experiencer adjectives 
cannot be in the ‘long-distance ECM’ construction is now connected with the fact that they do not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
than stated above (Tanaka 1992, 2006), and under close scrutiny, acceptability of the ‘long-distance ECM’ 
construction does not accord with the generalization. For illustration, let us consider the following pair. It 
shows that by adding an adjunct, a bad sentence which violates the generalization becomes acceptable. 
 
      (ii)   a.  *?John-wa   kono daigaku-o          kyampasu-ga  ookii  to         sinziteiru. 
          John-Top this    university-Acc campus-Nom   large  Quote  believes 
          ‘John believes this university to have a large campus.’ (Kawai 2006a: 335(13b)) 
 b.  John-wa    kono daigaku-o         kyampasu-ga   hoka-no   dono-daigaku-yori  
      John-Top  this    university-Acc campus-Nom  other-Gen any   university-than 
      ookii-to       sinziteiru. 
      large-Comp believes 
      ‘John believes this university to have a larger campus than any other universities.’ 
        (Tanaka 2006: 9(15)) 
 
Tanaka claims that “a predicate must have some arguments or adjuncts within its projection” (Tanaka 
2006:8) if there are two or more arguments within the complement clause. With his generalization in mind, 
let us add an adjunct to an unacceptable ‘long-distance ECM’ sentence with a transitive non-Experiencer 
adjective. If the badness is due to the generalization, it is expected that the sentence becomes better by the 
addition of an adjunct. However, this expectation is not borne out. Let us consider the following pair. 
 
        (iii) a.  Taroi-wa   [Δi/j  yakyuu-{ga/*o}            uma     -i    -to]  omotta 
      Taro-Top           baseball-{Nom/Acc}  skillful -Prs-C    thought 
      ‘Taro thought that {he, someone else} was good at baseball.’ (Fujii 2006: 165(23)) 
 b.  Taro-wa   [ Δi/j   yakyû-{ga/*o}           hoka-no     dono-ko-yori     uma-i-to]         omotta 
      Taro-Top           baseball-{Nom/Acc}  other-Gen  any-child-than  skillful -Prs-C thought 
      ‘Taro thought that {he, someone else} was better at baseball than any other children.’ 
 
(iii.b) is made by adding an adjunct, hoka-no dono-ko-yori ‘than any other children’, to (iii.a), as in pair 
(ii.a,b). Note that accusative marking on the Theme NP is bad in both sentences. This observation suggests 
that the generalization by Kuno and Tanaka is not the source of the badness of the ‘long-distance ECM’ 
with transitive non-Experiencer adjectives. 
 Another problem is that the ‘long-distance ECM’ construction and the ordinary ECM construction 
have somewhat different properties, so it is doubtful that they can be treated in a unified way. See the main 
text below for the differences. 
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take Theme and Experiencer arguments. Because the θ-grids of transitive non-Experiencer 
adjectives are different from those of omo-u and kanzi-ru (especially, omo-u and kanzi-ru take an 
Experiencer argument), non-Experiencer adjectives are not licensed in the ‘long-distance ECM’ 
construction. A supportive fact for this analysis is that -to can be used to modify verbs in other 
sentences, as in (350). Gôn and karan are onomatopoeias and (350) shows that gôn-to and karan-
to can modify a verb (or a verb phrase). 
 
(350) a. kane-ga      gôn-to       nat-ta. 
  bell-Nom  bong-quot  ring-Past 
  ‘A bell rang with a sound, ‘bong.’’ (‘A bell bonged.’) 
 b. itakire-ga                karan-to    oto-o           tate-ta. 
  small board-Nom  clop-quot   sound-Acc make-Past 
  ‘Small boards made “clop” sounds. 
 
 It should be noted that in this analysis, there are two mechanisms to produce the surface 
form, ‘NP-{Top/Nom} NP-Acc Adj-i-to omo-u.’ One mechanism is the one proposed above. The 
other mechanism is the one which produces sentences such as (351). As for the second 
mechanism, I have little to add to the previous studies (Kuno 1976, Kaneko 1988, Ueda 1988, 
Tanaka 1992, 2002, 2006, Sakai 1996, 1998, Ohta 1997, Bruening 2001, Kawai 2006a, among 
others), where these sentences are analyzed to involve Raising-to-Object or ECM as in English. 
 
(351)  Tarô-wa    sora-o      aka-i-to                         omot-tei-ru. 
  Taro-Top  sky-Acc   red-Pred.be.Pres-Quot  think-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Taro thinks the sky to be red.’ 
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 There are some differences between sentences produced by the first mechanism and ones 
produced by the second mechanism. One difference is that in the latter sentences, the embedded 
adjective need not take an Experiencer argument. For example, in (351), the embedded adjective 
aka-i ‘be red’ takes a Theme, but no Experiencer. On the other hand, in the former sentences, the 
embedded adjective’s θ-grid must accord with the θ-grid of the matrix verb. It means, in 
particular, that the θ-grid contains an Experiencer. 
 Another difference is the selection of the matrix verb. The matrix verb of sentences 
produced by the first mechanism can be only omo-u ‘think’ and kanzi-ru ‘feel’ (as observed by 
Fujii), which have rather bleached meaning. On the other hand, the matrix verb of sentences 
produced by the second mechanism is not so limited. Epistemic verbs (which is called ‘b-type’ by 
Postal 1974) such as sinzi-ru ‘believe’ and omoikom-u ‘assume, convinced oneself’ can form the 
construction (e.g., Kawai 2006a), as in (352). 
 
(352) a. Tarô-wa   sono nyûsu-o    uresi-i-to  
Taro-Top that  news-Acc glad-Pred.be.Pres-Quot 
  {omot-tei/*sinzi-tei/*omoikon-dei}-ru. 
{think-Perf/*believe-Perf/*assume-Perf}-Pres 
  ‘Taroi {thinks/*believes/*assumes} that hei is glad about the news.’ 
 
 b. Tarô-wa    sora-o      aka-i-to                           
  Taro-Top  sky-Acc   red-Pred.be.Pres-Quot 
  {omot-tei/sinzi-tei/omoikon-dei}-ru. 
{think-Perf/believe-Perf/assume-Perf}-Pres 
  ‘Taro {thinks/believes/assumes} the sky to be red.’ 
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 Yet another difference is that the embedded complement in the sentences made by the 
second mechanism must represent an individual-level predicate (e.g., Kawai 2006a), while that in 
the sentences made by the first mechanism need not. For example, (351) cannot be used if Taro 
thinks that the sky is temporarily red (say, with the setting sun). In such a situation, sora ‘sky’ 
must be marked with a nominative Case, as in (353). 
 
(353)  Tarô-wa    sora-ga      aka-i-to                          omot-tei-ru. 
  Taro-Top  sky-Nom   red-Pred.be.Pres-Quot  think-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Taro thinks that the sky is red.’ 
 
This applies to Experiencer adjectives also. For example, uresi-i ‘be glad’ represents a stage-level 
property, so it can be embedded with a nominative Experiencer, but it cannot be with an 
accusative Experiencer: 
 
(354) a. Tarô-wa    Hanako-ga       uresi-i-to                          omot-tei-ru. 
  Taro-Top  Hanako-Nom   glad-Pred.be.Pres-Quot   think-Perf-Pres 
  ‘Taro thinks that Hanako is glad.’ 
 b. *Tarô-wa    Hanako-o        uresi-i-to                          omot-tei-ru. 
    Taro-Top  Hanako-Acc   glad-Pred.be.Pres-Quot   think-Perf-Pres 
   (Intended:) ‘Taro thinks Hanako to be glad.’ 
 
Now, sentences produced by the first mechanism do not show this restriction, as exemplified by 
the goodness of the following example. 
 
(355)  Tarô-wa    sono  nyûsu-o     uresi-i-to                         omot-tei-ru. 
  Taro-Top  that    news-Acc  glad-Pred.be.Pres-Quot  think-Perf-Pres 
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  ‘Taroi thinks that hei is glad about the news.’ 
 
 The existence of these differences is not a surprise if there are two different mechanisms 
which make sentences of the form, ‘NP-{Top/Nom} NP-Acc Adj-i-to omo-u’. 
 
6.5 Summary 
 This section reviewed three previous analyses of the Experiencer restriction. First, 
Kamio’s analysis, which is based on his theory of territory of information, can explain the 
Experiencer restriction in root clauses. But it is not clear how it accounts for the behavior of the 
Experiencer in non-root clauses because the theory of territory of information at present treats 
only root clauses. Second, the feature-checking analysis by Tenny (2006) also can explain the 
Experiencer restriction in root clauses. The proposal, however, boils down to a too severe 
constraint on the Experiencer argument: Experiencer adjectives lexically select an Experiencer 
who is a speaker or an addressee. It is because of the claim that Experiencer adjectives assign a 
morphosyntactic feature [+discourse participant] to their Experiencer argument. The prediction 
that Experiencers are a speaker or an addressee does not fit with the empirical data. In fact, there 
are many environments where the Experiencer restriction is lifted. I used no-complement clauses 
of a verb of knowing for illustration of such an environment. Third, the reflexive subject 
requirement for Experiencer adjectives (Fujii 2006, 2007) is based on the Experiencer restriction 
found in clauses with an exceptionally Case-marked Theme argument, which was not discussed 
in the previous chapters. I argued that the requirement is inconsistent with the availability of overt 
non-reflexive Experiencer NPs in (at least) root clauses and no-complement clauses of verbs of 
believing and knowing. Also, I showed that the requirement does not account for the Experiencer 
restriction in root clauses and the absence of the restriction in no-complement clauses of verbs of 
believing and knowing in the same breath. Finally, I gave some possible accounts of the 
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Experiencer restriction in clauses with an accusative Case-marked Theme argument which can be 
incorporated into the situation-based and feature checking analyses developed in the previous 
chapters. 
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 CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation has analyzed the restrictions on the Experiencer argument of adjectives 
of emotions and sensations in Japanese. In Chapter 1, after introduction of the Experiencer 
restriction, I reviewed those analyses which preceded development of the cartographic approach 
to the left (right)-periphery. Many of them account for the restriction in some environments, but 
each fails to account for it in some other environments. 
 In Chapter 2, I first explained the background data and theoretical hypotheses which I use 
to analyze the Experiencer restriction, and then presented the basic data of the Experiencer 
restriction. 
  In many embedded clauses, emergence of the Experiencer restriction is dependent on the 
choice of the complementizer. To treat complementizers, I follow the cartographic approach to 
the left(/right)-periphery of clauses, and suppose the fine-structure of the Japanese right-periphery 
as in (20), based on the work by Saito and Haraguchi (2013) and others.  
 
(20)  [[[[[ TP ]  Fin ] …  ] Force ]       (SA)                ] (Report) ] 
                (ka)    (wa, yo, ne, sa, …)      (to) 
      (ASSERT)             
                (INTERROG) 
 
 In matrix clauses and some embedded clauses, emergence of the Experiencer restriction 
is dependent on the speech act. If a sentence is asserted in conversation (or in ‘reportive style’), 
the Experiencer restriction is active. But, if a sentence is uttered in third-person narrative (or in 
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‘non-reportive style’), the Experiencer restriction is lifted. Based on the fact that sentence-final 
particles can appear in conversation but not in third-person narrative, it was supposed that 
sentences which are asserted in conversation have a speech act projection (SAP), while sentences 
which are uttered in third-person narrative do not, as in Tenny (2006). 
 The distribution of the Experiencer restriction is summarized in (62). 
 
(62) a. In a root clause in reportive style, the Experiencer of an Experiencer adjective must be 
the speaker. 
 b. In a to-clause under a verb of saying, the Experiencer must be the local speaker. In a 
no-clause under a verb of saying, the Experiencer restriction is lifted. 
 c. In a clause under an epistemic modal, an evidential, or a non-communicational attitude 
predicate (except vivid memory report), the Experiencer restriction is lifted. 
 d. In a clause under a vivid memory report verb, an Experiencer must be the subject of the 
memory verb, namely the de se individual in the clause. 
 e. In a restrictive relative clause, the Experiencer restriction is lifted. 
 f. In a non-restrictive relative clause, the Experiencer is restricted to the speaker. 
 
 Chapter 3 presented a possibilistic situation semantic analysis which was inspired by the 
conceptual-structural analysis of Experiencers by Jackendoff (1990) and the locative syntax of 
Experiencers claimed by Landau (2010) and others. In my analysis, Experiencer adjectives like 
uresi- ‘glad’ have a presupposition as in (99). Here, l is a location function which maps a 
situation to its location, and μ is a function which maps a sentient individual a to his mental 
location, which is called a’s mind. 
 
(99)  [[ uresi- ]] = λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s 
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This entry means that, for example, Tarô-wa uresi-i ‘Taro is glad’ means ‘gladness is at s’ if the 
location of s is Taro’s mind, and has no truth-value otherwise. The Japanese assertive speech act 
requires the location of the topic situation, if it is mental, to be the speaker’s mind, as in (103). 
 
(103)  [[ Assert ]]
g,c
 = λp.λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. p(s) 
 
The combination of the presuppositions on Experiencer adjectives and the speech act yields the 
Experiencer restriction. English assertion does not have requirement (103), so English does not 
show the Experiencer restriction. 
 In Chapter 4, I analyzed the appearance and disappearance of the Experiencer restriction 
in non-restrictive relative clauses. First, it was argued that the semantics of Japanese non-
restrictive relative clauses is similar to the one proposed by Schlenker (2010, 2013a,b) for French 
and English non-restrictive relative clauses. Second, it was shown that an Experiencer in a non-
restrictive relative clause is (i) restricted to a speaker if the non-restrictive relative clause is not in 
the scope of an attitude predicate, (ii) restricted to a local speaker if the non-restrictive relative 
clause is in the scope of a verb of saying, and (iii) not restricted if the non-restricted relative 
clause is in the scope of a non-communicational verb. Third, it was shown that the situation-based 
analysis proposed in Chapter 3 can account for this pattern. 
 Chapter 5 presented another analysis of the Experiencer restriction, which employs a 
feature [sen] and a semantic parameter h. In this analysis, Experiencer adjectives assign the 
feature [sen] to their Experiencer argument, and Mod also has the feature [sen]. When checking 
of the feature [sen] occurs at ModP which is headed by a phonetically null Mod Mod, the referent 
of the Experiencer NP is fixed to h. Supposing that assertion sets the value of h at a SAP to the 
speaker, it was shown that this mechanism leads to the Experiencer restrictions in various 
environments correctly. The supposition that assertion sets the value of h is the norm of assertion 
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proposed by Stephenson (2007b) for English. In the feature-checking analysis, what differentiates 
Japanese and English is the presence/absence of checking between an Experiencer NP and a Mod. 
This mechanism, however, cannot be involved in the Experiencer restriction in no-clauses under 
verbs of vivid memory because no-clauses do not contain ModP (no-clauses are FinP, and FinP 
are smaller than ModP). Thus, if this analysis is correct, there are at least two kinds of 
Experiencer restrictions whose derivations are different. And so the principle of parsimony favors 
the situation-based analysis over the feature-checking analysis.  
 In Chapter 6, I reviewed previous formal analyses of the Experiencer restriction. Kamio’s 
(1995, 1997a,b) analysis based on the theory of territory of information explains the Experiencer 
restriction in root clauses, but it is not clear how the account can be extended to cover the 
Experiencer restriction in embedded clauses. In Tenny’s (2006) feature-checking analysis, 
Experiencer adjectives assign two features, [+sentient] and [+discourse participant] to their 
Experiencer argument. The feature [+sentient] is checked at a Sentience/EvidentialP, and the 
feature [+discourse participant] is checked at a Speech Act projection. A difference between this 
analysis and the analysis proposed in Chapter 5 is the use of the feature [+discourse participant]. I 
argued that the use of the feature [+discourse participant] is problematic because the assignment 
of [+discourse participant] to the Experiencer argument means that the Experiencer is non-third-
person in any environment, which does not fit the data. Fujii (2006, 2007) proposes the “reflexive 
subject requirement” for SubjExp predicates (SubjExp predicates include Experiencer adjectives). 
According to his proposal, Experiencer adjectives lexically select as their Experiencer argument 
(i) OC PRO, (ii) reflexive zibun, or (iii) the null counterpart of zibun. A problem of this analysis 
is that it does not account for the (un)grammaticality of the following pair of sentences. 
 
(339)  watasi-{wa/ga}   uresi-i. 
  I-{Top/Nom}      glad-Pred.be.Pres 
  ‘I am glad.’ 
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(343)  *watasi-{wa/ga}   zibun-ga    uresi-i. 
    I-{Top/Nom}      self-Nom   glad-Pred.be.Pres 
  (Intended:) ‘I am glad.’ 
 
Suppose that the reflexive subject requirement for Experiencer adjectives is correct. Then, the 
grammaticality of sentence (339) indicates that the Experiencer NP in (339) is the null 
counterpart of reflexive zibun (note that the Experiencer NP in (339) cannot be OC PRO for Case 
reasons). But if so, it is not clear why (343) is ungrammatical, for the difference of (339) and 
(343) is whether the Experiencer NP, the reflexive zibun, is pronounced or not. Another problem 
is that it is not clear how it can treat the cases where the Experiencer restriction is lifted. 
 In this dissertation, I presented a situation semantic analysis which supposes that 
Experiencers have a locative semantics and a feature-checking analysis which supposes that the 
Experiencer restriction involves a feature [sen] and a semantic parameter h. As mentioned above, 
I argued that the principle of parsimony favors the situation-based analysis over the feature-
checking analysis. However, it is important to find empirical data which differentiates the two 
analyses. It is not done in this dissertation, but I am going to return to it in future work. 
  
231 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abrusán, Márta. (2011) “Presuppositional and negative islands: a semantic account.” Natural 
Language Semantics 19: 257-321. 
 
Akatsuka McCawley, Noriko. (1978) “Epistemology and Japanese syntax: Complementizer 
choice.” In Donka Farkas, Wesley M. Jacobsen, and Karol W. Todrys, eds., Papers from 
the Fourteenth Regional Meeting Chicago Linguistic Society, 272-284. Chicago, IL: 
Chicago Linguistic Society. 
 
Akmajian, Adrian and Chisato Kitagawa. (1981) “AUX in Japanese.” In Susan Steele with 
Adrian Akmajian, Richard Demers, Eloise Jelinek, Chisato Kitagawa, Richard Oehrle, 
and Thomas Wasow, An Encyclopedia of AUX: A Study in Cross-Linguistic Equivalence, 
97- 114. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Alexiadou, Artemis and Elena Anagnostopoulou. (1998) “Parametrizing AGR: Word order, V-
movement and EPP-checking.” Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 16: 491-539. 
 
Amaral, Patricia, Craige Roberts, and E. Allyn Smith. (2007) “Review of The Logic of 
Conventional Implicatures by Chris Potts.” Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 707-749. 
 
Anand, Pranav. (2006) De De se. Ph.D. dissertation, MIT. 
 
Anand, Pranav. (2007) “Re-expressing judgment.” Theoretical Linguistics 33: 199-208. 
 
Anand, Pranav and Andrew Nevins. (2004) “Shifty operators in changing contexts.” In Robert B. 
Young, ed., SALT XIV, 20-37. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. 
 
Aoki, Haruo. (1986) “Evidentials in Japanese.” In Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols, eds., 
Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 223-238. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
 
Arad, Maya. (1998) VP-Structure and the Syntax-Lexicon Interface. MIT Occasional Papers in 
Linguistics 16. MIT. 
 
Asher, Nicholas and Alex Lascarides. (2003) Logics of Conversation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Azuma, Hiroko. (1992) “Kanjōkeiyōshi jutsugobun ni okeru kanjōshu no ninshōseigen: Jojutsu 
no tachiba kara [Person restriction on the Experiencer: from the standpoint of narration].” 
In Ikudō Tajima and Kazuya Niwa, eds., Nihongo Ronkyū 3, Gendai Nihongo no kenkyū, 
45-68. Osaka: Izumi Shoin. 
 
Azuma, Hiroko. (1993) “Tôziteki tokutyo-niyoru kanzyokeiyôshi-no imikizyutsu [Description of 
the meaning of adjectives of feelings by syntactic features].” Nagoya Daigaku Kokugo 
Kokubungaku 72: 58-72. 
 
Azuma, Hiroko. (1997a) “Nihongo ni okeru ninshō to mūdo no itchi [Agreement of person and 
mood in Japanese].” Nanzan Kokubun Ronshu 21: 7-25. 
232 
 
Azuma, Hiroko. (1997b) Gendai Nihongo ni okeru kanjōkeiyōshibun o meguru tōgogenshō: 
kanjōshu no ninshō no seiyakugenshō o chūshin ni [Syntactic Phenomena of Sentences 
with Adjectives of Feeling in Modern Japanese: Mainly on the Person Restriction 
Phenomena of Experiencers]. Ph.D. dissertation, Nagoya University. URL: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/16775 
 
Banfield, Ann. (1982) Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and Representation in the Language of 
Fiction. Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Barwise, Jon. (1981) “Scenes and other situations.” Journal of Philosophy 59: 369-396. 
 
Belletti, Adriana and Luigi Rizzi. (1988) “Psych-verbs and θ-theory.” Natural Language and 
Linguistic Theory 6: 291-352. 
 
Benveniste, Émile. (1959) “Les Relations de temps dans le verbe Français.” Bulletin de la Société 
de Linguistique de Paris 54: 46-68. Reprinted in Émile Benveniste (1966) Problèmes de 
linguistique générale, 237-250. Éditions Gallimard; English translation by Mary 
Elizabeth Meek, “The correlations of tense in the French verb.” In Emile Benveniste 
(1971) Problems in General Linguistics, 205-215. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami 
Press. 
 
Bhatt, Rajesh. (2005) “Long distance agreement in Hindi-Urdu.” Natural Language & Linguistic 
Theory 23: 757-807. 
 
Bouchard, Denis. (1995) The Semantics of Syntax: A Minimalist Approach to Grammar. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Bowers, John. (1993) “The syntax of predication.” Linguistic Inquiry 24: 591–656. 
 
Bruening, Benjamin. (2001) “Raising to object and proper movement.” Ms., University of 
Delaware, Newark. 
 
Büring, Daniel. (2005) Binding Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Castañeda, Hector-Neri. (1967) “Indicators and quasi-indicators.” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 4: 85-100. 
 
Castañeda, Hector-Neri. (1987) “Self-consciousness, demonstrative reference, and the self-
ascription view of believing.” Philosophical Perspectives 1: 405-454. 
 
Castañeda, Hector-Neri. (1989) Thinking, Language, and Experience. Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Chierchia, Gennaro. (1989) “Anaphora and attitudes de se.” In Renate Bartsch, Johan van 
Benthem, and Peter van Emde Boas, eds., Semantics and Contextual Expression, 1-31. 
Dordrecht: Foris Publications. 
 
Chierchia, Gennaro and Sally McConnell-Ginet. (2000) Meaning and Grammar: An Introduction 
to Semantics, Second Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
233 
Chomsky, Noam. (1995) The Minimalist Program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Chomsky, Noam. (2000) “Minimalist inquiries: The framework.” In Roger Martin, David 
Michaels, and Juan Uriagereka, eds., Step by Step: Essays on Minimalist Syntax in Honor 
of Howard Lasnik. 89-155. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Chomsky, Noam. (2001) “Derivation by phase.” In Michael Kenstowicz, ed., Ken Hale: A Life in 
Language, 1-52. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Cinque, Guglielmo. (1999) Adverbs and Functional Heads: A Cross-Linguistic Perspective. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Constant, Noah. (2011) “Re-diagnosing appositivity: Evidence for Prenominal Appositives from 
Mandarin.” To appear in Carissa Abrego-Collier, Arum Kang, Martina Martinović and 
Chieu Nguyen, eds., Proceedings of Chicago Linguistics Society (CLS) 47. 
 
Cooper, Robin. (1983) Quantification and Syntactic Theory. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
 
Cresswell, M. J. (1990) Entities and Indices. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. 
 
Deal, Amy Rose. (2008) “Events in space.” In Tova Friedman and Satoshi Ito, eds., Proceedings 
of SALT 18, 230-247. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. 
 
Del Gobbo, Francesca. (2003) Appositives at the Interface. Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
California, Irvine. 
 
Doron, Edit and Caroline Heycock. (1999) “Filling and licensing multiple specifiers.” In David 
Adger, Susan Pintzuk, Bernadette Plunkett, and George Tsoulas, eds., Specifiers: 
Minimalist Approaches, 69-89. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Dowty, David and Paul Jacobson. (1989) “Agreement as a semantic phenomenon.” In Joyce 
Powers and Kenneth de Jong, eds., Proceedings of Eastern States Conference on 
Linguistics (ESCOL) 1988, 95-101. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, CLC Publications. 
 
Endo, Yoshio. (2010) “Shûjoshi-no kâtogurafî [Cartography of sentence-final particles].” In 
Nobuko Hasegawa, ed., New Developments of Syntax and Japanese Linguistics: Beyond 
Propositions, 67-94. Tokyo: Kaitakusha. 
 
von Fintel, Kai. (1994) Restrictions on Quantifier Domains. Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst. 
 
von Fintel, Kai and Anthony S. Gillies (2011) “‘Might’ made right.” In Andy Egan & Brian 
Weatherson, eds., Epistemic Modality, 108–130. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
von Fintel, Kai and Irene Heim. (2007) Intensional Semantics. Spring 2007 edition. Ms., MIT. 
 
Fujii, Tomohiro. (2006) “Evidentiality and the distribution of OC PRO.” In Donald Baumer, 
David Montero, and Michael Scanlon, eds., Proceedings of the 25th West Coast 
Conference on Formal Linguistics, 159-167. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Proceedings 
Project. 
 
234 
Fujii, Tomohiro. (2007) “Controlling Japanese experiencer.” Nanzan Linguistics: Special Issue 1, 
Vol. 2, 1-17. 
 
Fukui, Naoki. (1995) Theory of Projection in Syntax. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. 
 
Gajewski, Jon. (2002) “On analyticity in natural language.” Ms., MIT. 
 
Gajewski, Jon. (2009) “L-triviality and grammar.” Handout. University of Connecticut. URL: 
http://gajewski.uconn.edu/papers/Logic.pdf 
 
Garrett, Edward John. (2001) Evidentiality and Assertion in Tibetan. Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, Los Angeles. 
 
Giorgi, Alessandra, and Fabio Pianesi. (1998) Tense and Aspect: From Semantics to 
Morphosyntax. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Groenendijk, Jeroen, and Martin Stokhof. (1982) “Semantic Analysis of Wh-Complements.” 
Linguistics and Philosophy 5: 175–233. 
 
Hamblin, C. L. (1973) “Questions in Montague Grammar.” Foundations of Language 10: 41-53. 
 
Hara, Yurie and Christopher Davis. (2013) “Darou as a deictic context shifter.” In Proceedings of 
FAJL 6. 
 
Hara, Yurie, Youngju Kim, Hiromu Sakai, and Sanae Tamura. (2013) “Projections of events and 
propositions in Japanese: A case study of Koto-nominalized clauses in causal relations.” 
Lingua 133: 262-288. 
 
Harada, S.I. (1973) “Counter Equi NP deletion.” Annual Bulletin 7: 113-147. Tokyo: University 
of Tokyo, Research Institute of Logopedics and Phoniatrics. 
 
Harris, Jesse A. and Christopher Potts. (2009) “Perspective-shifting with appositives and 
expressives.” Linguistics and Philosophy 32: 523-552. 
 
Harris, Jesse A. and Christopher Potts. (2009) “Predicting perspectival orientation for appositives.” 
In Ryan Bochnak, Nassira Nicola, Peet Klecha, Jasmin Urban, Alice Lemieux and 
Christina Weaver, eds., Proceedings of CLS 45, Number 1: The Main Session, 207-221. 
Chicago, IL: Chicago Linguistic Society. 
 
Heim, Irene. (2008) “Features on bound pronouns.” In Daniel Harbour, David Adger, and Susana 
Béjar, eds., Phi Theory: Phi-Features across Modules and Interfaces, 35-56. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Heim, Irene and Angelika Kratzer. (1998) Semantics in Generative Grammar. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Heycock, Caroline. (1993) “Syntactic predication in Japanese.” Journal of East Asian Linguistics 
2: 167-211. 
 
Higginbotham, James and Robert May. (1981). “Questions, quantifiers, and crossing.” The 
Linguistic Review 1: 41-80. 
 
235 
Hiraiwa, Ken. (2010) “Spelling out the Double-o Constraint.” Natural Language and Linguistic 
Theory 28: 723-770. 
 
Hiraiwa, Ken and Shinichiro Ishihara. (2002) “Missing links: cleft, sluicing, and ‘no da’ 
construction in Japanese.” In Proceedings of Humit 2001, MIT Working Papers in 
Linguistics 43, 35-54. 
 
Huddleston, Rodney and Geoffrey K. Pullum. (2002) The Cambridge Grammar of the English 
Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Huemer, Michael. (2011) “Sense-data.” In Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition). URL: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/sense-data/ 
 
Inoue, Kazuko. (1976) Henkei Bunpô to Nihongo, Jô [Transformational Grammar and Japanese, 
Volume 1]. Tokyo: Taishukan. 
 
Inoue, Kazuko. (2007) “Nihongo-no môdaru-no tokutyô saikô [Reconsideration of the characters 
of Japanese modals].” In Nobuko Hasegawa, ed., Nihongo-no Syubun Gensyô: Tôgokôzô-
to Modaritî [Main Clause Phenomena in Japanese: Syntactic Structure and Modality], 
227-260. Tokyo: Hituzi Shobo. 
 
Jackendoff, Ray. (1990) Semantic Structures, Linguistic Inquiry Monograph 18. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
 
Jayaseelan, K. A. (2008) “Topic, focus and adverb positions in clause structure.” Nanzan 
Linguistics 4: 43-68. 
 
Jayaseelan, K. A. (2014) “Coordination, relativization and finiteness in Dravidian.” Natural 
Language and Linguistic Theory 32: 191-211. 
 
Kadmon, Nirit. (2001) Formal Pragmatics: Semantics, Pragmatics, Presupposition, and Focus. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
 
Kamio, Akio. (1990) Jôhô-no Nawabari Riron [The Theory of Territory of Information]. Tokyo: 
Taishukan Shoten. 
 
Kamio, Akio. (1995) “Territory of Information in English and Japanese and psychological 
utterances” Journal of Pragmatics 24: 235-264. 
 
Kamio, Akio. (1997a) Territory of Information. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
 
Kamio, Akio. (1997b) “Evidentiality and some discourse characteristics in Japanese.” In Akio 
Kamio, ed., Directions in Functional Linguistics, 145- 171. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
 
Kamio, Akio. (2002) Zoku Jôhô-no Nawabari Riron [The Theory of Territory of Information, the 
Second Volume]. Tokyo: Taishukan Shoten. 
 
Kaneko, Yoshiaki. (1988) “On exceptional Case-marking in Japanese and English.” English 
Linguistics 5: 271-289. 
 
236 
Kaplan, David. (1989) “Demonstratives: An essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics, and 
epistemology of demonstratives and other indexicals.” In Joseph Almog, John Perry, and 
Howard Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan, 481-563. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Karttunen, Lauri. (1977) “Syntax and semantics of questions.” Linguistics and Philosophy 1: 3-44. 
 
Kawai, Michiya. (2006a) “Raising to object in Japanese: A small clause analysis.” Linguistic 
Inquiry 37: 329-339. 
 
Kawai, Michiya. (2006b) “Verbal morphology of Japanese.” In Claire Gurski and Milica Radisic, 
eds., Proceedings of the 2006 Annual Conference of the Canadian Linguistic Association, 
10 pages. URL: http://westernlinguistics.ca/Publications/CLA2006/Kawai.pdf 
 
Kawai, Michiya. (2008) “Verbal morphology of Japanese and head movement.” In Susie Jones, 
ed., Proceedings of the 2008 Annual Conference of the Canadian Linguistic Association, 
15 pages. URL: http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~cla-acl/actes2008/CLA2008_Kawai.pdf 
 
Kinsui, Satoshi. (1986) “Rentai shūshoku seibun-no kinou [The function of nominal modifiers].” 
In Matsumura Akira Kyōju Koki Kinenkai, ed., Matsumura Akira Kyōju koki kinen 
kokugo kenkyū ronshū, 602-624. Tokyo: Meiji Shoin. 
 
Kinsui, Satoshi. (1989) “‘Houkoku’ ni tuite no oboegaki [A note on ‘report’].” In Yoshio Nitta 
and Takashi Masuoka, eds., Nihongo no Modariti [Modality in Japanese], 121-129. 
Tokyo: Kurosio Syuppan. 
 
Kinsui, Satoshi. (1990) “Jutsugo-no imisou-to jojutsu-no tachiba [The semantic layer of 
predicates and the standpoint of narration]” Joshidai bungaku. Kokubunhen 41: 26-56. 
 
Kishimoto, Hideki. (2011) “Setsu-no syûhenyôso: Modaritî-to daimoku [Peripheral elements of 
clauses: Modality and the topic.” In Michiko Takeuchi and Hiromi Sato, eds., Hatsuwa-to 
Bun-no Modaritî: Taisyôkenkyu-no Shiten-kara [Utterances and Modality of Sentences: 
From the Perspective of Comparative Study], 115-137. Tokyo: Hituzi Shobo. 
 
Kiyota, Masaru. (2008) Situation Aspect and Viewpoint Aspect: From Salish to Japanese. Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of British Columbia. 
 
Kizu, Mika. (2009) “Japanese modals at the syntax-pragmatics interface.” In Barbara Pizziconi 
and Mika Kizu, eds., Japanese Modality: Exploring its Scope and Interpretation, 183-
204. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Koizumi, Masatoshi. (1991) Syntax of Adjuncts and the Phrase Structure of Japanese. MA thesis, 
The Ohio State University. 
 
Koizumi, Masatoshi. (1993) “Modal phrase and adjuncts.” In Patricia M. Clancy, ed., 
Japanese/Korean Linguistics, Volume 2, 409-428. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. 
 
Koizumi, Masatoshi. (1995) Phrase Structure in Minimalist Syntax. Ph.D. dissertation, MIT. 
 
Koizumi, Masatoshi. (2006) “Control by predicate raising.” In Shosuke Haraguchi, Osamu 
Fujimura, and Bohumil Palek, eds., Proceedings of LP 2002: Studies in Language, 
Speech and Communication, 693-715. Prague: The Karolinum Press. 
237 
 
Koizumi, Masatoshi. (2008) “Nominative object.” In Shigeru Miyagawa and Mamoru Saito, eds., 
The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Linguistics, 141-167. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Koyama, Atsuko. (1966) “No, ga, wa no tukaiwake ni tuite: tensei bunpoo riron no nihongo e no 
tekiyoo [How to use the particles no, ga and wa: the transformation theory applied to the 
Japanese language].” Kokugogaku [Studies in the Japanese Language] 66: 61-84. 
 
Kratzer, Angelika. (1998a) “More structural analogies between pronouns and tenses.” In Devon 
Strolovitch and Aaron Lawson, eds., //Proceedings of SALT VIII//, 92-110. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University. 
 
Kratzer, Angelika. (1998b) “Scope or pseudoscope? Are there wide-scope indefinites?” In Susan 
Rothstein, ed., Events and Grammar, 163-196. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
Kratzer, Angelika. (2004) “Covert quantifier restrictions in natural languages.” Talk presented at 
Palazzo Feltrinelli in Gargnano, June 11, 2004. Semantics archive. 
 
Kratzer, Angelika. (2007) “Topic situations and other resource situations.” Lecture notes, 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
 
Kratzer, Angelika. (2009) “Making a pronoun: Fake indexicals as windows into the properties of 
pronouns.” Linguistic Inquiry 40: 187-237. 
 
Kratzer, Angelika. (2014) “Situations in natural language semantics.” In Edward N. Zalta, ed., 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition). URL: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/situations-semantics/ 
 
Krifka, Manfred. (1989) “Nominal reference, temporal constitution and quantification in event 
semantics.” In Renate Bartsch, Johan van Benthem and Peter van Emde Boas, eds., 
Semantics and Contextual Expression, 75-115. Dordrecht: Foris. 
 
Krifka, Manfred. (2001) “Quantifying into question acts.” Natural Language Semantics 9: 1-40. 
 
Krifka, Manfred. (2004) “Semantics below and above speech acts.” Handout. Talk presented at 
Stanford University, April 9, 2004. 
 
Krifka, Manfred. (2011) “Questions.” In Klaus von Heusinger, Claudia Maienborn, and Paul 
Portner, eds., Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning, 
Volume 2, 1742-1785. Berlin: de Gruyter Mouton. 
 
Kudo, Mayumi. (1995) The Aspect-Tense System and the Text. Tokyo: Hituzi Syobo. 
 
Kunihiro, Tetsuya. (1965) “Nichiei ondo keiyoshi no igiso no kouzou to taikei [The structure and 
system of the sememes of the English and Japanese temperature adjectives].” 
Kokugogaku 60: 74-84. 
 
Kuno, Susumu. (1973) The Structure of the Japanese Language. (Current Studies in Linguistics 
Series, no.3) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
238 
Kuno, Susumu. (1976) “Subject raising.” In Masayoshi Shibatani, ed., Syntax and Semantics 5: 
Japanese Generative Grammar, 17-49. New York, NY: Academic Press. 
 
Kuno, Susumu. (1978) “Theoretical perspectives on Japanese linguistics.” In John Hinds and 
Irwin Howard, eds., Problems in Japanese Syntax and Semantics, 213-285. Tokyo: 
Kaitakusha. 
 
Kuno, Susumu. (1988) “Blended quasi-direct discourse in Japanese.” In William J. Poser, ed., 
Papers from the Second International Workshop on Japanese Syntax, 75-102. Stanford, 
CA: CSLI. 
 
Kuroda, Sige-Yuki. (1965) Generative Grammatical Studies in the Japanese Language. Ph.D. 
dissertation, MIT. 
 
Kuroda, S.-Y. (1973) “Where epistemology, style, and grammar meet: a case study from 
Japanese.” In Stephen R. Anderson and Paul Kiparsky, eds., A Festschrift for Morris 
Halle, 377-391. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
 
Kusumoto, Kiyomi. (1999) Tense in Embedded Contexts. Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst. 
 
Kusumoto, Kiyomi. (2005) “On the quantification over times in natural language.” Natural 
Language Semantics 13: 317-357. 
 
Landau, Idan. (2010) The Locative Syntax of Experiencers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Lasersohn, Peter. (2005) “Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste.” 
Linguistics and Philosophy 28: 643-686. 
 
Lewis, David. (1979) “Attitudes de dicto and de se.” The Philosophical Review 88: 513-543. 
 
Lewis, David. (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Magri, Giorgio. (2009) “A theory of individual-level predicates based on blind mandatory scalar 
implicatures.” Natural Language Semantics 17: 245-297. 
 
Maier, Emar. (2009) “Japanese reported speech: Against a direct-indirect distinction.” In 
Hiromitsu Hattori, Takahiro Kawamura, Tsuyoshi Idé, Makoto Yokoo, and Yohei 
Murakami, eds., New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI 2008 Conference and 
Workshops, Asahikawa, Japan, June 11-13, 2008, Revised Selected Papers (Lecture 
Notes in Artificial Intelligence 5447), 133-145. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Mann, William C. and Sandra A. Thompson. (1988) “Rhetorical Structure Theory: Toward a 
functional theory of text organization.” Text 8: 243-281. 
 
Martin, Samuel Elmo. (1988) A Reference Grammar of Japanese. Revised Edition. Rutland, VT: 
Charles E. Tuttle Company. Republished by the University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, 
2003. 
 
239 
Masuoka, Takashi. (1997) “Hyôgen-no syukansei [Subjectivity of expressions].” In Takubo 
Yukinori, ed., Shiten-to Gengokôdô [Perspectives and Verbal Behaviors], 1-11. Tokyo: 
Kurosio Syuppan. 
 
McCloskey, James and Peter Sells. (1988) “Control and A-chains in Modern Irish.” Natural 
Language and Linguistic Theory 6: 143-189. 
 
McCready, Eric and Norry Ogata. (2007) “Evidentiality, modality and probability.” Linguistics 
and Philosophy 30: 35-63. 
 
McKenzie, Andrew Robert. (2012) The Role of Contextual Restriction in Reference-Tracking. 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
 
Minami, Fujio. (1967) “Bun-no imi-nituite ni san-no oboegaki [Some notes on meaning of 
sentences]” Kokugo Kenkyû 24: 28-46. 
 
Minami, Fujio. (1974) Gendai Nihongo no Kôzô [The Structure of Modern Japanese]. Tokyo: 
Taishukan Shoten. 
 
Minami, Fujio. (1993) Gendai Nihongo Bunpô no Rinkaku [An Outline of the Modern Japanese 
Grammar]. Tokyo: Taishukan Shoten.  
 
Miyagawa, Shigeru. (2012) “Agreements that occur mainly in the main clause.” In Lobke 
Aelbrecht, Liliane Haegeman, and Rachel Nye, eds., Main Clause Phenomena: New 
Horizons, 79-111. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
 
Miyake, Tomohiro. (1995) “Nihongo-no hukugômeisiku-no kôzô: seigenteki/hiseigenteki-
rentaisyûsyokusetu-o megutte [The structure of complex noun phrases in Japanese].” 
Studies in the Modern Japanese Language 2: 49-66. Osaka: Osaka University. 
 
Miyake, Tomohiro. (1996) “Nihongo-no shudaisosei-no shōgou-to kukōzō [Checking of the topic 
feature and phrase structures in Japanese].” Gendai nihongo kenkyu [Studies in the 
modern Japanese language] 3: 17-34. Osaka University. 
 
Mohanan, K. P. and Tara Mohanan. (1990) “Dative subjects in Malayalam: Semantic information 
in syntax.” In M. K. Verma and K. P. Mohanan, eds., Experiencer Subjects in South 
Asian Languages, 43-57. Stanford, CA: CSLI. 
 
Moltmann, Friederike. (2010) “Relative truth and the first person.” Philosophical Studies 150: 
187-220. 
 
Motomura, Mitsue. (2003) “The thematic roles of sentential to/ko complements in 
Japanese/Korean.” In Patricia M. Clancy, ed., Japanese/Korean Linguistics 11, 439-453. 
Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. 
 
Nakau, Minoru. (1979) “Modaritii to meidai [Modality and propositions].” In Hayashi Eiichi 
Kyoju Kanreki Kinen Ronbunshu Kankou Iinkai, eds., Eigo to Nihongo to [English and 
Japanese], 223-250. Tokyo: Kurosio Syuppan. 
 
240 
Newen, Albert. (1997) “The logic of indexical thoughts and the metaphysics of the ‘self’.” In 
Wolfgang Künne, Albert Newen, and Martin Anduschus, eds., Direct Reference, 
Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes, 105-131. Stanford, CA: CSLI. 
 
Nihon Daijiten Kankōkai, ed. (1976) Nihon kokugo daijiten (Shogakkan’s Japanese Dictionary), 
vol. 7. Tokyo: Shogakkan. 
 
Ninan, Dilip. (2008) Imagination, Content, and the Self. Ph.D. dissertation, MIT. 
 
Nishio, Toraya. (1972) A Descriptive Study of the Meaning and Uses of Japanese Adjectives [in 
Japanese]. The National Language Research Institute Research Report XXXXIV. Tokyo: 
Syuei Syuppan. 
 
Nishiyama, Kunio. (1999) “Adjectives and the copulas in Japanese.” Journal of East Asian 
Linguistics 8: 183-222. 
 
Nitta, Yoshio. (1991) Nihongo no Modariti to ninshō [Modalities and Persons in Japanese] 
Tokyo: Hituzi Shobo. 
 
Ohta, Kaoru. (1997) “Tense in the subject raising constructions.” In Ho-min Sohn and John Haig, 
eds., Japanese/Korean Linguistics 6, 353–368. Stanford, CA: CSLI. 
 
Oshima, David Yoshikazu. (2006) Perspectives in Reported Discourse. Ph.D. dissertation, 
Stanford University. 
 
Pancheva, Roumyana. (2003) “The aspectual makeup of Perfect participles and the interpretations 
of the Perfect.” In Artemis Alexiadou, Monika Rathert, and Arnim von Stechow, eds., 
Perfect Explorations, 277-306. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
 
Pandharipande, Rajeshwari. (1990) “Experiencer (dative) NPs in Marathi.” In M. K. Verma and 
K. P. Mohanan, eds., Experiencer Subjects in South Asian Languages, 161-179. Stanford, 
CA: CSLI. 
 
Partee, Barbara Hall. (1973) “Some structural analogies between tenses and pronouns in English.” 
The Journal of Philosophy 70: 601-609. 
 
Partee, Barbara H. (1984) “Nominal and temporal anaphora.” Linguistics and Philosophy 7: 243-
286. 
 
Partee, Barbara H., Alice ter Meulen, and Robert E. Wall. (1993) Mathematical Methods in 
Linguistics, Corrected First Edition. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. 
 
Paul, Matthias. (1994) “Young Mozart and the Joking Woody Allen: Proper names, individuals 
and parts.” In Mandy Harvey and Lynn Santelmann, eds., Proceeding of SALT 4, 268-281. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. 
 
Pearson, Hazel. (2013a) “A judge-free semantics for predicates of personal taste.” Journal of 
Semantics 30: 103-154. 
 
241 
Pearson, Hazel. (2013b) The Sense of Self: Topics in the Semantics of De Se Expressions. Ms. 
February 2013. A lightly revised version of her Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 
September 2012. 
 
Perry, John. (1979) “The problem of the essential indexical.” Noûs 13: 3-21. 
 
Pesetsky, David. (1995) Zero Syntax: Experiencers and Cascades. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Pietroski, Paul M. (2000) “On explaining that.” The Journal of Philosophy 97: 655-662. 
 
Postal, Paul M. (1974) On Raising. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Potts, Christopher. (2005) The Logic of Conventional Implicatures. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Preminger, Omar. (2010) “Failure to Agree is Not a Failure: phi-Agreement with Post-Verbal 
Subjects in Hebrew.” In Jeroen Van Craenenbroeck and Johan Rooryck, eds., Linguistic 
Variation Yearbook 9, 241–278. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
 
Rizzi, Luigi. (1997) “The fine structure of the left-periphery.” In Liliane Haegeman, ed., 
Elements of Grammar: A Handbook of Generative Syntax, 281-337. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
Rizzi, Luigi. (1999) “On the position “Int(errogative)” in the left periphery of the clause.” Ms., 
Università di Siena. 
 
Ross, John Robert. (1970) “On declarative sentences.” In Roderick A. Jacobs and Peter S. 
Rosenbaum, eds., Readings in English Transformational Grammar, 222-272. Waltham, 
MA: Ginn and Company. 
 
Ryan, Marie-Laure. (1981) “The pragmatics of personal and impersonal fiction.” Poetics 10: 517-
539. 
 
Sæbø, Kjell Johan. (2011) “Appositives in modal contexts.” In Ingo Reich, et al., eds., 
Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15, 79-100. Saarbrücken: Universaar-Saarland 
University Press. 
 
Saito, Mamoru. (1985) Some Asymmetries in Japanese and Their Theoretical Implications. Ph.D. 
dissertation, MIT. 
 
Saito, Mamoru. (2010) “On the nature of the complementizer to.” Journal of Japanese Linguistics 
26: 85-100. 
 
Saito, Mamoru and Tomoko Haraguchi. (2012) “Deriving the cartography of the Japanese right 
periphery: The case of sentence-final discourse particles.” Iberia 4: 104-123. 
 
Sakai, Hiromu. (1996) “Clause reduction in Japanese.” In Masatoshi Koizumi, Masayuki Oishi, 
and Uli Sauerland, eds., Formal Approaches to Japanese Linguistics 2, 193–212. MIT 
Working Papers in Linguistics 29. 
 
242 
Sakai, Hiromu. (1998) “Raising asymmetry and improper movement.” In Noriko Akatsuka, 
Hajime Hoji, Shoichi Iwasaki, Sung-Ock Sohn, and Susan Strauss, eds., 
Japanese/Korean Linguistics 7, 481–497. Stanford, CA: CSLI. 
 
Sato, Hiromi. (2011) “The speaker, the subject and different types of embedded clauses in 
Japanese.” The Human Studies 174: 115-155. Kanagawa University. URL: 
http://human.kanagawa-u.ac.jp/gakkai/publ/pdf/no174/17408.pdf  
 
Sato, Hiromi. (2012) “On Some Differences between Restrictive and Nonrestrictive Relative 
Clauses and the Parallelism between Head-Internal and Head-External Relative Clauses 
in Japanese.” Kanagawa University Studies in Language 34: 1-33. URL: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10487/10251 
 
Schlenker, Philippe. (1999) Propositional Attitudes and Indexicality: A Cross-Categorial 
Approach. Ph.D. dissertation, MIT. 
 
Schlenker, Philippe. (2003) “A plea for monsters.” Linguistics and Philosophy 26: 29-120. 
 
Schlenker, Philippe. (2010) “Supplements within a unidimensional semantics I: Scope.” In Maria 
Aloni, Harald Bastiaanse, Tikitu de Jager, and Katrin Schulz, eds., Logic, Language and 
Meaning: 17th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 16-18, 
2009, Revised Selected Papers (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 6042), 74-83. 
Berlin: Springer. 
 
Schlenker, Philippe. (2013a) “Supplements within a unidimensional semantics II: Epistemic 
status and projection.” In Seda Kan, Claire Moore-Cantwell, and Robert Staubs, eds., 
NELS 40: Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Meeting of the North East Linguistic 
Society, Volume Two, 167-181. Amherst, MA: GLSA. 
 
Schlenker, Philippe. (2013b) “Supplements without bidimensionalism.” Ms., Expanded version, 
February 12, 2013. Institut Jean-Nicod, CNRS; New York University. 
 
Schwarz, Florian. (2012) “Situation pronouns in determiner phrases.” Natural Language 
Semantics 20: 431-475. 
 
Searle, J. R. (1969) Speech Acts. London: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sells, Peter. (1987) “Aspects of logophoricity.” Linguistic Inquiry 18: 445-479. 
 
Shibatani, Masayoshi. (1978) Nihongo no Bunseki [Analysis of Japanese]. Tokyo: Taishukan. 
 
Singh, Raj. (2008) “Contradiction and oddness: A note on Yalcin’s theory of epistemic modals.” 
Ms., MIT. URL: http://web.mit.edu/singhr/www/singh-contradiction-oddness.pdf 
 
Smith, Carlota S. (1997) The Parameter of Aspect (Second Edition). Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic. 
 
Smythies, John. (2003) “Space, time and consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 10: 
47-56. 
 
243 
Sode, Rumiko. (2002) “Japanese adjectives in small clause complements.” Journal of Japanese 
Linguistics 18: 51-82. 
 
Speas, Margaret. (1990) “Comments on the papers by James W. Gair, Yamuna Kachru, and K. 
P. Mohanan and Tara Mohanan.” In M. K. Verma and K. P. Mohanan, eds., Experiencer 
Subjects in South Asian Languages, 77-83. Stanford, CA: CSLI. 
 
Speas, Margaret. (2004) “Evidentiality, logophoricity and the syntactic representation of 
pragmatic features.” Lingua 114: 255-276. 
 
Speas, Peggy and Carol Tenny. (2003) “Configurational properties of point of view roles.” In 
Anna Maria Di Sciullo, ed., Asymmetry in Grammar: Volume 1: Syntax and Semantics, 
315-344. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
 
Spenader, Jennifer and Emar Maier. (2009) “Contrast as denial in multi-dimensional semantics.” 
Journal of Pragmatics 41: 1707-1726. 
 
von Stechow, Arnim. (1982) “Structured propositions.” Arbeitspapier 59 des SFB 99, Universität 
Konstanz. 
 
von Stechow, Arnim. (2002) “German seit ‘since’ and the ambiguity of the German perfect.” In 
Barbara Stiebels and Ingrid Kaufmann, eds., More than Words: A Festschrift for Dieter 
Wunderlich, 393-432. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 
 
Stephenson, Tamina. (2006) “A parallel account of epistemic modals and predicates of personal 
taste.” In E. Puig-Waldmüller, ed., Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 11, 583-597. 
Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra. 
 
Stephenson, Tamina. (2007a) “Judge dependence, epistemic modals, and predicates of personal 
taste.” Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 487-525. 
 
Stephenson, Tamina C. (2007b) Towards a Theory of Subjective Meaning. Ph.D. dissertation, 
MIT. 
 
Stephenson, Tamina. (2010) “Vivid attitudes: Centered situations in the semantics of remember 
and imagine.” In Nan Li and David Lutz, eds., Proceedings of SALT 20, 147-160. Ithaca, 
NY: CLC Publications. 
 
Stowell, Tim. (2012) “Syntax.” In Robert I. Binnick, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Tense and 
Aspect, 184-211. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Strawson, P. F. (1950) “On referring.” Mind 59: 320-344. 
 
Sun, Jackson T.-S. (1993) “Evidentials in Amdo Tibetan.” The Bulletin of the Institute of History 
and Philology 63: 945-1001. Taipei. 
 
Takezawa, Koichi. (1987) A Configurational Approach to Japanese Case-Marking. Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Washington, Seattle. 
 
Tanaka, Hidekazu. (1992) “Raising-to-object in English, French, and Japanese.” English 
Linguistics 9: 39-60. 
244 
 
Tanaka, Hidekazu. (2002) “Raising to object out of CP.” Linguistic Inquiry 33: 637-652. 
 
Tanaka, Hidekazu. (2006) “Categorial status of raising complements in Japanese: A reply to 
Kawai (2006).” Ms., University of York. 
 
Tenny, Carol L. (2006) “Evidentiality, experiencers, and the syntax of sentience in Japanese.” 
Journal of East Asian Linguistics 15: 245-288. 
 
Teramura, Hideo. (1971) “‘Ta’ no imi to kinō [Meaning and function of ‘ta’.” In Iwakura 
Tomozane Kyōju Taishoku Kinen Ronbunshū Shuppan Kōenkai, eds., Gengogaku to 
Nihongo mondai [Linguistics and Problems in Japanese], 244-289. Tokyo: Kurosio 
Syuppan. 
 
Teramura, Hideo. (1973) “Kanjōhyōgen no sintakusu [Syntax of expressions of feeling]” Gengo 
2(2): 98-106. Reprinted in Hideo Teramura, (1973) Collected Papers of Teramura Hideo, 
Volume II: Linguistics and Japanese Education, 3-16. Tokyo: Kurosio Syuppan. 
 
Uchibori, Asako. (1996) “Opacity and subjunctive complements in Japanese.” In Ho-min Sohn 
and John Haig, eds., Japanese/Korean Linguistics Volume 6, 399-414. Stanford, CA: 
CSLI. 
 
Uchibori, Asako. (2000) The Syntax of Subjunctive Complements. Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Connecticut. 
 
Ueda, M. (1988) “Exceptional Case-marking in Japanese.” Sophia Linguistica 22/23: 39-46. 
 
Ueda, Yukiko. (2007) “Nihongo no modality no toogokoozoo to ninsyoo seigen” In Nobuko 
Hasegawa, ed., Nihongo no Syubun Gensyoo: Toogokoozoo to Modality (Main Clause 
Phenomena in Japanese: Syntactic Structures and Modality), 261-294. Tokyo: Hituzi 
Syobo. 
 
Umbach, Carla. (2004) “On the notion of contrast in information structure and discourse 
structure.” Journal of Semantics 21: 155-175. 
 
Ura, Hiroyuki. (1996) Multiple Feature-Checking: A Theory of Grammatical Function Splitting. 
Ph.D. dissertation, MIT. 
 
Ura, Hiroyuki. (1999) “Checking theory and dative subject constructions in Japanese and Korean.” 
Journal of East Asian Linguistics 8: 223-254. 
 
Varchetta, Nicola. (2010) “Psych-verbs: A locative derivation.” University of Venice Working 
Papers in Linguistics 20: 113-155. 
 
Varchetta, Nicola. (2012) Rethinking Italian Psychological Verbs. Ph.D. dissertation, Università 
Ca’ Foscari Venezia. URL: http://dspace.unive.it/handle/10579/1250 
 
Watanabe, Akira. (1996) “Nominative-genitive conversion and agreement in Japanese: A cross-
linguistic perspective.” Journal of East Asian Linguistics 5: 373–410. 
 
245 
Willett, Thomas. (1988) “A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticization of evidentiality.” 
Studies in Language 12: 51-97.  
 
Yamanaka, Joota, (1976) Kokugo gogen jiten [A Dictionary of Japanese Etymology]. Tokyo: 
Azekura shoboo. 
 
